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Preliminaries 
This is a double-numbered course. Some of you will be taking it as a graduate course in 
medieval philosophy, and others will be taking it as a senior-level undergraduate course 
“Special Topics in History of Philosophy.” 
Topic: Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109). 
Some of you perhaps already know something about Anselm of Canterbury. He was the 
author of the famous “ontological argument” for the existence of God, and we will 
certainly be talking at length about that. A few of you may know a little more about 
Anselm from other courses in various departments. 
But I can pretty well guarantee there are lots of things in Anselm that you don’t know 
about, and that are worth your time. For example, he not only has views on what we 
might call “philosophical theology” or “philosophy of religion,” as you might expect, but 
also interesting and novel views on free choice, the nature of truth, ethics, the nature of 
justice, logic, philosophy of language, modality, plus several topics you might normally 
think of as belonging more to theology than to philosophy: the Trinity, the Incarnation, 
human Redemption. 
We will talk about all of it, including the theological material—because, as we will see, 
the philosophy and the theology are not really separable in Anselm. 
Pass out Syllabus. 
Textbooks: There are only two actual “textbooks” I am asking you to buy, but there will 
be additional reading, as we’ll see. 
 Thomas Williams, ed. and trans., Anselm: Basic Writings (Hackett). A volume of 
translations. Despite the title, this volume contains not just the basic works, but—
with two exceptions—all the works except for the letters (although it has one of 
those too) and a few prayers and “meditations.” The two exceptions are (1) an odd 
little dialogue called De grammatico (= On the Grammarian, or even On the 
Literate Person). We will have occasion to talk about that work later in the 
course. And (2) a theological work called On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, 
which we’ll likewise talk about briefly. 
Several years ago I taught an earlier version of this course, and the Williams 
volume was not yet available. At that time I used a volume by Brian Davies and 
G. R. Evans, entitled Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford). I didn’t 
like that work, because the translations were very uneven and came from a variety 
of different translators with completely different translation-conventions—and in 
some cases I thought the translations were basically useless. The Williams 
translations are far superior. Still, the Davies and Evans volume does have 
translation of the two works missing from the Williams volume. 
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 Brian Davies and Brian Leftow, The Cambridge Companion of Anselm 
(Cambridge). A collection of articles covering basically all aspects of Anselm. 
They are of varying quality, but by and large pretty good. On the whole, the 
volume is excellent. We will be reading basically all of it by the end of the 
semester. 
Let me say a word about why Anselm. That is, why do a course devoted to one 
individual, and why pick Anselm in particular? 
Because he’s the perfect medieval author for non-specialists in medieval philosophy to 
focus on. 
In early authors, such as Augustine, students frequently ask: Where is the philosophy?  
The style of writing is so unlike present-day philosophical writing that students are often 
just baffled. For example, Augustine’s Confessions. The work is a classic of the first 
order, to be sure, but it makes for difficult reading. It’s often difficult to find any actual 
arguments in Augustine; instead, we are presented with a kind of vision of the way things 
are, together with an exhortation to adopt the same point of view. 
On the other hand, with later authors such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, or William 
of  Ockham), there’s so much jargon and technical vocabulary that students frequently 
have no idea what’s going on. It’s just too intimidating. 
But Anselm is just right. He provides real arguments, often very clever and interesting 
ones. And yet philosophy has not yet got so academic as to be inaccessible to all but 
specialists. 
Furthermore, there has been in recent years a kind of cottage industry in studying 
Anselm. People always talked about his “ontological argument,” but more and more 
people are focusing on other things. (For instance, Marilyn Adams.) 
Mechanics of the Course 
Take a look at the Syllabus. Note first of all the Oncourse site. When you first go to 
Oncourse, you will see two tabs across the top—among others. One will say either FA10 
BL PHIL P401 20448 (if you’re taking this course under the undergraduate number), or 
else FA10 BL PHIL P515 22178 (if you’re taking it under the graduate number). The 
other tab will say FA10 BL PHIL P401 C16120. You want the latter tab. (You will be 
forwarded if you go to one of the others.) 
As for the sequence of topics we will be discussing, see p. 3 of the Syllabus. I’m not 
really sure how long various topics will take. But that, at least, will give you the 
sequence. 
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Requirements 
 Weekly 15-point quizzes on Oncourse, beginning next week, September 8. (Wed. 
3:45 p.m. to Sunday midnight.) For terminology, names, factual things. 
 Term-paper. 
 A series of research reports on various items in the secondary literature. What is a 
research report? Not a term paper (that’s a more extended affair), and not just a 
book report or “article report” on the secondary literature. 
That is, I don’t just want you to tell me what a particular item in the secondary literature 
says. I want you to engage it: is it a plausible reading on Anselm, is it theoretically 
plausible in its own right, and so on? 
One of the things I want you to do in this course is learn how to deal with the scholarly 
literature on a historical figure such as Anselm. Unlike what you will find if you are used 
to dealing with philosophy topically rather than historically. Also unlike what you will 
find in the secondary literature for a lot of more familiar figures in the history of 
philosophy: e.g., Descartes or Hume. 
For example, a lot of the literature on Anselm is not written by philosophically trained 
scholars at all, but by people approaching Anselm from the perspective of intellectual 
history more generally, or theology, or Church history, or whatever. And a lot of the 
literature on Anselm is written by people who don’t have a very good knowledge of 
Anselm at all, but just want to talk about “the issues.” (This is especially true for the 
“ontological argument.”) 
This is the sort of thing you have to learn to deal with if you are a historian of philosophy, 
particularly (although not exclusively) in the medieval period. And that is what I want 
you to get used to in writing these research reports. 
The research reports are meant to short—no more than five pages (double-spaced). That’s 
part of the assignment. 
Undergraduates taking this course as P401 will write two such reports; graduate students 
taking the course as P515 will write four of them. The due dates are listed on pp. 5–6 of 
the Syllabus. 
Your term paper will be a more extended project. There I don’t want you just to respond 
critically to the secondary literature by other people (although I do hope you’ll use it), but 
also to formulate your own views on some topic relevant to Anselm. 
I will not be giving regular examinations in this class. Your research reports take the 
place of examinations. 
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Submitting written work 
With the exception of the weekly online quizzes, which will be done on the “Original 
Test and Survey” utility on Oncourse, all written work for this course will be submitted 
through the “Assignments” utility on Oncourse. 
All such work will be routinely submitted to Turnitin.com. 
Reserves 
For use in your papers and research reports, I have put a number of items on E-Reserve. 
Distribute handout on “Bibliography and E-Reserves.” You can get to our E-Reserves 
page directly from our Oncourse site. (Look in the menu-bar on the left of your screen.)  
There is much else available on Anselm, so don’t feel you have to confine your reading 
about Anselm to these things. Nevertheless, if you want to write a research report on 
something that isn’t on reserve, check with me first. 
If you need to check something in Latin, let me know. I have Anselm’s Opera omnia in 
digital form. 
Reading 
As described in the Syllabus, there is a general reading assignment you should get started 
on right away: read all of the Williams Basic Writings volume, cover to cover. Do this 
quickly and superficially to begin with—just plough ahead. You won’t know what the 
issues are at first, but just do it anyway. We will be jumping around to some extent in our 
discussion, so I want you to have at least a basic idea of what he’s talking about in the 
various works as quickly as possible. 
Apart from that general assignment, read the first two chapters in The Cambridge 
Companion: G. R. Evans’s article, “Anselm’s Life, Works, and Immediate Influence,” 
and Marilyn McCord Adams’s, “Anselm on Faith and Reason.” 
Anselm’s Life 
Anselm lived 1033–1109. He died at the age of 76. 
We are in a comparatively good situation with respect to knowing about Anselm’s life. 
With most medieval authors, we don’t know much about the details of their lives, 
particularly their early lives (because, while they may have been well known when they 
died, they weren’t well known when they were young). But with Anselm, we are 
fortunate. 
Anselm had a biographer in his own day, a certain Eadmer. Eadmer was roughly 25–30 
years younger than Anselm, and was a monk in the monastic community associated with 
Canterbury Cathedral in England. 
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Eadmer met Anselm in 1079, while Anselm was visiting Canterbury. Later on, Anselm 
became Archbishop of Canterbury, and Eadmer renewed their acquaintance and started 
writing Anselm’s biography, based on long conversations with him. Anselm apparently 
was very fond of talk and reminiscences. 
Nevertheless, the biography was more or less “unofficial.” It was not done with Anselm’s 
knowledge or permission. In fact, when Anselm learned about the biography-in-progress, 
he—as Archbishop of Canterbury—ordered Eadmer to destroy the manuscript. 
Eadmer was in a quandary. He did want to put down in writing the story of this 
wonderful man, and yet as a monk he owed Anselm his obedience. Eventually, he came 
up with a nice solution. He destroyed the manuscript—but not before making a copy of 
it! 
The biography, called The Life of Anselm (Vita Anselmi) has been translated by R. W. 
Southern, on facing pages with a critical Latin edition of the text. I’ve given you a 
reference to it in the handout of Bibliography and E-Reserves. 
It’s not quite a biography in the modern sense, but it’s also not mere “hagiography.” 
Eadmer also wrote a more general history, A History of Recent Events, in which again 
tells the story of Anselm’s life. 
Almost everything we know about Anselm’s life comes either from Eadmer or from 
occasional things Anselm himself says—for example, in his Letters. 
No doubt the best modern biography of Anselm, and in fact a magisterial study of the 
man, is by R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (see the handout of 
bilbiography). There have been complaints about various aspects of Southern’s 
biography, but pretty much everyone agrees that it’s place you have to start. 
Anselm was born in the little town of Aosta, in extreme northwestern Italy, in the Alps. 
It’s near the Mont Blanc tunnel through the Alps. 
Distribute handout on “Places.” 
The word ‘Aosta’ is a corruption of ‘Augustus’. The town was originally named 
“Augusta Praetoria,” after the Roman Emperor Augustus, who founded it in 25 BCE on 
the site of an earlier tribal settlement. Today it has a population of about 35,000, and was 
no doubt much smaller in Anselm’s day. 
Although it was not very big, it was an important town because of its location—which 
perhaps explains why Augustus founded it in the first place. It lies on one of the major 
mountain passes across the Alps, and was therefore a constant way-station for merchants, 
pilgrims, and other travelers. 
Although nowadays Aosta is part of Italy, in Anselm’s day it looked more north into 
France than south back into Italy. It was in fact not part of Lombardy at all, which we 
would think of as Italy, but rather the extreme south end of the kingdom of Burgandy, 
one of the successor-states that developed after the break-up of the Carolingian Empire in 
what is now France and Germany. 
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Anselm’s mother was a native of Aosta, named Ermenberga. His father was a Lombard, 
named Gundulf or Gandulf. (These are not Latin names, but some Germanic language.) 
They had one other child besides Anselm, a daughter named Richeza (which is probably 
a version of the modern Italian richizza = “wealth”). Apparently the family had some 
blood-links to nobility and power, but by Anselm’s day the line had fallen on hard times 
and was in decline. Still, they did own some land. 
Anselm was a bright and studious child, apparently quite devout. (G. R. Evans’s chapter 
in the Companion describes a charmingly pious dream he reported that he had as a 
youngster and that shaped his personality ever after.) 
There is some evidence that his parents had designs for Anselm to become a monk in the 
local abbey, or perhaps eventually bishop of the cathedral church in Aosta. (The latter, at 
any rate, would have been a bit of a “power play,” not just a matter religious sensibility.) 
But his mother died c. 1050, when Anselm was c. 17. This event apparently rather 
disoriented Anselm. He became a rather “wild” young man, there was friction with his 
father, and eventually Anselm left home in 1056 (age c. 23). He crossed the Alps and 
spent the next three years traveling around Burgundy and eventually West over into 
Normandy. During this period, he was probably going from “master” to “master,” 
furthering his education in a kind of “mix and match” fashion. 
Eventually, in 1059, he ends up at the abbey of Bec in Normandy. (Nowadays Le Bec–
Hellouin. (See the handout on “Places.”) 
What is an abbey? It is a monastery—i.e., a community of men dedicated to a religious 
form of life, governed by a rule, and presided over by an abbot (hence the name). The 
term ‘abbot’ comes from Syriac, and means “father.” (It’s related to Arabic “Abu,” as in 
Abu Dhabi, Abu Nidal, Abu Ghraib.) 
In the case of Bec, the abbot and founder of the community was a certain Herluin, who 
was a Benedictine monk. (Hence the modern name of the town: Le Bec–Hellouin.) It was 
founded in 1034. Herluin’s second-in-command, the Prior at the monastery, was a certain 
Lanfranc (c. 1005-89), who was to become an important person in Anselm’s life. (Note: 
A “prior” just means someone higher in rank—a “superior.” It’s usually lower than a 
abbot, and that was certainly the case at the Abbey of Bec.) 
In addition to his other duties, Lanfranc as Prior taught at the abbey school. Many 
monasteries had schools. For example, you had to teach the monks to read, in order to be 
able to read the Scripture and chant the prayers. But Lanfranc’s school was apparently 
unusual. First of all, he seems to have been teaching students who had absolutely no 
intention of becoming monks, but who just needed an education in order to get on in life. 
Going along with this, he was teaching his students not just the Bible, not just basic 
theology and canon law, but things like logic and rhetoric. 
In fact, it is only under these circumstances that Anselm could have fit in there. For, at 
least at first, Anselm had absolutely no intention of becoming a monk at Bec. He was just 
looking to get a good training. 
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Soon, however, (in 1060) Anselm did decide to become a monk—and at Bec, too. 
Among other consequences, this meant giving up any claim to the family estate back in 
Aosta; his father had in the meantime died. 
In 1063 (when Anselm was 30), Lanfranc had left Bec to become Prior at the monastery 
in Caen, nearby. (Again, see the handout on Places.) Anselm was chosen to succeed him 
as Prior. Eventually, Herluin died, and in September 1078, at age 45, Anselm was elected 
the second abbot at Bec. (Note: Lanfranc was never abbot at Bec.) 
Neither position—Prior or Abbot—was a natural fit for Anselm. He certainly had the 
intellectual capabilities—no doubt superior to Lanfranc’s in the end. But he was not a 
particularly good administrator. He didn’t like it, and he hated the time-consuming duties 
and obligations. He much preferred study and contemplation. 
This would be a theme that would mark Anselm’s career from now on. He was never a 
gifted bureaucrat. He tried hard enough, and he managed to muddle through his 
administrative duties, which only grew, but he was never good at them and never liked 
them. 
Now, you’ll remember what happened in 1066: the Norman Conquest of England. In 
1070, Lanfranc leaves Caen to become Archbishop of Canterbury. About the same time, 
Anselm began to write, starting with various Prayers and Meditations. Actually, he wrote 
the De grammatico somewhat earlier, around 1060–63, but he started to write more 
frequently around 1070. These Prayers and Meditations are of no particular theoretical 
interest for us, although they are interesting in their own right. They show a remarkable 
degree of rhetorical skill. There’s lots of alliteration, rhetorical balances, and other 
devices you might not be aware of in translation. 
Then in 1075–76, while he was Prior at Bec, Anselm wrote the first of his main 
theoretical treatises, the Monologion. (It means “monologue.” The title is also sometimes 
given in the form Monologium.) He was 42 years old at the time. 
A number of other works followed, which we will look at as we proceed. He visited 
Canterbury in 1079, and met his figure biographer Eadmer. 
Lanfranc died in 1089, and eventually in 1093 (four years later!) Anselm became his 
successor. He didn’t want the position, and did everything he could to avoid getting 
saddled with it. But eventually, there it was: he was Archbishop of Canterbury. There 
followed a number of political controversies with the king of England over things like 
who had control over appointing bishops, and where did the Pope fit in, and Anselm 
spent two extended periods in a kind of exile on the Continent away from his job at 
Canterbury. 
Eventually he returned and died in 1109, and our story is over. 
There is a detailed “Chronology” of Anselm’s life in Southern’s biography, much more 
detailed than the chronology in Cambridge Companion. Nevertheless, while it’s useful to 
have this chronology, it’s not as if the exact chronology of his works is particularly 
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important. For Anselm’s writings show a remarkable unity. That is, there is no real 
difference in content between his early and his late writings. 
Background 
Now let me set up some background about medieval philosophy generally. 
I like to set up medieval philosophy as the product of two components: (a) The classical 
philosophical heritage from Greece (Rome is not important separately in this instsance), 
and (b) Christianity. I don’t say “Christian doctrine,” because the doctrinal formulation of 
Christianity was in large measure a result of thinking philosophically about Christian 
concerns—sin, original sin in particular, grace, redemption, the special status of Jesus, 
Scriptural passages about the “Son of God” and the “Spirit,” etc. 
To say Christianity is not to ignore Judaism and Islam, but it is true that Christianity is 
what gives medieval philosophy its special flavor—particularly if we’re talking (as in this 
course) about Anselm. 
Still, it is important to understand that, despite this two-ingredient formula, for the first 
part of the Middle Ages (including the time of Anselm), the Greek sources of philosophy 
were largely lost. They were in the wrong language. 
 Consider Plato: Of all the works of Plato, only the first half of the Timaeus 
(hardly a representative Platonic work), up to 53c, was available to the “Latin 
West” in a translation by Chalcidius (or Calcidius), from somewhere between the 
first half of the 4th century and the early-5th century, together with Chaclidius’s  
commentary. There had been a few other Latin translations made earlier, but most 
of these vanished from circulation before the Middle Ages got very far along. 
Cicero himself had translated the Protagoras and a small part of the Timaeus, and 
the second century Apuleius did the Phaedo, but these almost completely 
disappeared after the sixth century and had very little effect on anyone. 
This state of affairs lasted until the Renaissance, when Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) 
translated and commented on the complete works of Plato. Remember, except for 
the first half of the Timaeus, the Middle Ages did not know the actual texts of 
Plato. 
 
As it turns out, there was a copy of Chalcidius’s translation of and commentary on 
the Timaeus in the library at Bec in the 12th century. And—peculiarly—there was 
even a copy of Cicero’s fragmentary translation of the Timaeus there. But it’s 
unclear whether they were there as early as Anselm, who had left Bec for 
Canterbury by 1092. And in any case, there is no evidence that Anselm was in 
any way influenced by having read the Timaeus, if he in fact did. 
 As for Plotinus, matters were even worse. His Enneads (the collection of his 
writings) were almost completely lost. Marius Victorinus, who was a Roman, 
slightly older than Augustine (Augustine: 354–430), is said to have translated 
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some of the Enneads into Latin in the fourth century, but his translation, if in fact 
it really existed, seems to have been lost soon afterwards. 
 For Aristotle, the Middle Ages were in somewhat better shape. The same Marius 
Victorinus translated the Categories and On Interpretation, but these translations 
were pretty much lost quickly. And a little later, the logical works in general, 
except perhaps for the Posterior Analytics, were translated by Boethius c. 510–12, 
but only his translations of the Categories and On Interpretation ever got into 
general circulation before the twelfth century. (And they were fairly well known 
from that point on.) The rest of Aristotle eventually got translated into Latin, but 
only much later—from about the middle of the twelfth century, well after the time 
of Anselm. First there came the rest of the logical works, and then the Physics, the 
Metaphysics, and so on. Almost all the works of Aristotle we have today had been 
translated by the middle of the thirteenth century. 
This “recovery” of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was a 
momentous event in the history of mediaeval philosophy. It led to the “technical” 
kind of late-medieval thought we associate with people like Aquinas and Duns 
Scotus. But it is after the time of Anselm. 
It’s important to emphasize this lack of source-documents of Western philosophy in the 
early Middle Ages. All they had was the first part of Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle’s 
Categories and On Interpretation, and an odd work by the neo-Platonist Porphyry called 
Isagoge (= “Introduction”), which is intended as a kind of introduction to Aristotle’s 
Categories. 
But, while it’s important to realize this lack of primary sources, it also should not be 
over-emphasized. A fair amount of information about ancient pagan philosophy was 
nevertheless available to the early Middle Ages secondhand. It came, for instance, from: 
 Some of the Latin Church Fathers, like Tertullian (3rd century), who wrote before 
knowledge of Greek died out in the West, and who discussed Greek philosophy in 
some detail. For that matter, Boethius (c. 480–524/26), whom I’ve already 
mentioned as translating Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation, also wrote 
commentaries on them and independent treatises obviously indebted to ancient 
pagan philosophy, particularly ancient logic. 
 Some of the Latin pagan authors, such as Cicero and Seneca, contain a great deal 
of information about Greek philosophy, much of it pretty reliable too. 
But, even from this limited available knowledge of ancient pagan philosophy, how much 
was available to Anselm while he was being trained at Bec? 
In this connection, it is important to remember that Lanfranc, who was no doubt 
Anselm’s main teacher and mentor, was not just teaching Scripture studies, but grammar, 
rhetoric and logic. This means that the library at Bec must have included manuscript 
copies of at least some of Boethius’s translations and writings on logic, and at least some 
pagan models for rhetoric. Anselm himself cites Aristotle’s Categories no fewer than 
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seven times in the De grammatico, and plainly alludes to the On Interpretation in Cur 
Deus Homo. 
The library at Bec also included at least some of the works of Augustine and other 
patristic authors. Anselm explicitly cites Augustine’s De trinitate right in the Prologue to 
the Monologion and a few other places; it is plain in fact that Augustine is one of his 
major influences. The Monologion also clearly makes use of Boethius’s definition of 
eternity in his Consolation of Philosophy, although without citing Boethius explicitly. 
While the library at Bec was fairly extensive for the day, both in the number of volumes 
and the breadth of their topics, it was quite small in terms of what we think of today—
probably fewer than 100 volumes, I would guess. 
Anselm’s work is symptomatic of the beginnings of an intellectual revival in Europe. 
Recall that in the early Christian era, the old Roman Empire split into two parts, an 
eastern part, headquartered in Constantinople, and a western part, headquartered in the 
original Rome and various other places in the West. After this split, learning and even 
literacy declined precipitously in the West. The situation was made worse by the fact that 
various “barbarian” tribes were running around upsetting things all over Western Europe. 
(To call them “barbarian” just means they weren’t Roman; it doesn’t necessarily mean 
they were uncouth or rude—although many no doubt were.) And shortly afterward, the 
dreaded Vikings came down out of Scandinavia , making matters even worse. It was not 
a good time for “culture” and “learning.” 
Then, shortly after the year 1000, things seemed to stabilize suddenly. The “barbarian” 
tribes had become pretty much assimilated, and the Vikings eventually settled down and 
became respectable. Trade began to pick up. Cities began to grow. And it was once again 
relatively safe to travel. Anselm’s own wanderings, before he ended up at Bec, would 
have been pretty unlikely just a generation or two earlier. 
During the period before Anselm, what learning there was was pretty much confined to 
the monasteries. The monks preserved and copied the few works of antiquity they had 
available. But by Anselm’s own day, things had begun to revive. Lanfranc’s school at 
Bec, with its relatively well-stocked library, was a symptom of better times to come. 
Anselm on Faith and Reason 
See also Adams’s paper in the Cambridge Companion. 
Anselm was interested in trying to prove certain truths of the faith. That is, he wanted to 
argue rigorously, and in a way we would nowadays describe as purely philosophically, 
for things he already believed in virtue of his religious faith. As a Christian, for instance, 
he already believed in the existence of God. Nevertheless, he thought human 
understanding was enough to prove the existence of God all by itself, without appealing 
to faith. 
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Some people have found this procedure suspicious, as though the fact that Anselm never 
doubted the things he was trying to prove somehow tainted the proofs themselves, 
reduced them to “jury-rigging.” 
But this need not be so. Consider: Bertrand Russell, in the early-twentieth century, wrote 
three huge and enormously technical volumes called Principia Mathematica, at the end 
of which he had succeeded in proving a few elementary mathematical truths, such as 
2 + 2 = 4, on the basis of what he took to be purely logical principles—even though he 
never for a moment doubted that 2 + 2 = 4! The extent to which his project was 
successful is a question that nowadays is subject to some doubt. But no one had ever 
suggested that the project was suspicious on the face of it, simply because he already 
knew the answer he was trying to reach. 
So too with Anselm. We have to look at his arguments on their own grounds, not just 
dismiss them in advance as special pleading. 
Anselm’s use of philosophical argumentation at the service of religion is not an 
“apologetical” use of philosophy. That is, it isn’t not designed to defend the faith against 
non-believers. And it is not designed to shore up his own faith that might otherwise falter. 
It’s rather an exploratory use of faith. Anselm didn’t doubt for a moment the existence of 
God, or the various other articles of Christian faith. But he was curious, and wanted to 
know how these things were connected with one another, how they “hung together,” and 
to what extent we could know them only by revelation. 
On the other hand, a lot of the secondary literature on Anselm written from the 
perspective of recent philosophy of religion is motivated by apologetical considerations. 
I’m thinking of the Alvin Plantinga style of writing, and worries over “the coherence of 
theism.” 
Whatever the merits or demerits of the latter enterprise, this is not Anselm’s worry. 
Anselm, for example, will talk about reconciling divine justice with divine mercy—but 
he’s not the slightest bit concerned with defending the faith! 
So when people write about the “Anselmian” theory of this or that from a philosophy of 
religion point of view, we need to ask whether they are putting his views to purposes he 
himself never intended. 
There need not be anything wrong with doing that, but we have to be careful of it for 
interpreting Anselm himself. 
E.g., H. Scott Hestevold, “The Anselmian ‘Single-Divine-Attribute’ Doctrine.” 
(E-reserves.) Possible research report. 
Anselm then was interested in trying to find “necessary reasons” (= rationes necessariae) 
for what he regarded as the truths of the faith. These “necessary reasons” are a common 
theme in Anselm. In the Proslogion, for instance, he tries to prove the existence and 
nature of God. In the earlier Monologion, he gives some additional proofs for these 
things, and even tries to find “necessary reasons” for the Trinity! In Cur deus homo, he 
tries to find necessary reasons for the Incarnation. (Cur deus homo = literally, “Why a 
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God-Man?” I.e., “why did God become man—why the Incarnation.” It’s a decidedly 
theological topic. I will probably cite it as Cur deus homo.) 
All these necessary reasons are based on pure reason (or at least they’re supposed to be), 
supplemented by ordinary empirical experience. (So they’re not necessarily a priori or 
“analytic.”) There’s no appeal to Scripture, no appeal to theology, no appeal to special 
mystical experiences, and so on. It is true that, in his late writings—after the Cur Deus 
Homo—he deals explicitly with Scriptural passages, but even then it’s only to show that 
these passages do not conflict with the results of reason. 
By contrast, in Augustine (354–430), theology and philosophy are thoroughly mixed. In 
Anselm, the two have begun to be separated more clearly. 
Anselm was not the first to proceed like this. Boethius (c. 480–524/6), in addition to his 
translations and writings on logic, had written a series of Theological Tractates in all but 
one of which there is no explicit appeal to Scripture at all. 
Eventually, by the time we get to Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century, the distinction 
between philosophy and theology is quite explicitly established: theology can use 
philosophical reasoning, but also relies essentially on the data of revelation, Scripture and 
the teaching tradition of the Church, whereas philosophy relies on pure reason and our 
ordinary experience, without resorting to the authority of revelation. 
The distinction is not yet fully developed in Anselm. Even in this early stage, however, 
note that Anselm does use philosophical argumentation in dealing with theological topics. 
Theology for him is no longer just a matter of Scripture studies, or even of the 
formulation of doctrine, no longer a matter of writing commentaries on the Psalms and 
the Pauline Epistles, as it had largely been even for Lanfranc right before Anselm. 
What’s happening then is that by Anselm’s time theology is becoming a theoretical, 
argumentative discipline, no longer a matter of “wisdom literature.” Anselm was not the 
first to push in this direction, but he certainly does it big time. 
In this connection, it is instructive to contrast Augustine’s important work On the Trinity 
with Anselm’s treatment of some of the same issues in the Monologion. Augustine was 
looking for various analogies to the Trinity in human experience, various “models” to 
help us think about this doctrine with a minimum of confusion. The most fertile analogy 
Augustine could find is the human mind itself, where we find memory, intelligence, and 
will, each of which is identical with the mind (Augustine says), each of which is 
somehow distinct from the other two, and each of which is equal to the others: we 
remember that we remember, know and will; we know that we remember, know and will; 
and we will to remember, know and will. Augustine thinks this provides a kind of 
glimpse of how the Trinity works, by analogy. But he certainly doesn’t think he has in 
any sense “proven” the doctrine of the Trinity; he takes it as given all along that the 
Trinity is ultimately mysterious and can never be known as the result of unaided human 
reasoning. All he’s trying to do is to explain how we are to think about it, insofar as we 
can think about it at all. Anselm, by contrast, seems to think he’s in some sense proving 
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the Trinity. It’s worth looking closely at his procedure here when you read the 
Monologion. 
It is interesting to look at Anselm’s various statements of his intentions. Look for 
instance at the Prologue to the Monologion. There he says that the work is to adhere to 
the following restrictions (Basic Writings, p. 1—but I am here using my own translation
—as I often will): 
nothing at all in it would be urged on the authority of Scripture. Rather 
whatever the end would assert by individual investigations [i.e., whatever 
conclusions the individual arguments in the book come to], the necessity 
of reason would briefly infer and truth’s clarity would plainly show it to 
be the case, with a plain style, ordinary arguments and a simple 
disputation. 
Also, look at Cur deus homo I.10 [Basic Writings, p. 261 top]. Here he says, in effect, 
let’s take for granted all the things we’ve proved in earlier works by “necessary reasons.” 
But let’s not take the Incarnation for granted. Can we then prove the doctrine of the 
Incarnation (the doctrine that God became man in the person of Jesus) on the basis of the 
necessary reasons? And furthermore, can we show that the death of Christ is “reasonable 
and necessary”? His answer to both these questions will be yes; these are astonishingly 
strong claims! 
Possible research report: David Brown, “‘Necessary’ and ‘Fitting” Reasons in 
Christian Theology.” (On CDH). Note the reference to fitting reasons! 
But note two things about all this: First, Anselm did not think there was no room for 
mystery in religion. While he thought it possible, for instance, to prove God is a Trinity 
of persons, he certainly didn’t think it was possible to explain clearly just how that 
Trinity worked. The talk about intellect and will in God provides a proof that the Trinity 
exists, but it doesn’t explain completely—or even very helpfully—how it all fits together. 
See Monologion 64 (Basic Writings, pp. 62–63), the title of which is “That although this 
cannot be explained, it must nevertheless be believed.” Likewise, he thought it possible to 
prove the necessity of the Incarnation—the need for God to become man. But just how it 
worked—how the human nature and the divine nature were brought together in a single 
person—he thought that was beyond our comprehension. 
In this connection, note also the limits of Anselm’s use of “necessary reasons.” He was 
not importing Greek necessitarianism into Christian thought, at the expense of divine 
freedom. For instance, he would not have thought there was any necessary reason why 
God had to create in the first place. But, given that the world exists, Anselm thought it 
was necessary (it necessarily followed) that it was created ex nihilo. See Monologion 7–8 
(Basic Writings, pp. 13–17). Similarly, the Cur deus homo does not try to show that God 
had to become man willy-nilly. But given that man exists, and given that he was created 
for eternal happiness, and given that he freely fell—given all that, then the Incarnation 
was necessary—in the sense of “needed.” 
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Second, let me repeat that that Anselm was not trying to prove all these things as though 
they were subject to some doubt. Rather, the main purpose of these proofs is to explore 
what he already believes by faith, to see how the doctrines of the faith are connected with 
one another and with the other things we know. He’s concerned to examine Christian 
doctrine rather than to establish or defend it. Nevertheless, while this is his motivation, 
his method of appealing only to pure reason seems to guarantee, if it is applied correctly, 
that the arguments he comes up with will have whatever probative force they have for 
believer and non-believer alike. That’s why Anselm can put his so called “ontological” 
argument for the existence of God in the Proslogion in terms of the Biblical Fool of the 
Psalms, who says in his heart “There is no God.” 
This peculiar attitude becomes clear at the beginning of the Proslogion, at the end of 
Chap. 1 (p. 81—but again I’m using my own translation): 
Lord, I am not trying to penetrate your heights, for my understanding is in 
no way equal to that. But I do want to understand your truth a little bit, 
which my heart believes and loves. For neither do I seek to understand in 
order to believe, but I believe in order to understand. For I believe this too, 
that “unless I believe, I shall not understand.” 
The statement “Unless I believe, I shall not understand” is a very famous slogan 
associated with Anselm. It’s a quotation adapted from Isa. 7:9, in an old Latin translation 
that predates the Latin Vulgate version of the Bible that was in use in Anselm’s day, and 
is based on the Greek Septuagint. Augustine cites the passage in this old form (for 
example, in On Free Choice of the Will I.2), and that’s no doubt where Anselm is getting 
it. 
But, apart from the pedigree of the passage, note the difficulties in understanding it. If 
Anselm really couldn’t understand unless he believed, then in what sense do his proofs 
not presuppose the faith after all? Perhaps what Anselm means to say is that, while his 
proofs are in fact iron-clad and don’t assume the faith, so that in a sense they should 
convince even the non-believer, nevertheless the non-believer is somehow not in a 
position to see how strong these proofs really are. That is, lack of faith not only means 
you are a non-believer, it also somehow affects your ability to use your pure reason. 
Anselm is very hard to interpret on these matters. Is this perhaps an implicit reference to 
the theological view that, as a result of the sin of Adam, we all come into the world with 
a fallen human nature, and that includes a corrupted human intellect? This is the sort of 
view that will become quite prominent in certain strands of Reformation thought later on, 
but perhaps it’s already operating here in Anselm. 
Let me try to sharpen the point here a little: why is it so hard to interpret Anselm on this 
point? (Here I’m following Stephen Gersh’s article “Anselm of Canterbury,” in Peter 
Dronke’s book A History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy—as described on the handout of 
Bibliography, E-Reserves, and Other Resources. NB: As flagged there, this article mainly 
a general overview, and is not eligible for “research reports.” But it’s still a good article.) 
Here we go: 
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1) On one hand, Anselm plainly does in some sense think human reason is capable of 
showing lots of truths of the faith without resorting revelation to (i.e., to things we 
have to be told—the notion of revelation is no doubt narrower than that, but this will 
do to make my point): 
a) The ontological argument in the Proslogion—see also his Reply to Gaunilo § 8 
(Basic Writings, pp. 111–12)—is directed against the atheist Fool. 
b) In the Monologion there is no appeal to Scripture—or really to any kind of 
authority at all. Yet he thinks he can establish the doctrine of the Trinity there. 
c) CDH “proves” the necessity of the Incarnation and death of Christ. 
But notice: If we push this point, it has the result that is makes revelation completely 
superfluous. 
2) On the other hand, he plainly doesn’t think revelation is superfluous: 
a) In the Prosligion (p. 81, but again this is my translation), we get the point about 
how “unless I believe, I shall not understand.” 
b) Gersh cites other passages too on this point. (You may want to check to see 
whether they really confirm the point Gersh is making. But in any case, the 
Proslogion line does!) 
What do we do in such a case? Gersh suggests that we need to keep in mind that the 
world “reason” (ratio) in Anselm means lots of different things—and that’s true. 
As long as we take it to mean just logical deduction—syllogistic demonstration—we end 
up with the result that Anselm’s “necessary reasons” would render revelation 
superfluous. And therefore, he concludes, we must look at the other things it can mean. 
My reply: It’s certainly true that Anselm doesn’t proceed syllogistically in any of his 
arguments I’m aware of. And, to be sure, it’s good to have a survey of the various things 
“reason” can mean for Anselm, as Gersh gives us. 
But how does this help with the problem? 
Whatever “reason” means, if it’s available to non-believers too, then revelation ends up 
being superfluous. And if it isn’t available to non-believers, then the point of the 
arguments in the Monologion and the CDH won’t work! 
So what does Anselm mean? That’s the problem. 
Anselm: The Monologion Arguments for the Existence and 
Nature of God 
We’ve already talked about Anselm’s avoiding any appeal to Scripture or authority in the 
Monologion, and about how he claims to be arguing all these conclusions simply by “the 
necessity of reason.” Even apart from his arguments about the Trinity—which I think 
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most later theologians would have regarded as being overly ambitious, depending on how 
we interpret Anselm’s intentions—I want to call your attention to how much he is trying 
to do in this work. Simply in the first 26 chapters (which is all I’ve asked you to look at at 
this time), he claims to have shown the following. (Look at the Table of Contents on pp. 
3–6 of Basic Writrings—this Table of Contents is actually in the manuscripts of the 
Monologion; it’s not something Williams added. Gersh is helpful here on the structure of 
the Monologion—see pp. 265–70.) 
 That there is in effect what Plato would have called the Form of the Good, a 
single entity that is good all by itself and through which every other good thing is 
good (Chap. 1), 
 That there is likewise what we might call a Platonic Form of the “Great” (Chap. 
2). We’ll talk about what this is later on. 
 That there likewise is a single entity that “exists through itself” and through which 
all other exiting things exist (Chap. 3). As it turns out, this is going to be probably 
the most important chapter in the entire work. The same point is developed further 
in Chap. 4. 
 Then in Chaps. 5–9, we get some spinning out of the various senses in which we 
can say that a thing exists “through” something and that it exists “out of” 
something. In effect, what’s going on here is that Anselm wants to say that 
everything besides God exists through God—that is, depends on God—and yet do 
justice to the theological doctrine that all creatures are created ex nihilo (“out of” 
nothing). 
 In Chaps. 10–11, we get our first glimpse of the notion that this supreme being 
we’ve proven the existence of is a conscious being with a plan. 
 In Chaps. 12–14, we get some discussion of the supreme being’s essence and its 
relation to creatures. 
 In Chap. 15 there is a distinction drawn between what we can say about it 
essentially and what we can say about it only relationally. Along the way, he 
argues that this supreme being is incorporeal. 
 In Chaps. 16–17, we get the famous Anselmian doctrine that God’s essence is 
identical with all his essential features. In other words, it’s not that just that God is 
essentially just; he’s identical with justice. So too, God isn’t just essentially wise; 
he’s identical with wisdom. Notice that this has the consequence (by substitution 
of identicals) that justice is wisdom. 
 In Chaps. 18–24, we get a very interesting discussion of how God can be said to 
be outside space and time even though we also say God is everywhere and at all 
times. 
 In Chap. 25, Anselm argues that the supreme being is not subject to accidental 
change. 
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 Finally, in Chap. 26, we get a discussion of how the supreme being is and is not 
related to the Aristotelian category of substance. 
Now that is quite a lot, and it’s all done in less than thirty pages! In effect, what Anselm 
has done is give us the Middle Ages’ first systematic treatise on what later came to be 
called “natural theology.” That is, what we can know about God on the basis of ordinary 
human reasoning, without resorting to revelation. I know of nothing quite like it earlier. 
Now let me give you a kind of road-map of the rest of the Monologion, just so you’ll 
have an idea of the overall plan of the book: 
In Chap. 27 or thereabouts (the dividing line isn’t sharp), Anselm begins 
talking about the Trinity. This runs to Chapter 64. 
Finally, in Chapters 65–the end in 80 (again, the exact dividing line isn’t 
entirely clear), there is some miscellaneous additional material at the end of 
the work, including stuff on life after death, immortality of the soul, and so on. 
The arguments in Chapter 1 
Anselm—both here in the Monologion and later in the Proslogion—tries in effect to 
prove the existence of God. But what exactly is he doing in these places? What does it 
take to count as a proof for the existence of God? 
Here I refer you to my paper “What Is a Proof for the Existence of God” (not eligible for 
a “research report”). I know think this is a good example of how not to write a philosophy 
paper! It’s too “analytic” in a sense that was very popular and trendy when I wrote it, but 
it just needless. 
Pascal had said: “The God of the philosophers is not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob.” 
That is, whatever the philosopher ends up proving by his philosophical arguments, the 
non-believer can always say: that’s not God! Suppose the philosopher proves the 
existence of an “uncaused cause” (as Thomas Aquinas, for instance, will try to do). The 
non-believer can always object, “why should that be God?” Why isn’t it instead some 
kind of subatomic particle? 
So, just how much do we have to prove in order to count as proof of the existence of God 
in particular? That this “first cause” parted the Red Sea? That it appeared in the burning 
bush? That it was incarnated? That it rose again on the third day? 
Suppose a (monotheistic) religion that holds a set of beliefs BEL about God. If you 
accept that religion and want to prove the existence of God, do you have to prove there is 
something that satisfies BEL? 
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That’s way too strong! For many people in the Christian tradition (including Anselm?), 
you can’t do that—and indeed it’s a consequence of BEL that you can’t do it! Yet they 
think you can prove the existence of God! 
Therefore, my candidate for what it takes to be a proof for the existence of God: Pick a 
property ø such that BEL → God uniquely has ø, and then philosophically show (Ǝx) øx. 
This of course will not answer the non-believer. But “what else can it be?” For instance, 
if you believe in a God that created (and thus caused) absolutely everything else besides 
himself, and have a proof of a “first cause,” then from the point of view of your belief set 
BEL, what else could that “first cause” be but God? I refer you to my paper for the 
details. 
Note that Anselm adheres to this method in the Monologion. The actual word ‘God’ 
occurs only very rarely in this work. Instead he talks about a “supreme being” or 
“supreme nature.” It’s not as if we’re not supposed to know who he’s talking about, but 
the fact remains, he doesn’t say “God.” 
Let’s begin at the beginning. In Chapter 1, Anselm gives his first argument for the 
existence of God—actually, of a supreme good. This is not a particularly forceful 
argument unless you are an out and out Platonist. Actually, there are two arguments, or 
two strands of argument, contained in this Chapter 1, and both of them are in effect 
arguments for Plato’s Form of the Good. 
The first argument 
(Distribute handout “The Monologion Arguments for the Existence of God.”) 
The first argument, boiled down, runs like this (Basic Writings, pp. 7–8): People desire 
things insofar as they think they are good (whether they’re really good or not). Now as a 
matter of fact, many things are good. Hence, the argument concludes, there is some one 
thing—goodness—in virtue of which all those good things are good. 
Notice the first premise (p. 7): “After all, everyone desires to enjoy only those things that 
he thinks good.” Does this amount to saying that no one knowingly chooses evil (the 
“Socratic Paradox”)? If so, then what is that going to do for Anselm’s theory of free 
choice? But perhaps it doesn’t imply that. Desires are not at all the same things as 
choices. I can choose, after all, to act contrary to my desires. But perhaps it makes no 
difference to the argument here. For note also that this first step of this argument, about 
desires, seems completely idle. It’s not appealed to at all later in the argument. So, as far 
as the actual argument is concerned, whether that first step commits one to the Socratic 
principle that no one knowingly chooses evil, is altogether irrelevant. 
This argument rests on a pretty strong claim, the general form of which runs as follows: 
Whenever two or more things are alike in being ø (‘ø’ is to be replaced by some adjective 
or common noun), there is a single entity, ø-ness, in virtue of which they are all ø. 
That’s the first argument, in effect an argument for a Form of the Good. 
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The second argument 
The second argument, or perhaps the second strand of the argument (if we think of Chap. 
1 as giving us a single argument) occurs on p. 8: “ Now who would doubt that this 
thing, through which all goods exist, is itself a great good?”  
Anselm doesn’t actually give us a real argument for this second strand; he just says “Who 
would doubt it?” But the move is a straightforwardly Platonic one, and Anselm could 
have got it from any number of sources (but not from Plato himself, recall, since the texts 
of Plato were not available to Anselm): Whenever you have things that are more-ø and 
less-ø, they are measured against a standard or ideal, which is ø to the highest degree: the 
most-ø. 
In the literature on Plato, this is called the self-predication assumption. The standard by 
which we judge things to be more or less ø is itself ø, and is indeed ø most of all. 
This is Platonism, in the sense that it’s a Platonic principle that is perhaps plausible in the 
case of values and mathematical ideals, where Platonism has always been most 
appealing. Approximations of circularity, for example, are judged with respect to the 
perfect circle, which is a circle par excellence. The principle is perhaps not so plausible 
in realms other than values and mathematical ideals. We have larger and not-so-large, but 
no largest. Again, there is hot and hotter, but no hottest. Largeness, however, is not a 
matter of values or ideals. Of course in the present instance, that’s no problem, since what 
we’re talking about in this case is a value—goodness—so that the principle is quite at 
home here. 
The convergence of the two strands of argument 
There’s an implicit third assumption operating in this Chapter 1, namely, that the two 
strands of the argument we’ve just examined are talking about the same thing. That is, 
that in virtue of which all good things are good is also the standard against which good 
things are measured. In other words, things get their goodness from the same thing to 
which we turn to measure their goodness. Again, this is a quite familiar Platonic notion. 
If we grant Anselm this implicit assumption (and it is only implicit here), then the two 
strands of argument complement one another nicely. The first strand shows there is one 
goodness in virtue of which all good things are good, but by itself it doesn’t show that 
this goodness is itself good. The second strand of the argument shows there is a highest 
good, which is itself good, but doesn’t by itself show there’s only one such highest good. 
You need both arguments—and you need them both to be talking about the same entity—
if you want to be sure you’re talking about something that’s a plausible candidate for 
God. 
Of course, even if you do have this implicit third assumption, you still have only shown 
the existence of something like Plato’s Form of the Good. You have to go on now to 
argue that this thing you’ve just proved the existence of has also the other properties 
associated with God. Anselm gives that a try in later chapters of the Monologion.  
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How to avoid the “Third Man” 
If you’re familiar with Plato, you will remember that there is a problem with the theory of 
Forms, one that Plato himself recognizes in the first part of his Parmenides (131e–32b). 
It’s the famous Third Man Argument, and goes like this. Suppose two things: 
(a) Whenever you have a class of things that are alike in being ø, 
there’s some other entity, ø-ness, in which they all share. (Call this the 
“One-Over-Many” Principle.) 
(b) ø-ness is itself ø. (Call this the “Self-Predication” Principle.) 
If you accept both these claims, then you’re going to have a problem. If α and β are both 
ø, then (by the “One-Over-Many” Principle) there’s something else γ, called “ø-ness,” in 
virtue of which α and β are both ø. But (by the “Self-Predication” Principle) ø -ness is 
itself ø. Now take the class α, β, γ. They are all ø. Hence (by the “One-Over-Many” 
Principle again) there is a fourth thing, δ—a kind of ø -ness2—in virtue of which α, β, and 
γ are all ø. And so on. As you see, we are committed to an infinite regress of ø -ness, ø -
ness2, ø -ness3,  Hence, we never really have a full explanation how things got to be ø. 
However far you go, you always have to appeal one step further. 
How does Anselm avoid this regress, Plato’s Third Man? Of course Anselm didn’t have 
the text of the Parmenides, or the texts of Aristotle where the Third Man Argument is 
mentioned, and so probably never heard of this argument in connection with Plato. But 
still, is he committed to a “Third Man” type argument anyway, whether he realizes it or 
not? After all, premise (b) above (“Self-Predication”) is just the principle behind the 
second strand of argument in Anselm’s Chapter 1, and premise (a) (the “One-Over-
Many” Principle) seems to be the principle behind the first argument. 
Well, Anselm does manage to avoid the infinite regress. He does it by not requiring that 
the one entity in virtue of which all those ø things are ø has to be other than—distinct 
from—the things that are ø. That is, he would delete the word ‘other’ in the “One-Over-
Many” Principle. 
Virtue and happiness are both good in virtue of goodness, which is itself good. But we 
don’t have to go any further to explain why goodness itself is good. It is good through 
itself. So while Anselm does seem  
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 (Basic Writings, p. 8) is very short, and basically just says you can apply the 
same kind of argument to show that there is something in terms of which all great things 
are great, and which is itself the greatest of all. 
There’s not much new to be learned from this chapter. But I do want to call your attention 
to the significance of the word ‘great’ here. For later on, in the famous “ontological 
argument” in the Proslogion, Anselm starts off by defining God as that than which no 
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greater can be thought. Now, while that’s the Proslogion and not the Monologion, there’s 
probably every reason to think Anselm is using the notion of “great” in pretty much the 
same sense in both works. And in this connection, note what he says here, in Chap. 2 of 
the Monologion (p. 8): 
Now I do not mean great in size, as a given body [= physical object] is 
great [in other words, ‘great’ doesn’t mean “big”]; rather, [I mean great in 
the sense] that the greater something is, the better or worthier it is, as 
wisdom is great. 
Since ‘greater’ means ‘better’, as he says, ‘great’ must mean ‘good’. (So Chapters 1 and 2 
are making basically the same point.) File that fact away for future reference when we 
come to the ontological argument. 
In this connection, I want to call your attention to the article by R. Brecher, “‘Greatness’ 
in Anselm’s Ontological argument” (on E-Reserves). Brecher argues that this is just false, 
and that ‘great’ does not mean the same as ‘good’ for Anselm. It’s true, he says, that 
better ↔ greater for Anselm, but ‘good’ is a moral-evaluative term, while ‘great’ is 
ontological. (The Platonic picture of “Degrees of Reality.”) He gives lots of evidence that 
Anselm does distinguish these two notions in the Proslogion, but – curiously – he 
doesn’t  mention Monologion, Chap. 2, which says just the opposite! 
The argument in Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, we get an interesting new argument, which turns out I think to be perhaps 
the most central argument in the entire Monologion, since so many other conclusions in 
later chapters depend on the argument in Chapter 3. And in fact, we might well claim that 
the arguments in Chaps. 1–2 could be dispensed with, as long as we have the argument in 
Chap. 3. 
We’ve just seen the argument in Anselm’s Chapter 1 that there is one goodness in virtue 
of which all good things are good, and it is good through itself, and the claim in Chap. 2 
that a similar argument can be mounted for greatness, which isn’t surprising, since he 
there identifies greatness with goodness. 
The notion of things that have certain features they don’t get in virtue of something else, 
but have just through themselves (= per se) in this way, leads to a much tighter argument 
in Anselm’s Chapter 3, an argument that does not rely on the Platonic “Self-Predication” 
Principle, as does the second strand of argument in Anselm’s Chapter 1, although it does 
rely at one point on the equally Platonic “One-[Not-Necessarily]-Over-Many”1 principle 
that stood behind the first strand of argument in Anselm’s Chapter 1. 
The key notion in this argument in Chapter 3 is the notion of a thing’s “existing through” 
something, and in particular the notion of something’s “existing through itself.” The 
                                                 
1  See the discussion of the Third Man Argument, p. 20 above, for why I put this principle in this 
odd way. 
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rough idea is “Where does the thing get its existence?,” “What does it depend on?” 
(That’s only very rough, and we’ll try to firm it up.) 
Now Anselm is perfectly willing to grant that some things don’t depend on anything else 
at all for their existence. If they exist, they exist through themselves. They are, so to 
speak, “self-existent”; they depend on nothing besides themselves. We want to allow this, 
but we aren’t going to assume there are any such things at the outset of the argument. 
It’s worth spending some time to get clear about this notion of “existing through” at the 
outset, since so much is going to rest on it in the Monologion. I said that, roughly 
speaking, it amounts to “depending on,” and that’s a good first approximation. But 
there’s a problem: 
To say that x depends on y suggests a kind of priority of y over x—if not a priority in 
time, then at least causal priority or a priority in the order of explanation. 
But “prior to” is what logicians call asymmetrical: if y is prior to x, then x can’t also be 
prior to y (in the same respect). Hence, nothing can be prior to itself. And therefore, if 
“existing through” just means “depending on,” and “depending on” implies a kind of 
priority, then nothing can exist through itself. But that’s not what we want. Anselm’s 
whole point in Chap. 3 is that there is exactly one thing that does exist through itself. 
On the other hand, if we just get rid of the sense of priority and posteriority (eliminate the 
asymmetry), and say that x exists through y iff x requires y, in the sense that you can’t 
have x without having y, then of course everything exists through itself (at least), since 
you can’t have x without having x! And in that case, we would have to understand that, 
when Anselm says in Chapter 3 that there is something that exists through itself, that’s 
trivial, and that what he really means is that there is something that exists only through 
itself, and not through anything else as well. 
That’s the way I’ve interpreted the Chap. 3 argument in the past. But I’ve subsequently 
come to realize that this isn’t the way Anselm actually talks. He doesn’t say that 
everything exists at least through itself, and that everything except God exists through 
something else as well. He seems to use “exists through itself” as meaning “exists only 
through itself.” (That is, while “exists through” in general does not amount to “exists only 
through,” it seems that “exists through itself” does amount to “exists only through 
itself.”) 
I suggest we proceed like this. And now I’m going to be a little “logical,” so just bear 
with me. Let’s begin with a preliminary notion: x requires y. (This is not a piece of 
Anselmian vocabulary. But let’s adopt it provisionally, just to see if we can figure out 
what’s going on.) 
Let’s say then that ‘x requires y’ simply means “You can’t have x without y,” or “The 
existence of  x entails the existence of y.” And let’s abbreviate “requires” by “R.” 
Now let’s notice some things about this “requires” relation. 
First of all, it’s what logicians call reflexive. That is, you can’t have x without x, or the 
existence of x entails the existence of x. That’s trivially true, and applies to any x. And in 
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this respect, the “requires” relation will differ from the “exists through” relation that we’ll 
define in a moment, since not everything will “exist through” itself. 
(Thus, we have: xRx.) 
Second, the “requires”-relation is transitive. That is, if x requires y, and y requires z, then 
x requires z. (xRy & yRz → xRz. 
Now, given that, we can define “exists through” (= ET) as in terms of the “requires” 
relation as follows: 
xETy =df. xRy & (x=y ↔ (z)(x ≠ z → ~xRz)) 
(See the handout “The Monologion Arguments for the Existence of God,” bottom of p. 1 
and top of p. 2.) 
That is, x “exists through” y iff (i) x “requires” y [you can’t have x without having y], 
and (ii) x just is y (i.e., they are identical, so that we’re saying that x exists through itself) 
if and only if x doesn’t require anything else. 
Think about that. This allows that something can exist through itself, but only if it doesn’t 
require the existence of anything else. And it also allows that some things can exist 
through things other than themselves. 
Notice that, unlike the “requires” relation, the “exists through” relation is not reflexive. 
Not everything automatically exists through itself. Some things require for their existence 
the existence of something else too, and in that case they can’t be said to “exist through” 
themselves. Note also that the fact that “exists through” isn’t reflexive is not just a point 
of logic, but a substantive metaphysical claim. As far as logic is concerned, everything 
might very well be totally independent of everything else! Nevertheless, the claim seems 
uncontroversial enough. Some things, for example, are the effects of other causes. 
On the other hand, the “exists through” relation, this time like the “requires” relation, is 
transitive. How do we know that? Well, there are two subcases: 
1. If x exists through itself, then x doesn’t require and so doesn’t exist through 
anything else (from the definition), so that transitivity in that case trivially holds. 
2. If x exists through something y other than itself, then the left half of the 
biconditional on the right of our definition is false, and so is the right half of that 
biconditional (since x does require something other than itself). In that case, the 
right conjunct on the right of the definition is true, and the “exists through” 
relation just reduces to the left conjunct, the “requires” relation, which, as we saw, 
is transitive. 
In either case, therefore, “exists through” is transitive. 
Finally, notice that the “exists through” relation, unlike the “requires” relation, is what 
logicians call “antisymmetric.” (This is not the same as being asymmetric, in the sense 
we discussed above.) That is, if x exists through y and y in turn exists through x, then x 
just is y; they’re the same thing. 
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Here’s why: If x exists through y and y exists through x, then by the transitivity of “exists 
through,” x exists through x—that is, x exists through itself. But then, in virtue of our 
definition of “exists through,” x doesn’t exist through anything other than itself. 
The logical machinery may be more than you’re comfortable with, and is certainly more 
than Anselm himself was thinking of. But my point is fairly simple: We can quite clearly 
define what Anselm means by the “exists through” relation in terms of an unproblematic 
notion of one thing’s requiring something for its existence. The definition we end up with 
it such that it is transitive, and rules out “exists through” loops of more than one item 
(that is, it’s antisymmetric). 
Now notice that so far, all we’ve done is to give some definitions. We have the definition 
of the “requires” relation, and everything satisfies that with respect to something or other, 
we said (even if it only satisfies it with respect to itself). But we’ve said nothing yet to 
show that there’s actually anything that “exists through itself.” Much less have we said 
anything to show that there’s only one such thing. That’s what Anselm is going to argue 
in Chap. 3. Let’s look at his argument. 
The argument proper 
The actual argument starts by claiming that nothing exists through nothing. (Basic 
Writings, p. 9, 1st paragraph of the chapter—“For every existing thing exists either 
through something or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing.”) That is, 
everything exists through something, even if it’s only through itself. 
This is true, given what we’ve developed so far. Look back to our definition of “exists 
through”: 
xETy =df. xRy & (x=y ↔ (z)(x ≠ z → ~xRz)) 
Everything x either exists through itself or it doesn’t. If it does, then it exists through 
something. If it doesn’t, then (from our definition) either (i) x does not require itself 
(which is false, since “requirement” is reflexive), or else (ii) the biconditional after the 
‘&’ on the right of the definition is false when x = y, that is, when the left half of that 
biconditional is true. But in that case the biconditional itself is false only if its right half is 
false—that is, only if x does require something z other than itself. And in that case, x 
exists through z, as you can verify by looking at the definition. In either case, therefore, x 
exists through something or other, which is what Anselm claims. 
Now if everything exists through something or other, then there must be (i) some one 
thing, or perhaps (ii) a group of several things, through which everything whatever exists. 
That is, no matter what you’ve got, it exists through something in that group. (I don’t 
mean that it exists through everything in that group.) This is trivially true, since if you 
just allow the “group” in (ii) to be big enough, so that it includes absolutely everything, 
you’ve got enough. 
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Now what Anselm is going to try to show is that the hypothesis that such a group requires 
several leads to a contradiction. In short, there is some one thing through which 
everything exists. It exists through itself, and everything else exists through it. And we 
know who that is going to be, don’t we? (Recall the discussion of my paper “What Is a 
Proof for the Existence of God?”) 
Now what’s going on here? We can look at it like this: Basically, Anselm is looking for 
the smallest class of things such that everything that exists exists through something in 
that class. And he’s going to try to show that this class consists of exactly one thing and 
no more. 
Picture it this way: Start off with the class of all things that exist. Surely that class is large 
enough to do the trick. You don’t have to appeal to anything else, since you’ve already 
included everything in advance. But this is presumably not the smallest class such that 
everything exists through something in that class. We can throw some things out and still 
have enough left. If x ≠ y but x exists through y, then we can throw x out and leave y, and 
still have enough left. Anything that exists through x will also exist through y (by the 
transitivity of “exists through”), and we’ve left y. 
Now let’s throw out everything we can throw out in this way, and we’ll end up with the 
smallest class such that everything that exists exists through something in that class. 
(There’s a problem coming up here, but just be patient!) How many things are in that 
smallest class? One or more than one? (Surely there will be at least one—since if we 
throw everything out, there won’t be anything left, and nothing exists through nothing, 
we said.) Well, if there are more than one, then Anselm distinguishes three cases (Basic 
Writings, p. 9, but this is my own translation): 
But if there are several [of them], either they are [all] related to some one 
thing through which they exist, or the same several [things] exist 
individually, through themselves, or they exist through one another, 
reciprocally. 
In effect, the three cases amount to the following: 
Case (α): Suppose the class consists of X1, X2, , Xn, and they all exist 
through some Xn+1 that isn’t in this group. Then clearly we don’t have the 
smallest class; we can keep Xn+1, and get rid of X1, X2, , Xn, and still do 
the trick. (Note: This isn’t really a “case” of the kind we were talking 
about—the “smallest class such that everything that exists exists through 
something in that class.” All the more reason, then, to rule it out.) 
Case (β): Suppose X1, , Xn are all self-existent. Then (here it is—the 
one place in the argument where you need something like the Platonic 
“One-Over-Many” assumption), they all exist through Self-Existence. 
Hence Self-Existence by itself would have been enough. Everything exists 
through one or more of  X1, , Xn, and they all exist through Self-
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Existence. Thus everything exists through Self-Existence. (Note that this 
does not imply that everything is self-existent, but only that they require 
something that is.) Whatever you think of that argument, let’s go to: 
Case (γ): Suppose X1 exists through X2, X2 in turn exists through X3, and 
in general Xi–1 exists through Xi, until we come to some Xn that exists 
through X1. Plainly, what we have here is a kind of loop. But, in virtue of 
the transitivity of “exists through,” this means that X1 exists through Xn, 
and Xn we know exists through X1. But this violates the antisymmetry of 
“exists through.” So case (γ), it turns out, can’t really arise. Like case (α), 
this one is not really a “case” at all; it cannot arise. So the only really 
operative case is (β), and that’s handled by the One-Over-Many principle. 
Therefore, Anselm triumphantly concludes, all three ways our smallest class could turn 
out to have more than one member are ruled out. Hence there is only one item in that 
smallest class, and it exists through itself while everything else exists through it. Q.E.D. 
Comments on the argument 
Whatever you think of this argument, it has an interesting feature. It is an attempt to 
prove two things simultaneously: (i) the existence of God as a “self-existent” being, and 
(ii) the uniqueness of God. This is a rather interesting feature of the argument. Many 
attempts to prove the existence of God separate the existence-claim from the uniqueness-
claim. Thomas Aquinas, for example, in one of his famous “five ways” to prove the 
existence of God at the beginning of his Summa theologiae, argues that God is an 
“uncaused cause.” But the conclusion that there is only one such “uncaused cause” comes 
only much later in the Summa. Anselm’s argument tries to accomplish both tasks at once. 
There is, however, a serious objection to this argument (even apart from the appeal to 
something like the “One-Over-Many” Principle, which you may or may not find 
objectionable, depending on how much of a Platonist you are). Why does Anselm think 
there is any smallest class in the first place? There are classes bigger than necessary (for 
example, the class of absolutely everything), and classes smaller than necessary (for 
instance, the empty class—where we throw everything out), but is there any smallest 
class of things such that absolutely everything exists through something in that class? 
Suppose there are an infinity of things that exists, and suppose we number things that 
exist, as follows: X1, X2, , and so on without end. (For the mathematicians among you, 
note that I’m not supposing that we can number all the things that exist in this way, that 
is, that there are only denumerably many existents. I don’t need to assume that to make 
the present point.) And suppose we’ve numbered them in such a way that X1 exists 
through X2, X2 exists through X3, and in general Xn exists through Xn+1. So we have a 
kind of infinite regress. In this case, there would simply be no smallest class of the kind 
Anselm is looking for. We can keep throwing things out one by one, but there will always 
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be more to be thrown out. We can go too far, by throwing everything out at once, in one 
fell swoop. But we cannot get exactly what we want. 
Notice that Anselm could be sure there is the smallest class he wants, if he could 
somehow rule out this kind of infinite regress. Hence, when you come right down to it, 
the argument in Anselm’s Chapter 3 is really a disguised infinite regress argument for the 
existence of God, not essentially different in kind from arguments to be found later on in 
Aquinas. And, like all such arguments, there is one big question: Why can’t you go on to 
infinity? 
But even if the argument ultimately fails (and I think it does), it’s more interesting than 
most such infinite regress arguments insofar as it has the uniqueness claim built in too. 
Notice, please: the ultimate success or failure of this argument is not the real point as far 
as I’m concerned. The point is that this is a very sophisticated argument. There is a 
sharpness and edge to the argument that is unlike anything to be found earlier in the 
Middle Ages—and, I suspect, anywhere in the earlier history of philosophy. Anselm 
seems to be delighting in the “case by case” argument he develops here. We will see this 
sort of thing big-time when we get to his discussion of how God can and can not be said 
to be in space and time (Mon., Chaps. 18–24). 
One other thing you may want to consider about the argument in Chap. 3: Anselm 
considers three ways in which our “minimal” class might have more than one member 
(cases (α)–(γ) above). You might want to ask whether these three cases really exhaust all 
the possibilities. I haven’t worked it out in detail, but I think the argument is probably OK 
in that respect. Still, it’s something to consider. 
In any case, at the very end of Chap. 3, Anselm goes on to identify the one being that 
exists through itself with the highest good he argued for in Chap. 1, and the highest great 
thing he argued for in Chap. 2. (You may want to ask whether this move is legitimate.) 
This is in effect a familiar Platonic ordering of the cosmos, according to value. 
Let’s now move on to some of the subsequent chapters of the Monologion. I’m not going 
to look at all of them in great detail, but I do want to give you some idea of how they go. 
Chapters 5–8 
Chapter 4, as the Monologion’s Table of Contents suggests, is basically more of the same 
as Chap. 3. I won’t spend any time on it. 
Chapters 5–8 concern the notions of existing through something, as distinct from existing 
from or out of something. I want to sketch the way I understand these chapters, and you 
can focus on them more carefully if you want in your papers. (I hasten to add that I’m not 
100% confident of my understanding of these chapters.) 
The distinction in these chapters is between two Latin prepositions: per (= “through”), 
which the one we were talking about in Chap. 3, and ex (= “out of” or “from”). 
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Now this may seem to you like much ado about nothing, and in fact in a sense it is, as 
we’ll see. For we’ve just seen in Chap. 3 that the supreme being alone exists through 
itself, and everything else exists through it. Now in Chap. 5, Anselm goes on to say that 
“through” and “from” can be used interchangeably, and that whenever we say something 
exists through something, we can also say it exists from or out of that something, and 
vice versa, even though—depending on what we’re talking about, these expressions may 
be used in various ways. For instance (Chap. 6, p. 12), we may be talking about material 
causality and say the statue, for instance, is made through or out of (from) marble. On the 
other hand, we can also say the statue is made through or out of (from) the sculptor, the 
efficient cause. Or through or out of (from) the chisel, the instrument or tool (sometimes 
described as an “instrumental cause”). Some of these expressions are a little strained in 
English, as they are in Latin as well. But they’re all serviceable, and they’ll all work. 
Of course (Chap. 6), the supreme being (God) isn’t caused to exist at all in any of these 
ways. Effects exist through their causes, and yet are always in some sense posterior to 
and therefore distinct from their causes. But the supreme being exists only through itself, 
we know from Chap. 3. So the supreme being isn’t caused to exist in any of these ways. 
Note something here. Anselm makes no mention of Aristotelian formal or 
final causes. The Physics was not available to him. 
Note also that Anselm doesn’t say that God is “self-caused” or anything 
like that. In his vocabulary, cause and effect are always distinct. 
So when we talk about the supreme being’s existing through or from itself, we’re not 
talking about causality. What we do mean we discussed back in Chap. 3. 
On the other hand (Chap. 7), when we’re talking about things other than the supreme 
being—which means when we’re talking about creatures—we are talking about causality. 
Note: This seems to suggest that Anselm identifies causality with existing 
through something other than yourself. That is, x causes y =df. y exists 
through x & x ≠ y. 
So all of creation exists through and out of (from) the supreme being, which is then their 
cause. But how is it their cause? Is the supreme being their material cause, their efficient 
cause (their “maker,” as he says), or their instrumental cause? (Note: You may want to 
ask whether the Aristotelian formal and final causes that Anselm doesn’t mention would 
make any difference to his overall argument here. I don’t think they would.) 
Instrumental causality we can rule out in this case. An instrumental cause is a 
contributing cause; it contributes along with something else that uses it as an instrument. 
But there isn’t anything else besides the supreme being and creation. So the supreme 
being can’t simply be an instrument used by some other cause to produce creation. (Of 
course, after the first creature is created, this argument would take some additional work.) 
The supreme being, therefore, is either creation’s material cause or its efficient 
(“making”) cause. At the bottom of p. 15, Anselm argues that it can’t be a material cause. 
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That is, creation isn’t made out of the supreme being in the way the statue is made out of 
marble or bronze. God isn’t the stuff of creation. Anselm’s reason is: 
But if something less than the supreme nature can exist from the matter of 
the supreme nature [i.e., the matter that is the supreme nature], the 
supreme good [recall that he identified the supreme being with the 
supreme good at the end of Chap. 3] can be changed and corrupted [= can 
be decomposed, can come apart.] 
The idea here seems to be that a material cause is somehow changed in the production of 
its effect. The marble or bronze gets changed in causing the statue. Anselm doesn’t say 
how it gets changed, and it’s perhaps worth speculating about that. In Aristotelian terms, 
it gets changed by being formed or shaped by a formal cause; but Anselm doesn’t seem to 
have any notion of a formal cause. 
And besides, what’s wrong with saying the supreme being is changed? Nothing we’ve 
seen so far suggests that it can’t change. He says it would be “changed and corrupted,” 
but it’s not clear how that would have to follow. (The argument is pretty obscure at this 
point.) 
Perhaps the important thing here is the passive voice: “be changed.” Matter is changed in 
causing its effect; the marble or bronze is changed in causing the statue. It’s changed by 
the sculptor, the “maker” or “efficient cause.” So if the supreme being is the material 
cause of creation, something else would have to be the efficient cause of creation, and 
there isn’t anything else besides the supreme being and creation. 
I suggest this line of reasoning, although I’m not confident that’s what’s going on. 
In any case, Anselm concludes that the supreme being is neither the material nor an 
instrumental cause of creation, and so can only be its “maker.” 
Creation as a whole, therefore, can’t be through any kind of pre-existing matter. The 
supreme being isn’t itself its matter, as we’ve seen, and apart from the supreme being and 
creation, there isn’t any third thing that could serve as a kind of matter. (It might still 
happen, however, that the supreme being might first create matter, and then create other 
things out of it.) 
The supreme being, therefore, “makes” creation as a whole out of nothing. (End of Chap. 
7.) 
That phrase “out of nothing” is really, I think, the whole point of this discussion in 
Chaps. 5–8. The standard Christian doctrine of creation—going back to some of the early 
Church Fathers—is that God created creatures out of nothing (ex nihilo). 
Notice what we’ve got here: a “philosophical” proof of the doctrine of creation! This is a 
strong claim. There’s nothing quite like the Christian notion of creation in Greek 
philosophy. For example, creation is not like Plato’s account in the Timaeus, where 
something Plato calls the “Demiurge” (= handicraftsman) produces the familiar world out 
of a kind of pre-existing “matter” (what Plato mysteriously calls the “Receptacle”), using 
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patterns the Demiurge finds in the equally pre-existing Forms. The Christian notion of 
creation is not like that. (For more details, see my A Survey of Mediaeval Philosophy, 
Version 2.0, August 29, 1985, Vol. 1, Chap. 4.) For what it’s worth, recall that Anselm 
may have had access to Chalcidius’s translation or and commentary on the first part of 
the Timaeus. And note that what Anselm is arguing for in this chapter, although it’s in 
effect the doctrine of creation, is being argued without any appearl to Scripture or 
revelation. 
But now we’ve got a problem (Chap. 8). All along we’ve been saying that all things 
besides the supreme being exist through the supreme being, and therefore out of or from 
the supreme being. But now we’re saying that they are out of nothing. How can we say 
both? 
Certainly the supreme being isn’t nothing. And besides, nothing exists through nothing, 
as we saw in the proof back in Chap. 3. 
Anselm’s reply (p. 16) is that there are three ways of saying that something is made out 
of or from (Latin: ex) nothing: 
1. x is made out of nothing = x isn’t made at all. (Non-existent creatures are like this, 
and the supreme being itself is like this.) 
2. x is made out of nothing = x is made out that which is nothing. (Better translation: 
nothing itself.) As if nothingness were a kind of cause. He says we can think this 
and say this, but it can never be true of anything. (Note for future reference in our 
discussion of the “ontological argument” in the Proslogion: Anselm is explicitly 
saying we can think of things that aren’t possible.) 
3. x is made out of nothing = x is made, but there is not any thing out of which it is 
made. 
It’s in the third sense that we say that creatures are made out of or from (ex) nothing. But 
there’s still a problem, because we earlier said that creatures exist and are made through 
and so out of or from the supreme being. As a result, Anselm goes on to give us what 
might be considered a kind of sub-sense of (3): 
3a. x is made out of nothing = x is made and is now something, but earlier it was 
nothing. (So the “from” or “out of” [ex] is here being read in a temporal sense.] 
And this is the sense in which creatures are made out of nothing. And it’s in this sense 
that I said earlier this whole discussion in Chaps. 5–8 was in a way “much ado about 
nothing.” 
Chapters 9–12 
In Chapters 9–12 we learn that the supreme being has a mind or reason. This is going to 
lead ultimately into a discussion of the Trinity. But Anselm breaks off the discussion at 
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the end of Chap. 12, in order to talk about other things, before coming back to it in 
Chapter 29 or thereabouts. 
In Chap. 9 (p. 17), Anselm claims that a maker makes something rationally 
(“reasonably”) iff it already has in its mind a kind of exemplar (a kind of “plan” for it),  
that it is reasonable to suppose that a maker makes something only if it already has in its 
mind a kind of exemplar (a “plan” for it). 
As it stands, the text allows that a maker might make something without an exemplar; it 
would just not be a rational thing to do. (I’ve checked the Latin on this.) But I think 
Anselm really means something stronger: that it isn’t reasonable to say that a maker can 
make something any other way than with a plan. 
That is, “reasonably” or “rationally,” I suggest, isn’t really about what the maker does. 
Rather, it’s about what it’s “reasonable” to say or to suppose. And the idea is that it isn’t 
reasonable to say a maker proceeds without a plan. (Otherwise, there doesn’t seem to be 
any connection between the observation at the beginning of this chapter and the remark at 
the end of it.) 
Not that all this amounts to saying that efficient causality is always conscious causality, 
that efficient causes work by design. 
This is actually a fairly plausible view, and one with which I am in considerable 
sympathy. John Locke and George Berkeley recognized that the only good notion we 
have of causality (= efficient causality for them) comes from the experience of our own 
wills. Anselm’s picture then seems to be the same: efficient causes are conscious, 
purposeful causes. What we nowadays think of as unconscious efficient causes (the fire 
heating the water, the billiard ball striking and moving a second billiard ball) are really 
what Anselm would call instrumental causes. 
For Anselm, then, the supreme being is an efficient cause (see Chapters 5–8), and is 
therefore rational. But so are human beings, and angels, and whatever other rational 
agents there are. 
In Chap. 10, Anselm speaks of the supreme being’s plan or exemplar as a kind of 
“verbalization” (vox) of the creature that is going to be made. What he’s doing here is 
leading right up to the notion of the second person of the Trinity as the Divine “Word,” a 
notion that goes back to Saint John’s Gospel, the beginning of which reads: 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God. 
John then goes on to say that this “Word” is that according to which all creatures were 
made. 
Anselm distinguishes three types of “words”—voces, plural of vox, translated as 
“utterance(s)” by Williams (pp. 17–18): 
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1. Spoken or written words, or in general linguistic signs. These words will of 
course vary from language to language. 
2. Mental images of those spoken or written words. (This is what happens when 
rehearse a speech silently, for instance.) These words will likewise vary from 
language to language. 
3. A kind of “word” that does not have anything to do with “natural language,” but 
is simply a kind of imagining or conceptualizing of the objects themselves. 
The supreme being’s “verbalization” of creation is this third type of word. (God doesn’t 
think in Latin or Greek or Hebrew, after all.) 
Incidentally, this passage is an important text in the development of the 
later medieval theory of mental language. 
So the supreme being, in a way, proceeds as does a human artisan who, before he makes 
something, has a kind of mental plan of what he’s going to make. 
In Chap. 11, Anselm observes that there is nevertheless an important dissimilarity 
between the supreme being and a human artisan in this respect. Human artisans construct 
their plans on the basis of things they’ve already experienced; you plan how to build a 
bicycle, for instance, by ingeniously combining your already acquired knowledge of 
wheels, chains, seats, etc. But for the supreme being, there was nothing else in advance to 
serve as the basis for a plan. Therefore (p. 19):
 the things that are created through the Creator’s utterance are nothing at 
all but what they are through his utterance … 
In Chap. 12, Anselm observes that the “word” (= the mental plan) of this supreme being 
is nothing other than the supreme being itself. He doesn’t really give any argument, but 
it’s not hard to supply one. The supreme being’s “word” has to be identical with the 
supreme being itself. For the “word” is supposed to be the plan according to which the 
whole of creation is produced. But if the “word” were not identical with the supreme 
being, it would have to be a creature, and so would itself require a plan. In short, if it 
were not identical with the supreme being, it couldn’t do the job it’s supposed to do. 
Chapters 13–14 
We don’t need to pause over Chaps. 13–14 very long. Chap. 13 remarks that everything 
that continues to exist, continues to exist through the supreme being. That is, we don’t 
just need the supreme being to get things started, but also to keep them going. 
Chap. 14 may at first be confusing. The title claims (p. 20) that the supreme essence 
“exists in all things and through all things,” but then goes on to say that all things are 
from, through and in it. Now we’ve already talked about how everything that exists exists 
through and out of (= from) the supreme being. But we also said that the supreme being 
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doesn’t exist through anything besides itself. So how can we now say it is through all 
things? Aren’t we contradicting ourselves? (There’s an additional question about “in.”) 
I think all that’s happening here is that Anselm is momentarily using the “exists through” 
talk in a looser way than he has been. Look at how he begins his argument in this chapter 
(p. 20): “ where he [= the supreme being] does not exist, nothing exists.” 
The idea here is simply that since everything exists through this one thing, unless that one 
thing is somehow present, nothing can exist at all. (We’ll talk in a little bit about just 
what kind of “presence” this requires.) In that sense, then, the supreme being is “in and 
through” all things—it is through them in the sense of being throughout them; it pervades 
them. Everything is, so to speak, soaked in the supreme being, which has to be somehow 
“present” where anything at all exists. It doesn’t mean the supreme being somehow 
depends on other things. 
Now even though we just said the supreme being is in a sense in all things, we can also 
turn it around and say all things are in it. They are in it in the sense that they do not in any 
way escape it, they are within its realm or range, they are not beyond it; they are not 
“outside” it, because in that case they could not exist at all. As he says, “ where he 
does not exist, nothing exists.” 
All that’s happening in this chapter is that Anselm is being a little rhapsodic and poetic. It 
would be dead wrong to read this chapter as implying any kind of pantheism on Anselm’s 
part. 
Chapters 15–16 
I’m not going to spend a lot of time on Chaps. 15–16, although they are very important 
for Anselm’s overall project. They are discussed fairly well in Leftow’s Chap. 6 and the 
first part of Mann’s Chap. 11 in the Companion. 
I said earlier that I didn’t like Leftow’s article, and I don’t, but not because of its content. 
It’s the style I object to. For example, on p. 137, he quotes Anselm’s Monol. 15: 
 but in some cases the negation is in some respect the better; for 
example not-gold than gold. For it is better for a man to be not-gold than 
to be gold. 
Leftow then feels compelled to lecture us in schoolmaster-fashion about proper usage: 
Anselm’s example is not entirely apt. A man cannot be golden. Someone 
who tried to turn a man to gold would instead replace the man with a 
golden statue. So it cannot be better for a man to be non-golden than to be 
golden, any more than it can be better for him to be non-golden than to be 
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a round square. You can be better off being F than being G only if you can 
be F and can be G. 
That may very well all be correct, although I don’t think it’s nearly as settled as Leftow 
says. But in any case, it presupposes substantive metaphysical views about natural kinds. 
Does Anselm buy those views? Perhaps, but Leftow hasn’t given us any evidence to 
think so. Furthermore, Leftow is talking about turning one thing into another, whereas 
Anselm is talking about being one thing as opposed to being another—nothing about 
change at all. Does that affect the issue? Who knows—Leftow just passes over it. 
Isn’t Anselm’s point pretty clear? Isn’t he just saying it’s better to be a human being than 
to be gold? And in fact Leftow himself says right after the passage I just quoted: “Still, 
what Anselm has in mind is clear enough.” 
But if the point is clear enough, why scold Anselm for not putting the point Leftow’s 
way, a way that—as I said—presupposes substantive views about natural kinds that 
there’s no evidence Anselm shared? 
Why am I making a big deal out of this? Because I think this style of dealing with an 
historical author is rigged in advance. It assumes that we know what the correct views are 
on fundamental issues (like natural kinds), and therefore what the author should have said 
and how he should have put his point. In short, it is rigged in advance to guarantee that 
we’ll never really learn anything important from our author. 
(Still, you can get a lot out of Leftow’s paper.) 
Now—back to Chaps. 15–16. I said I wasn’t going to spend a lot of time on them, but I 
do want to say a little. 
Chap. 15 is entitled “What can and cannot be said of him [= the supreme essence] 
substantially.” There’s an important distinction drawn in this chapter between substantial 
or essential terms and relative terms. Let’s start with relative terms. 
A relative term, in this context, doesn’t necessarily mean a “polyadic relation” in the 
sense of modern logic—that is, a two-or-more place expression that links several things. 
E.g., “x is to the left of y” or x is between y and z.” Those will normally count as 
“relative” terms, but the notion here is broader than that and goes back to Aristotle’s 
Categories, which Anselm had access to through Boethius. 
A relative term is a term that is attributable to something in a way that doesn’t depend 
just on the structural or metaphysical features of that thing, but also on the features of 
other things. One standard example is ‘father’. Notice I say ‘father’—not ‘father of’, 
which is a two-place relation in the sense of modern logic. No, just ‘father’. 
You can take a man and so to speak dissect him metaphysically, making a list of all the 
components and ingredients of him. You won’t be able to tell that way whether he’s a 
father or not. Whether he’s a father depends on the existence of a child (at least the one-
time existence—perhaps the poor thing died). So ‘father’ is a relative term. 
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(‘Father of’ is also a relative term. You can’t tell just by looking at Abraham whether 
Abraham is the father of Isaac. But that kind of polyadic relative term is fairly familiar to 
us from modern logical lingo, and my point now is only that Anselm’s usage is broader. 
It’s also quite standard usage until much later, probably the 19th c.) 
Now, in Chap. 15, Anselm is talking about what can be said of the supreme being in 
terms of substance or essence, and he contrasts those terms with relative terms. Now it’s 
important to understand that these do not exhaust the alternatives. That is, if a term can be 
attributed to something, but it’s not a relative term, that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s an 
essential or substantial term. There are also accidental terms, which Anselm talks about 
in Chap. 25, among other places. 
In short, if you metaphysically dissect something, and make a list of all its components 
and ingredients (so that we’re ignoring relative features), they won’t necessarily all be 
essential or substantial ingredients; some of them may be accidents. 
What’s the difference between essence and accident in Anselm? That’s not altogether 
clear. In Aristotle, I think there’s a fairly good metaphysical notion of what the difference 
is, but what you don’t get even in Aristotle is any reliable criterion for checking whether 
a given term is an essential or an accidental term. Whether Anselm has even got the 
metaphysical notion that Aristotle has is not clear to me, but he certainly doesn’t have—
any more than Aristotle had—any practical criterion. 
However this works out in Anselm, let me warn you about a possible pitfall when you see 
this essence/accident lingo: Don’t think the distinction is between the features a thing 
must have in order to be the kind of thing it is (the essential features), and those it may or 
may not have and still be the kind of thing it is. That is, don’t just think the distinction is 
the distinction between the necessary and the contingent features of a thing, given that it 
exists. That’s a modern, analytic way of drawing the distinction, and it’s usually 
anachronistic to apply it to the Middle Ages. 
OK, so in Chap. 15 Anselm is talking about what can be said essentially or substantially 
about the supreme being. And, as Leftow discusses (p. 138), the upshot is that we can 
essentially attribute to it any perfection, and we cannot essentially attribute to it any non-
perfection. I refer you to his discussion to see how this goes. 
(I hasten to add that the expression ‘perfection’ is not Anselm’s; Anselm doesn’t use 
“perfection”-talk. But Leftow defines what he means by a “perfection” in terms of what 
Anselm does say, so that’s OK.) 
And so we get, in one fell swoop at the end of Chap. 15 (Basic Writings, p. 23): 
He must therefore be living, wise, powerful and all-powerful, true, just, 
happy, eternal, and whatever similarly it is absolutely better to be than not 
to be. 
What we have here is in effect a list of some perfections. And it presupposes a broadly 
“Platonic” value-ranking. 
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OK, now in Chap. 16, we get an important move. We’ve just seen a partial list of 
perfections, and we know now that they can all be said of the supreme being essentially 
or substantially. Chap. 16 now tells us that the supreme being is identical with all these 
perfections. Look at the title (p. 23): 
That for him, to be just is the same as to be justice, and the same thing 
holds for those things that can be said of him in a similar way [i.e., 
essentially or substantially] , … [In short, it holds for all those 
“perfections” we just saw listed at the end of Chap. 15.] 
The rest of the title may at first puzzle you: 
… and that none of these designates what sort of thing or how great he is, 
but rather what he is 
This is in effect a reference again to the Aristotelian theory of the Categories. The Latin 
for ‘what sort’ is quale, and the answer to a “‘what sort?’ question” is a quality. So too, 
the Latin for ‘how great’ is quantum, and the answer to a “‘how great?’ question” (either 
in the sense described in Chap. 2 or in the sense “how much?”, “how many?”) is a 
quantity. Again, the Latin for ‘what’ is quid, and the answer to a “‘what is it?’ question” 
is a quiddity, which is just another way of saying essence or substance. Now, quality, 
quantity, and substance are three of the famous Aristotelian categories. 
Aristotle’s Categories lists ten categories in all: substance, quantity, quality, relation, 
where, when, “position” (which doesn’t mean where, but something more like 
orientation), having, action, and “passion” (being passive). Let’s not worry for now about 
what all these are. 
It’s curious that Aristotle himself discusses only the first four of these “categories” at any 
length (substance, quantity, quality, relation). The remaining six are treated in a few 
offhand lines at the end of Cat. 9. 
Now Boethius (together with a number of other early commentators on Aristotle) 
regarded only the first four categories, the ones Aristotle spends time on, as really 
ontological categories, corresponding to entities in the world; the other six are just 
“manners of speaking,” verbal categories. And Anselm, we know, had access to 
Boethius’s views on this. 
So, what the end of the title of Monologion Chap. 16 is telling us, then, is that those 
“perfections” we’ve just identified with the supreme being are not qualities (“what 
kind?”) or quantities ( “how great?”, “how many”, “how much?”). And we already said 
back in Chap. 15 that we weren’t talking about relatives. So the only real thing left we 
can be talking about is quiddity (“what is it?”)—that is, essence or substance. In effect, 
then, the end of the title just reiterates the point in Chap. 15, that we’re concerned now 
with what we can say essentially or substantially about our supreme being. 
The actual argument in Chap. 16 is fairly straightforward, with a wrinkle. The wrinkle 
comes on p. 29: 
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… whatever he is—whether good or great or subsistent—he is through 
himself and not through another. 
Note that, back in Chap. 11 (p. 19), we learned that creatures are whatever they are 
through the supreme being, but there was nothing there about the creator’s being what it 
is. 
At first, this claim looks like just a restatement of what we learned back in the argument 
in Chap. 3 about “exists through,” and Williams adds a footnote (p. 23 n. 13) referring 
back to those opening chapters. And, with respect to “subsisting” as Anselm lists it here, I 
suppose it is. (As Williams explains in his “Glossary,” to “subsist” is just to “exist” as a 
substance.) But what about “good” and “great”? We know that the supreme being is 
essentially good and essentially great (from Chap. 15), but where do we get the claim that 
it is good and great through itself? 
The only way I can think of is if we have a kind of unstated premise here, to the effect 
that: 
if x is essentially φ, then it exists through φ-ness. 
We already know from the One-Over-Many Principle back in Chaps. 1–2 that if 
something is good it is good through goodness, and if it is great it is great through 
greatness. But what we’re saying in this unstated premise is that if something is 
essentially good, then it isn’t just good through goodness; it exists through goodness. 
As I said, this is unstated; but I think something like this is needed if the argument is 
going to go through. And it will go through in that case: The supreme nature is essentially 
good, great, just, etc. By our unstated principle, therefore, is exists through goodness, 
greatness, justice, etc. But we know from Chap. 3 that the supreme nature exists through 
nothing besides itself. Therefore, the supreme nature just is goodness, greatness, justice, 
etc. 
This is a famous doctrine, and was held by lots of other people in the Middle Ages. And 
it raises a host of serious problems. For, as we know from the One-Over-Many Principle 
in Chap. 1, all good things are good through goodness, and all great things are great 
through greatness, etc. But now we learn that goodness and greatness, and all those other 
perfections too, are identical with one another and with the supreme being. But look at 
the end of Chap. 16 (p. 24), where Anselm again gives us a list of perfections—this time 
including things like life, justice, truth, beauty and immortality. Are we supposed to say 
that all just things are just through immortality—even though not all just things are 
immortal? or that all true things are true through life, even though as we’ll see in 
Anselm’s On Truth not all true things are alive? The answer has to be yes, and the 
problem then is to make sense of that. This is a problem that will continue throughout the 
Middle Ages, and for that matter today in a certain type of philosophy of religion. 
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Chap. 17 
Chapter 17 argues that the supreme being (that is, the good in virtue of which all things 
are good, and which is the standard and measure of all good things, and all the other 
things we’ve established about it so far) is “simple.” That is, there’s no internal structure 
to it; it’s not composed of parts. 
Note two things here: 
1. First, whatever the doctrine of the Trinity means in the end, it’s generally 
interpreted as not violating this kind of divine simplicity. 
2. Second, note that if this simplicity can be established, then it also follows that the 
supreme being is not a material object, since material objects are always of a 
certain size, and can therefore be divided into a left half and a right half, for 
instance, and so into parts. Anselm himself doesn’t make this point in Chap. 17. 
He had already argued that the supreme being is not a material object back in 
Chap. 15, on the evaluative grounds that immaterial things are better than material 
ones. But Chap. 17 provides us with another way of arguing the same point 
without appealing to any ranking of values. 
The argument in Chap. 17 that the supreme being is simple is itself a pretty simple 
argument. Recall where we ended up as a result of the “exists through” argument back in 
Chapter 3: the supreme being is the unique being that exists through itself alone. (Even if 
you don’t grant Anselm his “One-Over-Many” step in the Chapter 3 argument, you still 
have the conclusion that there is one or more such self-existent things.) The argument in 
Chap. 17 then is that what is composite, made up of parts, depends on those parts. If α is 
made up of parts β and γ, then α depends on parts β and γ. Now β and γ are not each of 
them the whole of α, but are rather other than the whole of α. It follows that anything 
composite exists through its parts, which are other than it. And since the supreme being 
does not exist through anything except itself, it doesn’t have parts. That’s the proof. 
Chaps. 18–22 
Chapters 18–22 give us a rather extended discussion of how our supreme being is related 
to space and time. On the one hand, we say the supreme being (= God) is everywhere 
(“omnipresent”) and exists at all times. Yet we also often speak of God as outside space 
and time altogether. How can we have it both ways? 
Now let’s pause for a moment. As always with these traditional things people have said 
about God, we should stop and ask ourselves why people say them. Why do people want 
to insist that God is outside space and time? Or at any rate that he is not in space and time 
in the way ordinary things are. What is at stake in maintaining this? You’d be hard 
pressed to say there’s Scriptural authority for it. So what important doctrines are 
threatened if we don’t put God outside space and time? I think it’s always worth asking 
questions like that. 
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For example, the traditional doctrine of the simplicity of God, which we just just saw in 
the preceding chapter. That’s not in Scripture either. But we now see what’s at stake in 
the doctrine. If God weren’t metaphysically simple, he would not be independent; he 
would depend on things other than himself, thus compromising the doctrine of Creation, 
which people thought they could find in Scripture. 
Well, can we find a similar pressure behind the view that God is outside space and time? 
I don’t think the answer is entirely clear. But let’s keep it in mind as we go through our 
discussion. 
Now although the main discussion of how God is related to space and time is 
concentrated in Chaps. 20–22, there are some preliminaries as far back as Chap. 18. I 
want to look at this discussion, and particularly at Chaps. 20–22, because it illustrates at 
least three things: 
 It illustrates once again the point I made in our discussion of the Chap. 3 
argument, that you get a much more complicated and tighter kind of 
argumentation in Anselm than you get in the rhetorical, visionary style of 
philosophy we find in Augustine and others early authors. 
 It also illustrates a typical mediaeval philosophical technique, one that later 
folks will get very good at: the art of making distinctions. “When in trouble, 
make a distinction.” For example, we’ve already seen (Chap. 8) the distinction 
made between three ways in which we can say something is made out of 
nothing (ex nihilo). (Of course, Renaissance anti-scholastics thought this art 
just showed the decadence of mediaeval thought.) 
 It more or less illustrates the quaestio-form. This is a format for that became 
virtually the default format for discussing any topic in the later Middle Ages. 
It goes like this: First you state a question or issue on which there are two 
sides. Then you rehearse the arguments available  for the one side of the 
question, followed by the arguments for the other side. After setting out the 
arguments for the two sides, the author gives his own view on the question, 
followed by replies to the arguments for the losing side. 
This pattern is obviously very much like what happens in a court of law, 
where both sides present their case and then a verdict is handed down. (There 
usually isn’t a “reply” to the losing side in a law-court, however.) As I said, it 
became virtually the default format for discussing anything in the later Middle 
Ages. Thomas Aquinas’s massive Summa theologiae, for instance is a tissue 
of one quaestio after another in this format. You find discussions in this 
format in theology, law, medicine, physics—virtually everywhere. 
The discussion in Anselm’s Monologion, Chaps. 20–22, is an early example 
of this pattern. But it is not the very first. We can find earlier examples as 
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well. For instance, in Boethius’s mysterious treatise De hebdomadibus (= “On 
the Hebdomads,” whatever they are). 
With those preliminaries, then, here we go: 
Chapter 18 
In Chapter 18, we get an argument that the supreme being has no beginning in time, and 
no end in time either. The argument is this: Suppose it began to exist in time. (That is, 
suppose there are times t1 and t2, with t1 earlier than t2, such that the supreme being 
doesn’t exist at t1 but does exist at t2. This will work whether you regard t1 and t2 as 
instants or as intervals of time.) Then, Anselm says, in that case we can ask where it came 
from—not in a spatial sense, of course, but in a causal sense. What made the supreme 
being come to be at a certain time, what made it begin to be? There are three alternatives, 
each one absurd, he says: 
(a) It didn’t come from anything. That is, it did come into being, 
began to exist, but there’s nothing from or out of which, or through which 
(our prepositions ex and per, again), it came into being. This is absurd on 
the general principle: You don’t get something from nothing. There’s no 
ontological “free lunch.” 
We haven’t seen this principle appealed to before, although it’s 
reminiscent of the claim we’ve seen back in Chap. 3, that nothing exists 
through nothing, and the claim in Chap. 4 that per and ex can be used 
interchangeably. 
But that was about existing through, or existing out of or from, not—as 
here—about coming to be through, or coming to be out of or from. And 
it’s not at once clear how the notion of existing and the notion of coming 
to be are related. 
Yet, if we haven’t seen the principle that you can’t get something from 
nothing before, it still seems like a plausible principle in its own right. 
(Compare the third sense of being made ex nihilo [= “out of or from 
nothing”] we saw back in Chap. 8, p. 16.) 
(b) It came into being through something other than itself. But then its 
existence would be derived. It would depend for its existence on that 
something else, and as a result it wouldn’t be a self-existent being, which 
we know it is (from Chap. 3). (Note: This argument seems to presuppose 
that coming into existence from another → existence through another! Is 
there any reason to believe that?) 
(c) It came into existence through itself. Note that this doesn’t just 
mean it would exist through itself. We already know it does that. What 
we’re talking about here is something more: that the supreme being came 
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into existence through itself, gave itself existence. But—here’s another 
inviolable ontological principle that we haven’t seen before, but that 
seems pretty good: You can’t give what you don’t have to begin with, and 
you can’t get what you’ve already got. So the supreme being would have 
to exist already, in order to give itself existence. But then of course it 
wouldn’t need it. It would have to exist before it began existing, which is 
absurd. 
Since all three alternatives are absurd, Anselm concludes by reductio that the supreme 
being doesn’t begin to exist in time after all. In short, it always existed. 
But what about coming to an end in time? Can the supreme being temporally cease to 
exist? Notice that you can’t use the same kind of argument here. For while you can’t give 
what you don’t have to begin with, you certainly can lose what you do have to begin 
with. So Anselm has to adopt a different approach here, and he does. 
He adopts an approach that is reminiscent of a very strange argument for the existence of 
God St. Augustine gives in his On Free Choice of the Will, Book II, an argument that 
proceeds by identifying God with truth. (We’ll see something like this in Anselm’s own 
On Truth later on.) 
This new argument simultaneously gives a second argument that the supreme being did 
not begin to exist in time either. In other words, this new approach can be applied both to 
beginning and to ending in time, whereas the former argument only works for beginning. 
The new argument is this: 
Truth didn’t begin in time, and won’t end in time either. There neither was nor will be a 
time when there isn’t truth. For consider: it’s now true that I’m saying these words, on 
such and such a day at such and such a time. Hence, Anselm argues, it always was true in 
the past that I would be saying these words on this date at this time. That is, whether 
anybody knew it or not, the truth ‘Spade will be saying such and such on day d at time t’ 
was true at every time in the past, and therefore truth—at least that truth—always existed 
in the past. 
Note: This is not an “eternal truth” in the sense in which people sometimes talk about 
“eternal truths” as being without tense. (Boethius may have had such a notion, and is 
often interpreted that way, although that’s probably wrong.) The truths we’re talking 
about now very much have a tense. It’s just that their truth value doesn’t change over 
time—at least not up until the present time, when I actually do say these words, and it’s 
no longer true that I will say them on day d at time t.) So, at every time in the past there 
was at least that one truth. 
So too, in the present (on day d at time t), it is true that I am saying these words, and so 
once again, there is at least that truth. 
Similarly, it will always be true ever after in the future that I was saying such and such on 
day d at time t. There will never be a time when there won’t be at least that truth. Hence, 
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at every time in the past, present and future, there is at least some truth or other. In short, 
truth in general has no beginning or end in time. 
Anselm may well have taken this part of his argument straight from Augustine’s On Free 
Choice of the Will. In any case, at the end of Chapter 18, Anselm unceremoniously 
identifies the supreme being with truth (that is, with something like the Form of the True 
in Plato’s sense, namely, that in virtue of which all true things are true), reminiscent of 
Augustine’s move. This move is OK, in virtue of what we’ve already said in Chaps. 15–
16. 
But the argument doesn’t really need this identification. We might instead argue less 
ambitiously, like this: Either the supreme being is truth in this way, and in that case 
since, as we’ve just seen, truth has no beginning or end in time, therefore the supreme 
being has no beginning or end in time either (Q.E.D.); or else the supreme being is not 
identical with truth, and in that case truth must exist through the supreme being, since 
everything does that, as shown in Chap. 3. But in that case, whenever there is truth, you 
also have to have the supreme being, to support it. (Compare the discussion in Chap. 14 
earlier, about how the supreme being is in and through all things.) 
Therefore, whether or not the supreme being is to be identified with truth, it follows that 
since truth has no beginning or end in time, neither does the supreme being. This isn’t 
quite the way Anselm argues in Chapter 18, but it’s by no means a non-Anselmian 
argument. In fact, it’s similar to an argument we’ll see in just a moment. 
Chapter 19 
Chapter 19 is another discourse on “nothing.” We’ve just seen that the supreme being 
always was and always will be, that it neither begins nor ends in time, and therefore there 
is nothing before it and nothing after it in time. Anselm explains that we don’t mean by 
this that there was a time before the supreme being such that there was not anything that 
existed then, and that there will be a time after the supreme being such that there will not 
be anything that exists then. Rather, all we mean is that it is not the case that there was 
something before the supreme being or that there will be anything after it. In effect, what 
he is doing is distinguish between whether the negation or the temporal adverb has what 
logicians would call the “greater scope.” We don’t need to spend any more time on it 
than that. 
(The distinction here is between: “Before it, it is not the case that there is 
something”—which is false—and “It is not the case that before it there was 
something”—which is true.) 
Chapter 20 
All this is background. The supreme being is simple (Chapter 17), and doesn’t begin or 
end in time (Chapter 18). Anselm now goes on to ask how it is related to space and time. 
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And on this I want to call your attention to two items in the secondary literature (on E-
Reserves): 
 Edward Wierenga, “Anselm on Omnipresence,” and a reply to Wierenga: 
 Brian Leftow, “Anselm on Omnipresence.” 
Both appeared in The New Scholasticism. (“Scholasticism” in this context does not mean 
“scholarliness.” The journal is basically devoted to medieval philosophy, even though the 
“schools” usually associated with “scholasticism” didn’t arise until roughly a century 
after Anselm.) 
The argument in this part of the Monologion takes the form of a dilemma. In Chapter 20 
Anselm argues what appears to be the case about the supreme being with respect to space 
and time. In Chapter 21, he argues that this cannot be so after all. So we have a conflict. 
In Chapter 22 he resolves the conflict by making a distinction. (Notice the rudimentary 
quaestio format.) 
In Chapter 20, Anselm sets out three possibilities regarding the supreme being’s 
existence in space and time. Two of these are absurd, so that only the third is left. Either, 
he says, the supreme being exists 
(a) everywhere and always, 
(b) somewhere and sometime only, or 
(c) nowhere and never. 
Actually, there are obviously other combinations. Why not try: somewhere only, but 
always, or everywhere, but only at some time and not always? You can easily adapt 
Anselm’s argument to handle these cases. I leave that to you as an exercise. 
Alternatives (b) and (c) he argues are absurd. Consider (c). Recall that nothing exists 
unless it exists through the supreme being, as proved in Chapter 3. Hence wherever and 
whenever anything at all exists, the supreme being is somehow “present.” It must be then 
and there, “supporting” whatever exists then and there. I already pointed out a similar 
claim back in Chap. 14, where Anselm was talking about how the supreme being is “in 
and through” all things, and we had to ask what he meant (Basic Writings, pp. 20–21). In 
any case, if the supreme being existed nowhere and never, nothing at all would exist 
anywhere or ever, which is empirically false. (Remember how Anselm’s use of necessary 
reasons does not mean he can’t appeal to public, empirical facts.) 
Similarly, consider alternative (b). Suppose the supreme being existed or was somehow 
present only at certain times and places but not at all of them. Then only in those times 
and places would anything at all exist. At other times and places, there would be strictly 
nothing. In fact, there would not even exist those very times and places themselves, since 
they too exist through the supreme being. (Exactly what does this step assume about the 
ontology of space and time?) 
Hence, only alternative (a) remains: the supreme being exists always and everywhere. We 
already have independent argumentation for the “always” part of this, back in Chap. 18. 
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Chapter 21 
In Chapter 21, Anselm goes on to ask how it can be that the supreme being exists always 
and everywhere, as we’ve just argued it does. Once again, Anselm considers some 
alternatives. But this time, he argues that all the alternatives are absurd. 
So we have a dilemma. The supreme being has to exist always and everywhere (Chapter 
20), but there doesn’t seem to be any way it can do this (Chapter 21). This dilemma is 
resolved in Chapter 22. 
OK now, what are the alternatives considered (and rejected) in Chapter 21? Here we go: 
If a thing exists always and everywhere, then either () all of it does, or else () only part 
of it does, and the rest does not. Whatever alternative () might mean, it certainly doesn’t 
apply to the supreme being, since we saw in Chapter 17 that the supreme being is simple 
and just doesn’t have any parts. Hence, only alternative () is really serious. 
How then can God be thought to exist as a whole always and everywhere? Well, a thing 
can be thought to exist as a whole always and everywhere, either insofar as: 
(i) Part of it is here, part of it there, part of it now, part then, but all the 
times and places taken together jointly exhaust the whole. That’s not as 
obscure as it sounds. It’s in effect the sense in which we might say, for 
instance, that space is everywhere as a whole, and time as a whole is at all 
times. That is, part of space is here and part there, and if you take all the 
places together, you exhaust the whole of space. Likewise for time. This 
clearly won’t apply to the supreme being, since it has no parts. (Chap. 17.) 
(ii) The whole of it is here, and the whole of it there, the whole of it exists 
now, and the whole of it then. Only this alternative can apply to the 
supreme being. 
Up to now, Anselm has been treating place and time together. But now he decides to treat 
them separately, beginning with place. 
How then can a thing exist the whole of it here and also the whole of it there, and so on? 
There are two possibilities: (a*) The whole of it exists in all these places at the same 
time, or (b*) at different times. But (a*) is absurd. If the whole of a thing exists in a given 
place, then it doesn’t also exist outside that place at the same time. Otherwise, the whole 
of it wouldn’t be in that first place. Similarly, (b*) is absurd in the case of the supreme  
being. If the supreme being wholly existed here at this time, and there at that time, then 
there would be certain times when the supreme being didn’t exist at a given place. But 
we’ve already seen this is absurd. Nothing at all would exist at those places at the times 
the supreme being did not exist there—not even the places themselves would exist then. 
A slightly different argument will apply in the case of time. Either (a) the supreme being 
exists at all times at once, or (b) it exists at the various times in succession. But (a) is 
absurd, since times simply don’t come all at once. Yet (b) is absurd too, in the case of the 
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supreme being, because if it existed at the various times in succession, then it would have 
to have temporal parts: at time t1 one part of the supreme being would exist, and at time t2 
a later part of it would exist. (Note: Anselm seems to be here thinking of an individual as 
being somehow identified with its personal “history.” My future and my past are different 
“parts” or time-slices of me. This notion will have a distinguished future in Leibniz, not 
to mention more recent physics.) But this can be ruled out in the case of the supreme 
being, since it doesn’t have parts in the first place (Chap. 17). 
For a summary of the arguments in Chaps. 20–21, see the handout “Anselm on Space and 
Time.” 
Chapter 22 
So we have a real problem. At the end of Chapter 20, Anselm had shown that the 
supreme being has to exist always and everywhere. But now, in Chapter 21, he seems to 
have shown there is no way this is possible. All the alternatives are absurd. Some of them 
are ruled out as being absurd for any kind of thing—e.g., alternative (a); others are ruled 
out because of the special nature of the being we are dealing with—one that is absolutely 
simple and has no parts, and on which everything else causally depends (that is, through 
which everything else exists. 
How are we to resolve this apparent contradiction? That comes in Chapter 22, and 
illustrates a basic move of mediaeval thinking: When you get in trouble like this, make a 
distinction. And so Anselm does. Here’s the distinction: 
When a thing x is wholly at a place p at a time t, this can mean one of two things: (1) x is 
wholly present at p and t, in a sense that doesn’t exclude its also being wholly present at 
other places and times; or (2) x is contained in or bounded by p and t, so that x cannot 
also be wholly present at other places and times. (Note that the Latin word for “contain” 
in this argument [e.g., p. 32] is “continere,” literally “hold together.” I’ll say more about 
that in a moment.) In other words, there is an inclusive and an exclusive sense of being at 
a place and time. We can say ‘here and now’ to the exclusion of ‘there and then’, or we 
can say it without committing ourselves to ‘there and then’ one way or the other. Now 
when we say the supreme being is in a certain place at a certain time, and saying it in the 
sense in which it’s true, we’re using only the inclusive sense (1). 
So in the end Anselm is adopting alternative () in Chap. 20 above (the supreme being 
exists as a whole in all places and at all times), and denies that this is really absurd, 
despite the argument in Chap. 21. In particular, he ends up adopting alternatives (a*) and
—I think—(b) and rejecting the arguments against them. (I have some hesitations about 
Anselm’s acceptance of (b), but  I think I’ve got that right.) That’s his solution to the 
problem. 
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Remarks on the argument 
Please note carefully that Anselm’s “solution” here is not just an evasion. Our initial 
reaction to this argument, perhaps, is that he hasn’t really done anything at all. All he’s 
said is that there’s a sense, whatever it is, in which what appears to be contradictory isn’t 
really contradictory after all, and so the faith is saved. It’s just this kind of thing, you may 
suspect, that gives mediaeval philosophy the reputation of being a thinly disguised 
attempt to make sure all the right dogmas come out true, no matter what. 
But that’s not what’s going on at all. Anselm isn’t just looking around for some spurious 
distinction made up on the spot. Recall the arrangement of the argument. He’s forced to 
make some distinction, by the arguments in Chapters 20–21. Those arguments are really 
a demonstration that some distinction like this is necessary, that there must be some sense
—even if we can’t yet fully fathom how it works, there must be one—in which things can 
be wholly at a given place and time, and yet wholly at a different place and time. In other 
words, there must be some sense of being in a place and a time different from the 
workaday, garden variety sense in which we say things are in a place at a time. 
It’s important to remember that the arguments in Chapters 20–21 (and for that matter, the 
preliminary arguments in Chapters 17–18, and the “exists through” argument way back in 
Chapter 3) are purely philosophical arguments. There’s no appeal to the faith, no flinging 
around of Scripture verses—it’s all just pure reason and publicly verifiable empirical 
facts (recall the one step where we noted that some things do exist at some times and 
places). A hard-nosed opponent might disagree with Anselm’s arguments, but he’d have 
to admit that at least they’re the right kind of arguments to appeal to a philosopher in the 
strictest sense, as distinct from the theologian. Given this, and given the dilemma that is 
the outcome of Chapters 20–21, just what was Anselm supposed to do? From this point 
of view, the distinction drawn in Chapter 22 is the only philosophically responsible move 
he could have made! 
The moral of the story here is that we should always be careful about accusing a 
philosopher of being “ad hoc.” What may look initially like a totally ad hoc move usually 
has some kind of reasoning behind it. We may not like the reasoning, and it may in fact 
be bad reasoning. But there is usually some reasoning there. In fact, I think it would 
repay out time and effort to think long and hard about just what we are saying when we 
call a philosophical view or move ad hoc. 
Let me make some final remarks about the argument we’re discussing here. (1) First, just 
a little fact to file away, which has applications in medieval philosophy beyond Anselm. 
Notice the etymology of the word ‘contains’ that occurs in the argument in Chap. 22. (I 
said I would come back to this.) Literally and etymologically, ‘contains’ means “holds 
together.” This is what it means, for instance, for a cup to “contain” a quantity of liquid; 
it “holds it together” and keeps it from running all over the table and making a mess. It’s 
only a small extension of this to speak, for instance, of an envelope as “containing” a 
letter. It doesn’t “hold the letter together” as though the letter would suddenly fly apart if 
it were taken out of its envelope. But it does “hold it together” in the sense that the 
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enclosed letter is not also somewhere else. It’s “in” the envelope in the exclusive sense of 
the word. 
Here’s an application of  this point. When we speak about the usual theories of the 
relationship between soul and body, we nowadays tend to say the soul is “in” the body. 
Recall for example the Platonic-Augustinian notion that the soul is “in” the body like a 
captain in his ship, or like a ruler in his city. Now the soul is certainly not in the body in 
the inclusive sense of “in” distinguished in Chap. 22. That is, while the soul is in the body 
it cannot also be somewhere else—at least not on the usual theories. But you will find 
people in the Middle Ages who do want to say the soul is not “in” the body in the 
exclusive sense either. That is, the body does not “contain” the soul, “hold it together.” 
On the contrary, it’s the other way around: it’s the soul that contains the body. An 
Aristotelian/Thomistic theory, for instance, in which the soul is the substantial form of 
the body, giving it its structure and unity, would fit this manner of speaking very well. 
It’s not the body that holds the soul together; rather, it’s the soul that holds the body 
together. Hence, you’ll sometimes find people saying that the soul “contains” the body. 
(There’s a passage in Aquinas like this, for instance.) And my reason for bringing all this 
up is simply so that you won’t be surprised or puzzled if you see such claims in your 
philosophical studies. There’s nothing especially mysterious about it once you see that it 
all rests on a simple point of etymology. 
(2) Second, recall the argument in Chapter 20 for why the supreme being must exist 
always and everywhere. Basically, it was that, if there is a place and a time in which it 
didn’t exist, then nothing at all would exist in that place at that time—including the very 
place and time themselves. The reason for this is that all other things exist through the 
supreme being, depend on it. This dependence, as we’ve seen, is causal. Remember, back 
in Chap. 7, where I observed that Anselm seems to identify causality with existing 
through something other than yourself: x causes y =df. y exists through x and x ≠ y. 
So the argument in Chap. 20 that the supreme being must exist always and everywhere 
seems to be implicitly assuming that the effects of the supreme being cannot exist when 
or where their cause, the supreme being itself, doesn’t exist. In short, the hidden premise 
behind Chapter 20 seems to be that there is no causal action at a distance, either local or 
temporal distance. Cause and effect must be spatially and temporally contiguous. 
Given this, one obvious way out of the dilemma Anselm finds himself in after Chaps. 20–
21 would be simply to deny that there can be no action at a distance. This is a move that 
would appeal to modern sensibilities, perhaps, since—after all—nowadays we don’t think 
causes have to be contiguous with their effects. Think of all the effects the sun has, for 
instance, on earth. Yet the sun is 93 million miles away in space. And, given the speed of 
light, that means it fails to be contiguous in time by about eight minutes. 
Now at first it may appear that by accepting the conclusion of Chap. 20—that the 
supreme being must exist always and everywhere, the argument for which (we just said) 
relied on the contiguity of cause and effect—Anselm is in effect rejecting the solution 
I’ve just suggested and insisting on cause/effect contiguity anyway, and therefore we 
 48 
 
don’t really have to take what he does here seriously, because it relies on an antiquated 
notion of causality. 
But when you think about it a little longer, is that the way to think of it? After all, all we 
really need in order to satisfy Chap. 20 is some way of saying that causes are “present” 
when and where their effects are felt. And if that’s all we mean by cause/effect 
“contiguity,” then in that sense even we nowadays can cheerfully say that the sun is 
“present” here on earth and the American Civil War is still “present” even now—insofar 
as their effects are felt. So too, the supreme being exists always and everywhere because 
its effects are felt always and everywhere. And that’s all the inclusive sense of being in a 
place at a time really requires. 
Can’t we just then say that what Anselm does in Chap. 22, with the distinction between 
an exclusive and an inclusive sense of being in a place at a time, amounts in effect to 
reinterpreting the requirement of cause/effect contiguity so that it no longer means what 
we initially thought it did, coming at this question from the perspective of a much later 
period?  
(3) Third, I want to call your attention briefly to something that would surely have struck 
Anselm’s contemporary readers, and in fact all medieval readers. His talk in Chap. 21 
about how something (in particular, the supreme being) can exist as a whole, at the same 
time in several different places—see (a*) above, which we said Anselm accepts—sounds 
an awful lot like Boethius’s notion of what a universal is. Boethius gave a famous 
account of the problem of universals in one of his commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge 
(recall what this was), and in that account he came up with one of the standard definitions 
of a universal used throughout the Middle Ages: 
A universal is that which can be common to several things (a) as a whole, 
(b) at the same time, and (c) in such a way as to enter their internal 
metaphysical make-up (their structure). (This third clause, of course, is 
always the hard one to interpret.) 
We’ve now learned that the supreme being is “present” as a whole, at the same time in 
several places at once (in fact in all of them), in order to sustain those places and 
whatever exists in them. Does this mean the supreme being is a universal in the Boethian 
sense? 
No, and the reason is clause (c). Universals have to enter into the structure of what 
they’re common to in a closer way than what we’ve just been talking about with the 
supreme being and the sun—at least they do unless we want to say the sun is a universal 
too! 
Nevertheless, the way in which universals are said to be wholly present at the same time 
in all their several instances is quite reminiscent to the way the supreme being is said to 
be omnipresent. So, whichever one you take to be the more mysterious—divine 
omnipresence or universals—you can think of it more or less in terms of the other. 
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(4) Finally, recall that earlier I said we should try to keep in mind what is really at stake 
when people talk about God as being outside space and time. Let’s see where we stand on 
that. 
When you look back, it is striking that Anselm doesn’t anywhere in this discussion say 
that God is outside space and time. (You may want to compare what he says in the 
Proslogion, Chaps. 13 and 19, or in the De Concordia, to see if he says it in those 
places.) All he says here in the Monologion is that God is not “in” space and time in any 
sense that would confine him to a place or time, to the exclusion of other places or times. 
All he’s worried about is that we not think of God as being “in” space and time in what 
we’ve called the exclusive sense. And the reason is because of the pressure of the 
doctrine of creation: everything else depends on God (Chap. 3). 
I suspect, although I cannot prove, that this is really the reason too some other people do 
say that God is “outside” space and time—simply to ensure that he’s not confined to a 
place or time in the way we’ve now learned to distinguish. 
The Proslogion 
Let’s now put the Monologion aside for the present, and turn to the Proslogion, which 
contains the famous “ontological argument” for the existence of God. In connection with 
the Proslogion, and with the ontological argument in particular, you should also read the 
reply to it by one of Anselm’s contemporaries, one Gaunilo (Gaunilon) of Marmoutiers, 
and Anselm’s own reply to Gaunilo (both in Basic Writings). (DISTRIBUTE MAP OF 
MARMOUTIERS.) 
We’ll talk shortly about this reply and counterreply. For now, get the name straight: 
‘Gaunilo’ and ‘Gaunilon’ are the only correct forms. Don’t call him “Guano” or 
“Galliano,” or other variations I’ve seen! 
The reason the ‘n’ is optional at the end of his name goes back to a point 
of philology. In the nominative case, the man’s name is ‘Gaunilo.’ This is 
a third-declension noun, with the genitive form ‘Gaunilonis’. That extra 
‘n’ is retained in other oblique cases too. Now, in deriving words from 
Latin third-declension nouns, English sometimes uses the nominative, but 
sometimes the oblique form instead. Thus, we talk about “Cicero” the 
great Roman orator, based on the nominative form of his name; but we 
form the adjective “Ciceronian” from the genitive “Ciceronis.” Again, 
Latin origo/originis = “origin.” That’s the end of this little language 
lesson! 
Now the Monologion was written 1075–76, and you’ve read the story about how it came 
to be written. (The monks persuaded Anselm “against his will” to set down some of the 
arguments they’d heard him give them in conversation.) 
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The Proslogion was written about a year or so later, 1077–78, according to the 
chronology in Richard Southern’s biography. And he tells us in a “Prologue” (Basic 
Writings, pp. 75–76) how it came to be written too. 
Unlike the Monologion, this time Anselm doesn’t claim the work was written only at the 
urging of others—that it was other people’s idea, and only more or less against his will. 
This one seems to have been done under his own initiative. As he tells us (p. 75), he 
looked back over the Monologion, and 
I began to wonder, when I considered that it is constructed out of a 
chaining together of many arguments [which is certainly a fair assessment, 
as we’ve seen], whether it might be possible to find a single argument that 
needed nothing but itself alone for proof, that would by itself be enough to 
show that God really exists; that he is the supreme good, who depends on 
nothing else, but on whom all things depend for their being and for their 
well-being; and whatever we believe about the divine nature. 
He goes on to tell us how he puzzled and puzzled without success, and was about to give 
the whole project up when the solution came to him—and the rest is history. 
Now think about what he’s just said. He is looking for one single argument. Most people 
take it for granted that the one single argument he came up with is the so called 
ontological argument, the proof for the existence of God in Chap. 2 of the Proslogion—
together perhaps with the additional argument in Chap. 3 that, not only does God exist, 
but can’t even be thought not to exist, and the brief further discussion in Chap. 4 of how 
the Biblical “Fool” of the Psalms can be so foolish as to say otherwise. 
And, it must be admitted, that section of the Proslogion (Chaps. 2–4) is certainly the most 
prominent and action-packed in the whole work. But look at what Anselm says his “one 
single argument” is supposed to do: 
to show that God really exists [that happens in Chaps. 2–4]; that he is the 
supreme good, who depends on nothing else [you might want to say that is 
an implicit result of Chap. 2], but on whom all things depend for their 
being and for their well-being [that’s certainly not discussed anywhere in 
Chaps. 2–4]; and whatever we believe about the divine nature [there’s 
nothing that goes that far in Chaps. 2–4, although a lot of it is covered in 
the later chapters of the Proslogion]. 
What I am suggesting then is that what Anselm has in mind by his one single argument is 
not so much the central argument in Chap. 2, or even the cluster of Chaps. 2–4, as the 
whole of the Proslogion. Just keep that idea in mind. 
One other thing about this “Prologue.” Note on p. 75, that Anselm remarks that the 
original title of the Monologion was A Pattern for Meditation on the Reason of Faith—
i.e., reason for faith. In short, it’s all about those necessary reasons we talked about 
earlier. Note also that he calls it a pattern for “meditation,” and recall that he had earlier 
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written a series of “Prayers and Meditations.” So the suggestion is that, originally, the 
Monologion was regarded as simply a continuation of this series of “meditations.” 
The original title of the Proslogion, however, was “Faith Seeking Understanding”—fides 
quaerens intellectum. Recall our earlier talk about “unless I believe I shall not 
understand” and “I believe in order to understand.” Those phrases appear at the very end 
of Chap. 1 of the Proslogion. 
Anselm also tells us that, although these were the original titles of these two works, he 
eventually came to call them, for short, the Monologion, that is, Greek for “monologue”
—or “speech made to oneself” as our translation has it (Basic Writings, p. 76)—and 
Proslogion, that is, Greek for “address,” “speaking to”—“a speech made to another,” as 
our translation has it (p. 76). And that is exactly what the Proslogion is—a prayer to God. 
Notice how the whole tone of the work is quite different from the Monologion’s, which 
isn’t addressed to anyone at all, not even to God. 
Finally, where is Anselm getting these Greek titles? He didn’t know Greek. (He may 
have known a few words, but I don’t know of anywhere else Anselm uses Greek words.) 
Roadmap of the Proslogion 
As we did at the beginning of the Monologion, let’s just do a brief roadmap of the whole 
thing, by looking at the Table of Contents Anselm himself provides for us on pp. 77–78. 
Only this time, let’s also see how far we can correlate the chapters of the Proslogion with 
corresponding passages in the Monologion. 
First of all, in Chap. 1, we get a kind of “mood setting” prayer/meditation to lead into the 
rest. Then in Chaps. 2–4, we get the centerpiece of the whole work, the ontological 
argument and the surrounding context. (There is nothing like Chaps. 2–4 in the 
Monologion.) 
Chap. 5: “That God is whatever it is better to be than not to be” [cf. Monologion, Chap. 
15, about what we can and cannot say of God substantially or essentially], “and that he 
alone exists through himself” [Monologion, Chap. 3] “and makes all other things from 
nothing” [Monologion, Chaps. 5–8]. 
Chap. 6: “How God can perceive even though he is not a body.” [That God is not a body, 
cf. Monologion 15. That he is “perceptive”—i.e., knowing—is not something we’ve 
talked about at all in the Monologion, although we have talked about his having a plan 
for creation (Chap. 9).] 
Now notice Chaps. 7–11. There is nothing comparable in the Monologion. These chapters 
are attempts to reconcile apparently conflicting divine attributes: How can be said to be 
“omnipotent,” even though there are lots of things he can’t do (e.g., he can’t sin). How he 
can be both merciful and yet impassible (that is, not subject to compassion, which would 
make him passive). How he can be both just and yet merciful? 
 52 
 
In effect, what we are getting here is a short discussion of what we might call “the 
coherence of theism.” I said early on, when we were talking about faith and reason in 
Anselm, that—unlike a lot of modern writers in philosophy of religion—Anselm is not 
particularly interested in worrying about this kind of problem. But here he does discuss it 
in these chapters. 
Chap. 12: “That God is the very life by which He lives and so on for similar attributes.” 
[This corresponds to Monologion 16, where we saw that God isn’t just just, but is 
identical with justice, and in fact identical with all the “perfections”—to use Leftow’s 
expression (Cambridge Companion, Chap. 6)—we say of him essentially or 
substantially.] 
There are some other miscellaneous chapters in the Proslogion. But note especially: 
Chap. 18 “That there are no parts in God or in his eternity, which he himself is.” [See 
Monologion 17 on divine simplicity.] 
Chap. 19: “That God is not in place or time, but all things are in him.” [Monologion, 
Chaps. 14 (on being “in), and Chaps. 20–22 (on place and time).] 
The Ontological Argument 
Let’s turn now at last to the centerpiece of the Proslogion, the ontological argument: 
Chaps. 2–4. 
Notice first of all something I remarked on when I was talking about what it takes to be a 
“proof for the existence of God.” At the beginning of Chap. 2 (p. 81), we’re in the prayer-
mode; it’s addressed to God. He continues to use the second-person prayer forms “Lord” 
and “God” that he’s been using in the preceding chapter: 
Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to faith [recall “faith 
seeking understanding”], grant that, insofar as you know it is useful to me, 
I may understand that you exist as we believe you exist, and that you are 
what we believe you to be. Now we believe that you something than 
which nothing greater can be thought. So can it be that no such nature 
exists, since “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no /p. 82 God’”? 
The reference is to the Psalms, where the Fool is so foolish as to say it twice. Our Basic 
Writings volume cites Ps. 14:1 and 53:1. The numbers in parentheses following those 
references—(13:1) and (52:1)—are the numbering of the Psalms in the old Latin Vulgate 
text, and that differs from the numbering in the Hebrew MSS, which are more commonly 
used nowadays. 
My point, though, is that from this point on, Anselm abruptly drops the second-person 
form and the words “Lord,” “God”, etc., and proceeds only in terms of this one 
characteristic he’s picked—being something than which nothing greater can be thought. 
 53 
 
This continues right up until the second paragraph of Chap. 3 (p. 82), when he just as 
abruptly switches back to the second-person prayer mode: “And this is you, O Lord our 
God.” 
Something Than Which Nothing Greater Can Be Thought 
Let’s pause over this phrase. There are several points to make about it. 
(1) First of all, master it. It’s not that hard. Don’t say “something OF which nothing 
greater than can be thought of,” or gibberish like that. It just means “what you can’t think 
of anything greater than.” (I suspect the reason people have so much trouble with it is 
because of the turned-around ‘than which’, which is just done to avoid ending the phrase 
with the ‘than’.) 
(2) Second, Anselm isn’t altogether mechanical about his use of this phrase. He’ll say 
“something than which nothing greater ,” “that than which no greater ,” and so on. 
So it isn’t strict. 
(3) Third, some points of translation: There are two clusters of terms at stake in Anselm’s 
discussion. 
One is intelligere or intellectus = “understanding” or “intellect” or “mind.” So we’ll see 
talk about how even the fool understands the phrase “something than which nothing 
greater can be thought,” and therefore it exists at least in his mind. The word here is 
intellectus and its cognates. 
The other is cogito or cogitare. This is literally “to think,” as in Descartes’s cogito ergo 
sum. But, for some reason, some translators translate it “conceive” in the context of the 
ontological argument. So you’ll see “something than which no greater can be 
CONCEIVED,” or “that than which no greater can be CONCEIVED.” There isn’t any 
difference here at all in the Latin; it’s just a translator’s preference. (Latin does have a 
separate word for “conceive”—concipere, which Anselm does not use here.) I’ll probably 
sometimes say “that than which no greater can be CONCEIVED,” simply because that’s 
what I’m most used to. 
There’s also talk about “saying in one’s heart,” and heaven only knows what that means. 
My point is that, in Anselm’s own argument, Gaunilo’s reply to Anselm and Anselm’s 
own counterreply, there’s a lot of talk about the differences between “saying in one’s 
heart,” understanding, and thinking, and it’s all very confusing. But there’s no point in 
making it more confusing by introducing conceiving as if it were yet a distinct notion. It 
isn’t in this context. So don’t be any more confused than necessary. 
(4) Fourth, notice that we haven’t seen anything like this notion of something than which 
nothing greater can be thought in the Monologion. There we talked (Chap. 2) about that 
which is “great through itself,” and through which all other great things are great. We 
may even get talk about how this thing is the greatest of all—that is, some kind of 
maximum of what actually exists (“supreme greatness”). But what we don’t get anywhere 
in the Monologion is talk that goes beyond what actually exists; we get no talk, for 
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instance, about something than which nothing greater can be thought. That’s something 
new, and I suspect it was this feature that Anselm saw as the crucial difference between 
the arguments of the Monologion and the argument of the Proslogion. 
(5) Fifth, notice the resolutely negative formulation of the phrase: “something than which 
nothing greater can be thought,” or “that than which no greater can be thought.” There’s 
no suggestion here that such a thing can be thought—only that nothing greater can be 
thought. Whether such a thing can be thought or not, whether it can be understood or not, 
is something we’ll have to see. But be warned: The title of Proslogion Chap. 15 is “That 
God is greater than can be thought”—suggesting that you cannot think of God. And you 
might very well object that we have to be able to think of such a thing in at least some 
minimal way, or else Anselm’s argument can’t even be stated. That may very well be 
true, but my point right now is that this fact, if it is a fact, isn’t one built in to Anselm’s 
very carefully negative formula. 
(6) Sixth, note that Anselm did not originate this phrase. He appears to have been the first 
to build an argument for the existence of God on the basis of it, but the actual phrase, or 
something very close to it, can be found earlier. Various people have thought they’ve 
seen antecedents of the phrase in Seneca (whom Anselm didn’t have access to) and other 
sources, but on the whole I haven’t been convinced. Nevertheless, there is one absolutely 
certain antecedent: Augustine, On the Customs of the Manichees (De moribus 
manichaeorum), II, 11 § 24, which describes God as a being “than which nothing better 
can be or be thought” (quo esse aut cogitari melius nihil possit). I don’t know for sure 
whether Anselm had access to this work, but in any case there it is. 
Preliminaries 
The expression “ontological argument” is not Anselm’s, of course. It seems to have been 
originated by Kant. See Critique of Pure Reason B 620–31, where Kant famously 
discusses and rejects what he calls an “ontological” argument. I have never seen any 
satisfactory account of why this argument is called “ontological.” To be sure, it has an 
“ontological” result in the sense that it tries to prove the existence of something, but then 
so does any other argument for the existence of God. There may also be some connection 
with a theory sometimes known as “ontologism,” found in Malebranche. (That’s the view 
that God and the “divine Ideas” are the primary object of the intellect.) But that’s not 
involved in either Anselm’s version of the “ontological” argument or Descartes’s. And 
I’ve never been ever to figure out what that connection would be or why Kant would be 
thinking particularly of Malebranche, any more than, say, of Descartes or Leibniz, who 
seem to be the ones he mainly has in mind. So the actual term “ontological argument” is 
something of a mystery. But it’s now widespread and generally accepted, so let’s not 
quibble over it. 
In any event, an ontological argument seems to be an argument that tries to show the 
existence of something (God, in particular) merely on the basis of the concept or 
definition of it. To put it baldly (and perhaps not entirely correctly), an ontological 
argument for the existence of God is an attempt to prove that God exists by definition. 
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As I’m sure you know, the literature on the so called ontological argument is enormous. 
And a lot of it, I’m afraid, is simply not very good. Indeed, I am tempted to say there has 
been more nonsense written about the ontological argument than about any other single 
philosophical topic! We’ll see some of it in this course. 
Let me tip my hand at the outset. I don’t think the ontological argument works, and I 
certainly don’t think Anselm’s ontological argument works. Nevertheless, what the 
ontological argument tries to do is not stupid or silly on the face of it. The argument has 
too often been dismissed out of hand because it tries to argue from the mere concept of 
something (namely, God) to the actual existence of that thing. And that, so it’s said, is 
impossible in principle. 
Why should we think it’s impossible in principle? Because if we could do that, then we 
could prove the existence of all sorts of crazy things? Well, hardly—although sometimes 
people try to say that is the issue. But from the fact that we cannot in every case deduce a 
thing’s existence from its mere definition it by no means follows that we cannot do it 
quite correctly in some special cases. Surely anyone who seriously upholds the 
ontological argument thinks it works only because there’s something quite special about 
the concept of God. I’m afraid what usually happens here is that the “refutation” boils 
down to: You can’t conclude the existence of even a single thing from its concept alone, 
because if you could do that then the ontological argument would probably work, and we 
just know that can’t be right. This is a refutation that has all the advantages of not 
actually requiring you to look at what it is you’re refuting. But I’m afraid it just won’t 
work; we can’t say the ontological argument fails because if it didn’t it would work! 
Another line you sometimes still hear is that logical truths, conceptual or definitional 
truths, are analytic or a priori, while truths about what does and what does not exist are 
synthetic or a posteriori. This is the Humean distinction between relations of ideas and 
matters of fact. Somehow people have got it into their collective head that this is a sharp 
and exclusive division, that merely thinking about something can never tell us anything at 
all about what does or doesn’t exist in the real world. 
For instance, J. N. Finlay, in his article “Can God’s Existence Be Disproved?” in the 
famous collection New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London and New York, 1955), 
tells us (p. 47): 
The proofs based on the necessities of thought are universally regarded 
[notice the appeal to “consensus” here, rather than any actual argument or 
evidence] as fallacious: it is not thought possible to build bridges between 
mere abstractions and concrete existence. 
Again, I. M. Crombie, in the same collection (p. 114): 
For all existential statements are contingent; that is to say, it is never true 
that we can involve ourselves in a breach of the laws of logic by merely 
denying of something that it exists. 
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But this is just dogma. The idea is that analytic truths can never tell us about what does or 
doesn’t exist in the world. As Finlay says, we cannot “build bridges” between thought 
and existence in that way. In Crombie’s expression, “all existential statements are 
contingent.” 
Now the analytic/synthetic distinction has been subjected to much criticism—for 
example, in Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” and other places. But quite apart 
from general Quinean worries, if we just step back and think for a moment about what 
Finlay and Crombie are saying, it’s blatantly and uncontroversially false. Consider “there 
exists a greatest prime number,” “there exists a round square.” Are those existential 
statements contingent (Crombie)? We quite frequently and unproblematically “build a 
bridge” (Finlay) between thought and reality in the one direction. We regularly conclude 
from an examination of a concept that turns out to be contradictory that there exists no 
corresponding object in reality. In other words, we frequently and without hesitating pass
—“build a bridge”—from the conceptual level to the real level when what we’re inferring 
is non-existence. Why should we not be able to do this at least in some cases when what 
we’re inferring is the existence of something? Why the peculiar asymmetry? 
No, if we just set our philosophical dogmas aside for a moment, it should be clear that 
these responses to the ontological argument are just evasions, attempts to dismiss the 
argument without actually taking the trouble to look at it in detail. But that’s cheating, 
and everyone knows it. No self-respecting thinker can get  by with shortcuts like that. 
Now I’ve given you this little pep-talk not to defend Anselm’s ontological argument (I 
think it fails), but to defend studying the argument—and studying it without prejudice 
about how it must—it just must—fail. 
Different versions of the ontological argument 
There are in fact at least two different kinds of “ontological arguments”—and I mean two 
quite different kinds of arguments. One is Anselm’s argument in Proslogion Chap. 2 
(with correlative material in Chaps. 3–4, Gaunilo’s reply and Anselm’s own response to 
Gaunilo). Another kind of ontological argument is found in Descartes’s fifth Meditation, 
and touched up in his Replies to the Objections. (Not to be confused with a quite different 
kind of argument for the existence of God in Descartes’s third Meditation.) Although 
Anselm’s and Descartes’s ontological arguments that try to prove the existence of God 
solely on the basis of the concept or definition of God, they are otherwise are completely 
different. 
Don’t mix them up. Part of the requirements for this course is that at least one of your 
“research reports” be about the ontological argument. And by that I mean Anselm’s 
ontological argument. People frequently lump all ontological arguments together, as 
though they were somehow all the same thing, and they aren’t at all. Anselm’s argument, 
for instance, proceeds by reductio, whereas Descartes’s does not. Anselm nowhere says 
anything at all about existence’s being a “perfection” or a “predicate.” That’s Cartesian 
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talk, not Anselmian. (Actually, Descartes talks about “perfections”; it’s Kant who talks 
about “predicates.”) 
The difference between the two kinds of argument is important. For Anselm’s version, I 
maintain, fails, whereas Descartes’s can be defended. I don’t say it works. But it can be 
defended at least in the sense that its success, after you touch it up a bit, depends 
ultimately on certain modal and perhaps epistemological questions that are controversial 
and open. In particular, it depends on the question whether or not the notion of God is a 
consistent notion to begin with. (HANDOUT ON DESCARTES’S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.) 
Anselm’s argument, as near as I can figure out, does not presuppose that the notion of 
God—or rather, of something than which nothing greater can be thought—is consistent. 
Of course, if Anselm’s argument succeeds in proving the existence of God, then it will 
trivially follow that the notion of God is a consistent one; but the argument doesn’t 
assume that to begin with. 
Let’s set aside Descartes’s version of the ontological argument for now. Just remember to  
make sure, when you write your research report on the ontological argument, that it’s 
Anselm’s version you’re talking about. It’s OK to contrast Anselm with things that are 
said about the Cartesian argument; I just want to make sure you understand that there’s a 
difference, and are focused on Anselm’s argument without running it together 
indiscriminately with Descartes’s. 
The Fool 
We’ve already briefly met Gaunilo or Gaunilon, the author of a reply to Anselm’s 
ontological argument. Gaunilo was not one of Anselm’s monks at Bec but a monk at the 
nearby abbey of Marmoutier  He read Anselm’s Proslogion argument, and while Gaunilo 
admired Anselm very much and was just as steadfast in the faith as the next person, he 
thought he could recognize a bad argument when he saw one. So he wrote a reply, in 
which he tried to expose the fallacy in Anselm’s argumentation. As we’ve seen, Anselm 
puts his own argument in the context of the Biblical Fool of the Psalms, who “says in his 
heart ‘There is no God’.” The question then for Anselm was in effect “How are we going 
to answer the Fool?” In this context, Gaunilo entitled his own little reply On Behalf of the 
Fool (= Pro insipiente—Basic Writings, pp. 99–103). It’s generally included in 
anthologies or collections that reproduce the text of Anselm’s own argument. Of course, 
it wasn’t that Gaunilo really believed, like the Biblical Fool, that there is no God; it’s just 
that he thought the Fool would have had more to say on his own behalf than Anselm gave 
him credit for. (Fair warning: Gaunilo’s On Behalf of the Fool is an extremely cryptic 
work. The difficulties you may have with it are not just your or the translator’s fault. The 
Latin itself is pretty obscure, and it’s frequently hard to tell just what Gaunilo means.) 
Anselm in turn wrote a reply to Gaunilo, in which he sought to defend his original 
argument and supplement it with some further remarks. People sometimes think they see 
importantly new and different arguments in Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, but I don’t. 
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Anselm’s reply is likewise generally included in anthologies and collections that contain 
Gaunilo’s text and Anselm’s original argument. (In our volume, it’s on pp. 105–16.) 
In fact, Anselm himself directed that whenever his Proslogion was copied out (in 
manuscript form), Gaunilo’s On Behalf of the Fool and his own reply to Gaunilo should 
be included. It’s really quite heartwarming to note how respectfully this exchange is 
carried out. There’s none of this petty academic “scoring of points” you so often see. 
There’s one last point I want to consider before we start in on the argument for real: Does 
Anselm think his argument has the power to convince the Fool? This is of course 
connected to our discussion of Anselm’s use of necessary reasons earlier, and of how his 
arguments are not supposed to presuppose the faith. 
A moment ago, I described Anselm’s rhetorical task in Proslogion, Chap. 2, as “How are 
we going to answer the Fool” or “What are we going to say to the Fool”? As if the 
ontological argument were directed against the Fool. 
But that’s not quite right. Remember, the whole of the Proslogion is a prayer. It’s 
directed to God, not to the Fool or to anyone else. What he says when he introduces the 
ontological argument is not “What are we going to say to the Fool” or “How are we 
going to convince the Fool,” but merely “can it be” as the Fool says—that there is no 
God. There’s no suggestion here that he’s trying to convince the Fool of the error of his 
ways. In fact, at the end of Chap. 3 (p. 83) he perhaps suggests that this is a hopeless 
cause: 
So then why did “the fool say in his heart, ‘There is no God’,” when it is 
so evident to the rational mind that you among all beings exist most 
greatly? Why indeed, except because he is stupid and a fool? 
On the other hand, there’s also the suggestion that if it weren’t for his incorrigible 
stupidity, the Fool should see the force of Anselm’s argument. In Chap. 2 (p. 82) he notes 
that even the Fool understands the expression “something than which nothing greater can 
be thought”—and this is all it takes to get the ontological argument going. In other words, 
the Fool may be incorrigibly stupid, but it’s not just because he doesn’t believe in God. 
The argument doesn’t presuppose belief in God; all it presupposes is that you’re not 
stupid. 
How you sort all this out is an open question. Recall the suggestion I made some time 
ago, that perhaps Anselm thinks that fallen and unredeemed human nature is corrupted to 
the extent that lack of faith not only means you don’t believe in God, but also affects your 
purely rational powers. 
The Proof Itself 
Let’s look at the proof itself. I should tell you that my reading of the ontological 
argument—or at least the reading I’m going to give you now—is ultimately inspired by 
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David Lewis’s excellent paper “Anselm and Actuality” (on E-reserves). I have a reply of 
my own based on Lewis’s paper, called “Anselm and Ambiguity,” and that is the 
proximate source of what I’ll be saying here. (But I’ve smoothed it out and supplemented 
it for my present presentation.) 
Here’s the crucial text from Proslogion, Chap. 2 (Basic Writings, p. 82): 
But when this same fool hears me say “something that which nothing 
greater can thought,” he surely understands what he hears; and what he 
understands exists in his understanding (intellectus), even if he does not 
understand that it exists [in reality]. 
Then we get a little discussion about the difference between something’s existing “in the 
understanding” and understanding that it “exists in reality.” Then, still on p. 82 we pick 
up again: 
So even the fool must admit that something than which nothing greater 
can be thought exists at least in his understanding, since he understands 
this when he hears it, and whatever is understood exists in the 
understanding. And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought 
cannot exist only in the understanding. For if it exists only in the 
understanding, it can be thought to exist in reality as well, which is 
greater. So if that than which a great cannot be thought exists only in the 
understanding, then the very thing than which a greater cannot be thought 
is something than which a greater can be thought. But that is clearly 
impossible. Therefore, there is no doubt that something than which a 
greater cannot be thought exists both in the understanding and in reality. 
Let’s see if we can outline the argument as follows: 
1. There exists in the understanding (or “mind”—in intellectu) something 
than which nothing greater can be thought. (Let’s just agree to abbreviate 
that whole phrase by z, for short.) 
2. Suppose, as a hypothesis for reductio, z doesn’t exist in reality. 
3. Nevertheless, z can be thought to exist in reality, and that would be 
greater. 
4. Hence z—i.e., something than which nothing greater can be 
thought—is not after all something than which nothing greater can 
be thought. (I just thought of something greater, in step 3.) Thus, z 
 z, which is a contradiction. 
5. Since the hypothesis in step 2 leads to a contradiction in steps 3–4, it must 
be false. Thus (by reductio), z does exist in reality after all. 
[DISTRIBUTE HANDOUT THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT] 
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Existence in the understanding 
This clever argument has several features that may misleadingly look like weaknesses, 
but really aren’t. For example, what’s this dubious business about “existing in the 
understanding” or “in the mind”? Anselm tells us that even the Fool understands the 
phrase ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’ when he hears it. And so, 
in that sense, he says, something than which nothing greater can be thought “exists” in 
his understanding, although whether or not it exists in reality is quite another question. 
Whatever this means, it’s clear that “existing in the understanding” is supposed to be a 
very minimal thing. I suspect all it means is that the phrase is a syntactically well-formed 
nominal phrase, so that any competent speaker of the language would be able to deal with 
it. If that’s right, then step 1 of the argument, although perhaps put rather colorfully, isn’t 
really a controversial claim and can be reasonably granted even by the Fool. The Fool has 
no intention of denying that God “exists” in his understanding, if that’s all it means; what 
he denies is that God also exists in reality. 
So, if I’m right, step 1 is an extremely minimal claim. ‘Something than which nothing 
greater can be thought’ is a syntactically well-formed expression, in a way that “gooby-
gooby skrimshel fot” isn’t (because those aren’t English words), or in the way “the 
between wow over to alas” isn’t, because—while the words are English—they don’t 
parse syntactically. 
I want to say two things here: First of all, step 1 can’t mean much more than this, or there 
is no reason to think the Fool is going to be forced to grant it. It doesn’t imply, for 
instance, that the phrase describes something consistent or possible; the Fool need not 
grant even the possibility of this thing. After all, I can understand the expressions “round 
square” or “greatest prime number” too. (If I couldn’t, I wouldn’t be able say such things 
don’t exist, and I wouldn’t even be able to start a proof that there is no greatest prime 
number.) 
Second, despite all that, I think it’s fairly clear that Anselm did have something stronger 
in mind with this “exists in the understanding” talk. Anselm and Gaunilo get into it in 
Gaunilo’s On Behalf of the Fool and Anselm’s Reply, and part of the issue is over how to 
interpret this expression. 
We’ll talk about this later on, but for now I just want to pass over it—because, notice: we 
don’t have to rely on an uncertain exegesis of the phrase ‘exists in the understanding’ in 
order to get us past step 1. For, whatever that step means, it plays no real role in the 
argument at all. It is never appealed to to justify any later step of the argument or to do 
anything else in it. Step 1 is certainly there in the way Anselm actually presents his 
argument, but it can be simply struck out without affecting the argument one way or 
another. 
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Greatness 
Second, what’s all this talk about being “great”? What does Anselm mean when he says 
God is that than which no “greater” can be thought? Well, perhaps Monologion 2 will 
help (Basic Writings, p. 8): 
Now I do not mean great in size, as a given body is [i.e., big]; rather [I 
mean great in the sense] that the greater something is, the better or 
worthier it is, as wisdom is great. 
That’s the Monologion, of course, not the Proslogion. But plainly some similar notion in 
involved in the Proslogion as well. Greatness is therefore a matter of (moral?) worth. 
Anselm is in effect adopting a Platonic/Augustinian hierarchical picture of the universe, 
so that the “greater” a thing is, the higher it is in the hierarchy. 
(Let me remind you here of a paper I mentioned earlier: R. Brecher, “‘Greatness’ in 
Anselm’s Ontological Argument,” where he argues pretty strongly that Anselm carefully 
distinguishes “greater than” from “better than” in the Proslogion. I think he makes a 
strong textual case here, but—oddly—he doesn’t cite Monologion, Chap. 2, which I think 
is an important text. In any case, whether we’re talking ontologically [“greater”] or 
evaluatively [“better”], we’re plainly in a Platonic/Augustinian hierarchical framework.) 
This fact is often regarded as the basis for an objection to Anselm’s argument. That 
argument, it is said, gets whatever plausibility it has by presupposing that values (or the 
ontological rankings of things in some way) are absolute, not subjective or conventional
—and worse, by presupposing a particular (basically Augustinian) ordering of these 
matters. Anyone who doesn’t share these considerable theoretical pre-commitments, the 
objection concludes, doesn’t have to worry about the ontological argument any further. 
But let’s not be so hasty. Let’s suppose for a moment that you’re a complete relativist 
about values and ontological hierarchies. You think “greatness” is entirely subjective and 
conventional, perhaps even arbitrary. Then go back through the argument, and wherever 
you see the word ‘greater’ substitute ‘greater according to Anselm’s own completely 
subjective standards’. (Anselm would have disagreed about their being subjective, but 
that’s not the point. You think they’re subjective, and we’re talking about how you’re 
going to assess Anselm’s argument.) 
Plainly, if the original argument is valid, so is this revised argument, since the validity of 
the argument doesn’t depend on what ‘greater’ means; you could just replace ‘greater’ by 
the placeholder ‘more-’ and still have the same formal structure of the argument. 
Moreover, I think we’ll see that whatever reasons the absolutist (Anselm) had for 
accepting the crucial Step 3 of the argument when read in terms of objective (“absolute”) 
hierarchies, those reasons will continue to count as reasons for accepting it when read in 
terms of arbitrary, subjective hierarchies. The idea is that, if we’re talking about a purely 
subjective ranking of values, then Anselm gets to make up the ranking, so that he can do 
it in a way that makes everything in the argument work. Of course, you get to make up 
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your own ranking too, and on your ranking the argument might not show anything very 
interesting. But so what? If the argument works for Anselm’s ranking, then we have a 
proof for the real existence of something than which nothing greater (according to 
Anselm’s ranking) can be thought. You can disagree with the ranking if you want (it’s 
“subjective,” by hypothesis), so that what we’ve proven the existence of isn’t very great 
at all according to your own ranking. But you can’t disagree with the fact that we’ve 
proven the existence of it—if the argument works. And even you must admit that 
Anselm’s ranking, no matter how subjective it might be, is such that what we’ve proven 
the existence of looks convincingly like the traditional God we were talking about to 
begin with. All this holds, I say, if the argument works on Anselm’s ranking. 
In short, rejecting Anselm’s own hierarchy of values doesn’t weaken the argument in the 
slightest. The objection is misguided. 
But that’s crazy, you say. What if Anselm had arranged his values, his hierarchy, in such 
a way that this something than which nothing “greater” (according to his arrangement) 
can be thought turned out to be a giant, two-ton cabbage! Not only do I not want to call 
this God, even if he does, but I don’t think I have to admit he’s proven the existence of it 
either, no matter what he calls it. You can’t prove the existence of two-ton cabbages, no 
matter how you arrange your values! 
Granted. But I didn’t say the ontological argument works; my point is only that whether it 
works or not has nothing whatsoever to do with whether it is the absolutist or the 
relativist about values and hierarchies who is right. If the ontological argument fails (and 
I think it does), it does so for other reasons. 
Existence in reality 
Look now at step 3 of the argument. Here Anselm says that even if z doesn’t exist in 
really, it can nevertheless be thought to exist in reality, and that would be greater. There 
are several things to note here. 
First, observe that Anselm does not say existence is a “perfection” or a “predicate” or 
anything of the sort. He does not say anything that exists is automatically by that very 
fact greater than anything that doesn’t—that existence is what is sometimes called a 
“great-making” property. 
People often criticize the ontological argument for allegedly presupposing these things. 
Descartes’s argument may presuppose them, but Anselm’s doesn’t. All Anselm requires 
is that if this thing z exists in reality, then it is greater than if it doesn’t. It’s no objection 
to say that the Devil, if he exists, is not “greater” (in the value-laden sense) than if he 
doesn’t, that oOn the contrary, he’s far worse; a non-existing Devil is not much cause for 
alarm, but a real one—look out! Well, perhaps, but that’s irrelevant to Anselm’s 
argument. Anselm’s not necessarily saying anything at all about the relative greatness of 
a real vs. an unreal Devil. All he needs to be talking about is the relative greatness of a 
real vs. an unreal “something than which nothing greater can be thought.” 
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Be especially careful about this in reading and writing about the ontological argument. 
My experience is that even otherwise careful authors miss the point on this. (David 
Lewis’s paper “Anselm and Actuality” does not miss this point, a fact that I count among 
its considerable virtues!) Anselm’s actual wording is ambiguous (Basic Writings, p. 82): 
For if it exists only in the understanding, it can be thought to exist in 
reality as well, which is greater. 
What does the ‘which’ refer to? Existing in reality—so that he’s saying in general that 
existing in reality is greater than existing in the mind alone? Or that in general, existing in 
reality is greater than this thing’s, z’s, existing in the mind alone? Or is all he is saying 
merely that this thing’s existing in reality would be greater than its existing in the mind 
alone? 
The text, as I say, is ambiguous (and it’s ambiguous in Latin too). It may very well be 
that Anselm himself believed one of the stronger readings. And in fact there is some 
negative evidence that he did: Gaunilo, in Chap. 1 of his On Behalf of the Fool (Basic 
Writings, p. 99), summarizes the ontological argument and says, “The argument for this 
claim [Anselm’s argument] goes like this: to exist in reality is greater than to exist only in 
the understanding.” That seems to be a pretty general formulation.  And it’s even more 
explicit in Gaunilo’s Chap. 5 (p. 101), where Gaunilo paraphrases Anselm as saying that 
if something than which nothing greater can be thought did not exist in reality, 
“everything that exists in reality would be greater than it.” My point is: in his Reply to 
Gaunilo, Anselm doesn’t object to these strong readings. He thinks Gaunilo has 
misunderstood the argument, but he doesn’t claim that Gaunilo has misunderstood him 
on that point. So perhaps Anselm does hold this. 
But even if Anselm did believe one of the stronger readings, that fact is irrelevant, 
because the actual argument doesn’t require that. Look at the formulation in the handout; 
all we need to get our reductio is the minimal reading: for this thing to exist in reality 
would be greater than for it to exist in the mind alone. Or—since we don’t even need to 
use the “exists in the mind” talk, we can just say: for this thing to exist in reality would be 
greater than for it not to exist in reality. 
Nevertheless, there is something genuinely puzzling about step 3 of the argument. In the 
phrase ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, the verb ‘think’ (or ‘think 
of, if you want the preposition) is construed with a noun or pronoun. You think (of) 
things, objects. But now, in step 3, ‘think’ is construed with a noun or pronoun plus an 
infinitive phrase: “z can be is thought to exist in reality.” Here we are no longer thinking 
(of) things but rather states of affairs or whatever you want to call them in your 
ontological terminology. (In Latin, the construction here is a regular way of forming 
indirect discourse.) Hence when you compare these locutions, it isn’t clear just what kind 
of mental operation “thinking” is supposed to be. Is it the forming of concepts, the 
making of a judgment, the entertaining of a hypothesis, or what? It’s not clear. I 
tentatively suggest, however, that all Anselm means is something like this: 
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Suppose z doesn’t exist in reality. Nevertheless, the following 
counterfactual conditional is true: If z did exist, it would be greater than it 
is (under our assumption that it doesn’t exist). 
That’s very rough, to be sure. This formulation has the advantage of getting rid of the 
murky terminology of “thinking,” but at the price of appealing to the equally mysterious 
vocabulary of “counterfactuals.” In David Lewis’s “Anselm and Actuality” and in my 
own “Anselm and Ambiguity,” there is a more technical way of construing this, one that 
tries to cash out the notoriously difficult notion of counterfactuality. I refer you to those 
places if you wish. 
What’s wrong with the argument? 
What about this argument? Does it succeed or fail? I’ve already indicated that I think it 
fails, but not for any of the reasons typically alleged. Why then? 
Well, I think Anselm’s argument trades on an ambiguity. (Hence the title of my paper, 
“Anselm and Ambiguity.”) The ambiguity is in the comparative notion “greater than.” 
Throughout the argument, Anselm is talking in two different ways. He’s talking about (1) 
the way things really are, but also about (2) the way they’re thought of as being, they way 
they’re thought to be. For example, something than which nothing greater can be thought 
may or may not (1) really exist, but, either way, it can (2) be thought of as existing. 
Be warned! When I talk about something’s being “thought of” as such and such, or 
something’s being “thought to be” such and such, I don’t necessarily mean it’s believed 
to be such and such. All I’m talking about is “entertaining the thought” of its being such 
and such. In order to avoid confusion about this, I’ll just adopt a slightly different 
terminology and distinguish between really being such and such and conceptually being 
such and such. 
Four senses of ‘greater than’ 
Now this is complicated, but just bear with me. 
When Anselm says one thing is or isn’t “greater than” another, we have to ask just what 
he means. To begin with, the phrase ‘x is greater than y’ might means any one of four 
things: 
(a) x is really greater than y really is. 
(b) x is really greater than y is conceptually. 
(c) x is conceptually greater than y really is. 
(d) x is conceptually greater than y is conceptually. 
 65 
 
Now a thing that doesn’t really exist isn’t really “great” at all, since there’s nothing real 
about it. It may still, to be sure, be conceptually great to some degree, perhaps to a high 
degree, but that’s quite a different issue. (Think of Utopia, for instance!) 
The point of these observations is that one thing can be greater than another in one of 
these four senses and yet not be greater than the other in some or all of the remaining 
senses. For example, an imaginary hundred dollar bill is 100 times greater than an 
imaginary one dollar bill in sense (d) and infinitely greater in sense (c) (since the 
imaginary one dollar bill gets zero real greatness), but it’s not greater in sense (a) or (b) 
(since the imaginary hundred dollar bill also gets zero real greatness). 
How does this apply to the ontological argument? Well, suppose God doesn’t really exist 
but I do. Then it turns out that I’m greater than God in senses (a) and (c), but not in 
senses (b) or (d). I really exist, so that no matter how meager my greatness really is and 
no matter how meager it is conceptually (provided I have at least a tiny measure of 
greatness both really and conceptually), still it’s more than God really has. For by 
hypothesis God doesn’t really exist and so doesn’t really have any greatness at all. 
(Of course, this remark would have to  be adjusted if some things—say, me—have 
conceptually have no greatness at all, or if some real things—say, me—really have no 
greatness at all. But the importance of the overall distinction among the four senses of 
“greater than” will not be affected.) 
On the other hand—still assuming for the sake of illustration that God doesn’t exist—
he’s nevertheless greater than I am in senses (c) and (d). God conceptually has an 
enormous amount of greatness—far more than I have either really or conceptually. As for 
sense (b), neither of us is greater than the other in that sense. My real greatness is far less, 
not greater, than the greatness God has conceptually. And by hypothesis, God doesn’t 
exist, so that his real greatness (namely, none) is certainly no greater than the greatness I 
have conceptually. 
For the logically inclined—the rest of you can just “tune out” for a 
moment”: Note that what I just said means that if God doesn’t exist but I 
do, then, in sense (c), each of us is greater than the other—I am both 
greater and less than God in sense (c)! I leave it to you to work out why 
this isn’t a problem. Note that while all four senses of ‘greater than’ are 
transitive, nevertheless—provided that everything conceptually has, and 
every real thing really has, at least some greatness—sense (c) is neither 
irreflexive nor asymmetrical. For with the stated proviso, if x doesn’t exist 
it will be greater than itself in sense (c). 
OK, non-logicians, tune back in now. Of course if God does exist, then he’s greater than I 
am in all four senses. 
Plainly, we have to keep these various senses of ‘greater than’ straight throughout the 
ontological argument, or else we run the risk of outright equivocation. Where exactly 
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does the notion of “greater than” come up in the argument? Well, it comes up in two 
contexts: 
In the phrase ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’—that is, 
in the expression we’ve abbreviated by ‘z’. 
In step 3 of the argument, where Anselm claims that, assuming z doesn’t 
really exist, nevertheless it can be thought to exist, and that would be greater. 
In each of these contexts, ‘greater than’ might be read in any one of the four senses we’ve 
distinguished. 
The ambiguity in the argument 
Now let’s pause and remind ourselves what it takes to convince ourselves that an 
argument is sound. (Not just to be sound, since an argument can be sound without our 
realizing it, but to be convincingly sound.) Well, first of all it has to be valid; that is, the 
conclusion must follow from the premises. And second, there must be good, non-
question-begging, reasons for accepting the premises. 
In my view, the ontological argument as outlined above, is plainly valid—provided we 
keep the same sense of ‘greater than’ throughout the argument. It doesn’t matter which 
sense we use, as long as it’s the same one throughout. If we do that, then the argument is 
just a plain reductio. There’s nothing even slightly dubious about reductio as an argument 
form (at least not on most logics). If, however, we don’t keep the same sense of ‘greater 
than’ throughout the argument, then although the argument will still look like a reductio, 
it won’t really be one because it’ll suffer from equivocation. So, as long as we avoid 
equivocation, there’s no problem about the validity of the ontological argument. 
But let’s think some more about the contexts where ‘greater than’ occurs in the argument. 
And first let’s look at the phrase ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, 
which we’ve been abbreviating “z.” The idea, then, is that I can’t think of anything 
greater than z. Now recall that this formula is supposed to express our notion of God—or 
at least something the believer would recognize as unique to God. (Again, see my paper 
“What Is a Proof for the Existence of God?”) 
In order to do that, it seems to me, the notion of “greater than” there has to be taken in 
either sense (b) or sense (d). Whether God exists or not, nothing (b) really or (d) 
conceptually has more greatness than God conceptually has. But in sense (a), ‘something 
than which nothing greater can be thought’ simply describes “something than which you 
can’t think of anything really greater,” whatever that turns out to be, whether God or 
something else. A proof for the existence of God needs to prove the existence of more 
than just that. If the traditional God doesn’t exist, but Queen Elizabeth just happens to 
turn out to be the greatest thing that does exist, we wouldn’t say God exists and is Queen 
Elizabeth! 
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Likewise, in sense (c) ‘that than which no greater can be thought’ will be a description of 
God only if he exists. For otherwise, if God doesn’t exist, I can think of all sorts of things 
greater (in sense (c)) than he is. So we’re not going to have any reason at all to think the 
phrase taken in sense (c) describes what we’re trying to prove the existence of—unless 
we already have reason to think God exists. But that’s exactly the kind of question 
begging we need to avoid. 
Therefore, we need to use “greater than” in sense (b) or sense (d) if we’re going to have 
any reason to think what we’re talking about is recognizably God. 
OK, now let’s consider the other context in which the notion of “greater than” occurs in 
the argument, namely in step 3. This step says: If we suppose z doesn’t exist in reality, 
nevertheless 
z can be thought to exist in reality, and that would be greater. 
Now why would we be inclined accept this claim? It’s a little difficult to know exactly 
how to represent it, how to evaluate it. In terms of a modern logic of counterfactuals? 
possible-world semantics (or thinkable-world semantics?) [See Lewis “Anselm and 
Actuality,” and my own “Anselm and Amgituity.”] But no matter how we understand the 
claim, it seems we have no reason to accept it in senses (b) or (d), which are the only 
senses, we’ve seen, in which our formula “that than which no greater can be thought” hits 
the target. As I observed just a moment ago, “Whether God exists or not, nothing (b) 
really or (d) conceptually has more greatness than God conceptually has.” So there’s no 
reason to accept step 3 read in sense (b) or (d), and in fact every reason to reject it. 
Here’s the situation then. There’s reason to accept the crucial step 3 at best only if we 
take the notion of “greater than” in either sense (a) or sense (c). Again, as we saw just a 
moment ago, there’s reason to recognize “something than which nothing greater can be 
thought” as God only if we take the notion of “greater than” in either sense (b) or (d) in 
that phrase. But unfortunately, we can’t have both without mixing the senses of “greater 
than” throughout the argument. And in that case, the argument is no longer valid; it’s a 
fallacy of equivocation. What persuasiveness the argument has comes taking advantage 
of this ambiguity. When we are looking for reasons to accept the crucial step (3) of the 
argument, we read “greater than” in one way—sense (a) or, more plausibly, sense (c). But 
then when we take the conclusion as establishing the existence of something that can be 
called God, we read “greater than” in a different sense, sense (b) or (d). And because we 
don’t realize what we’ve done, we perhaps suffer the illusion that the argument is valid 
when we equivocate like this—and it isn’t. 
There are lots of questions and lots of things to explore here, but I’ll leave that to you. 
Let’s move on. 
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The argument in Proslogion 3 
[DISTRIBUTE HANDOUT ON PROSLOGION 3.] 
We turn now to Proslogion 3, where Anselm goes on to make a much stronger claim. In 
Chap. 2, as we’ve just seen, Anselm gives us his argument that z—“something than 
which nothing greater can be thought”—really exists. Now, in Chap. 3, he says that it not 
only exists, it can’t even be thought not to exist! 
The argument for this extraordinary claim goes roughly like this: 
1. What cannot be thought not to exist is greater than what can be thought 
not to exist. (For now, don’t ask why.) 
2. I can think of something that can’t be thought not to exist. For 
convenience, let’s call it a. (Again, don’t worry for now about whether this 
is really true. We’ll return to this.) 
3. Suppose (as hypothesis for a reductio) z—the same z as in Anselm’s 
Chap. 2—can be thought not to exist. 
4. Therefore, a is greater than z. (From steps 2–3.) 
5. But step 4 is a contradiction, since z is something than which nothing 
greater can be thought. 
6. Therefore, by reductio, z cannot be thought not to exist. 
Note what this argument actually claims—and what it doesn’t claim! It’s about what can 
and cannot be thought. It’s not about what is and what isn’t possible. For some reason, a 
lot of the secondary literature has taken the argument in Chap. 3 as a modal argument—
as though when Anselm is talking about what can be thought, he’s talking about what can 
be. So, when Anselm concludes at the end of Chap. 3 that z cannot be thought not to 
exist, these people read the argument as saying that it cannot be that z doesn’t exist—in 
short, that God is a necessary being. (See Normal Malcolm, “Anselm’s Ontological 
Arguments” [note the plural], and Robert Merrihew Adams, “The Logical Structure of 
Anselm’s Arguments.”) 
But that’s not what the argument says, on the face of it. (Just look at the text.) You can 
read it as a modal argument if you want to, but that’s reading an interpretation into the 
text. And I don’t see any reason to do that. 
In any case, let’s look at the argument as it stands. What can we say about it? 
Well, I have no special quarrel with the premise in step 1. There’s room for discussion 
about the standards of greatness, but I don’t think that matters here, for reasons we’ve 
already discussed in connection with the argument in Chap. 2. In any case, I’m willing to 
grant step 1 for the sake of argument. I’m even willing to grant that the sense of ‘greater 
than’ used in step 1 is the same sense used in the phrase ‘something than which nothing 
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greater can be thought’. I’m willing to grant all this, even without looking at it closely, 
because I think there’s another problem with the argument. In other words, I think the 
main problem this time is not with equivocating over the notion of “greater than.” 
I think the problem comes in step 2. Why should we accept step 2? I can’t come up with 
any reason why we should. In fact, it seems to me that no matter what we’re talking 
about, I can always entertain the thought of its being or not being any way I please. (At 
least I can do this provided “thinkable” isn’t being read as “possible,” or even as 
implying that it’s possible.) I can do this even if I know better; I can do it even if it’s 
impossible for things to turn out the way I’m thinking of them. In fact, we do that all the 
time whenever we argue by reductio. Of course, it’s true I can entertain the thought of 
something-that-cannot-be-thought-not-to-exist. That is, I can think of something as if it 
were not able to be thought not to exist. But that’s not what we need for the argument to 
work. In order to get step 2 in a sense that will make the argument go, we need to be able 
to think of something that really can’t be thought not to exist, not just something that’s 
thought of as unable to be thought not to exist. 
That is (see the handout), I need to read step 2 not in the sense 
(2a) I can think of: something-(call-it-a)-that-can’t-be-thought-not-to-exist. 
but as 
(2b) I can think of something (call it a), such that a can’t be thought not to exist. 
So I think the argument rests on an ambiguity in step 2—an ambiguity quite different 
from the one I think is involved in the “ontological argument” in the preceding chapter. 
But perhaps you don’t agree with me. Perhaps you think step 2 is plausible, and that 
Anselm has a good argument here. In that case, you—and Anselm—have a really big 
problem. 
A major problem 
What about the Fool? I thought the Fool had said in his heart, “There is no God.” But if 
Anselm’s argument in Chap. 3 is correct, he can’t do that. What about this? 
This is the problem addressed in Anselm’s Chap. 4 (p. 83). His reply in effect claims that 
the Fool says in his heart “God doesn’t exist.” He doesn’t say “Something than which 
nothing greater can be thought doesn’t exist.” He can’t say that, as the argument in 
Anselm’s Chap. 3 purports to show. The reason he can get by with saying “God doesn’t 
exist” is that he simply doesn’t really know what the word ‘God’ means. (Perhaps that’s 
why he’s a Fool.) I suspect this is one reason Anselm studiously avoids the word ‘God’ in 
his actual statement of the argument in Chaps. 2–3.)  
Either the Fool attaches no meaning at all to the word, so that he’s just mouthing words 
without attaching any meanings to them (or “mouthing” them silently, “in his heart”—
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this is the second kind of “utterance” = vox distinguished back in Monologion 10, p. 18), 
or else he gives some wrong meaning to the word ‘God’, a meaning that entirely misses 
the point of what we’re really arguing about. He thinks that when he denies the existence 
of God, he’s denying the existence of an old man with a white beard who lives on clouds, 
or something like that. 
But it should be obvious that Anselm’s reply in his Chap. 4 just won’t work. Look back 
to the argument in Prosologion 2, the original “ontological argument.” In step 2 there, 
we’re asked to suppose for reductio that z—which is here serving as a mere 
typographical abbreviation for ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, 
which is the phrase Anselm actually uses—doesn’t exist in reality. If the argument in 
Proslogion 3 were correct, we couldn’t do that! In short, if Proslogion 3 is right, the 
argument in Proslogion 2 can’t even be formulated! 
Let me approach the point from a different angle.  The Fool may not know what the word 
‘God’ means, but we do. Anselm has told us! So if Anselm’s right, no one should be able 
to say in his heart ‘Something than which nothing greater can be thought doesn’t exist’. 
In short, everyone who reads Anselm must automatically agree with his ontological 
argument. (Including, notably, Gaunilo!) 
Well, do you agree? Or do you harbor even the slightest doubt about whether all this 
works? For that matter, if not you then does anyone else harbor such a doubt? Yes of 
course. The history of philosophy is full of people who have not only doubted but 
rejected the argument outright. But in that case we’ve empirically refuted Anselm! On his 
own grounds, no one should can do that, so the fact that people can and do shows that 
something’s wrong. 
Note that what this shows is that something’s wrong with the argument in Proslogion 3, 
not with the argument in Proslogion 2. But I think there’s also something wrong with the 
Chap. 2 argument, as we’ve already discussed. 
Gaunilo’s “Lost Island” objection 
Now let’s look quickly at one of Gaunilo’s objections in his On Behalf of the Fool. 
There’s a lot of terminological funny-business going on in this little work. having to do 
with “saying in one’s heart” and the difference between “understanding” and 
“comprehending.” And I can’t say I understand all of it. In fact, I’m not sure there is a 
coherent terminology running through Gaunilo’s text. Some people think there is one, 
and some even think they know what it is. But they haven’t told me in a form I can 
fathom. 
Nevertheless, one passage in Gaunilo’s On Behalf of the Fool is famous. It’s in § 6. This 
is the famous Lost Island argument. Here’s what it says (p. 102): 
For example, there are those who say that somewhere in the ocean is an island, 
which, because of the difficulty—or rather, impossibility—of finding what does 
not exist, some call ‘the Lost Island’. This island (so the story goes) is more 
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plentifully endowed than even the isles of the Blessed with an indescribable 
abundance of all sorts of riches and delights. And because it has neither owner nor 
inhabitant, it is everywhere superior in its abundant riches to all the other lands 
that human beings inhabit. 
Suppose someone tells me all this. The story is easily told and involves no 
difficulty, and so I understand it. But if this person went on to draw a conclusion 
and say, ‘You cannot any longer doubt that this island, more excellent than all 
others on earth [I’ll come back to this in a moment], truly exists somewhere in 
reality. For you do not doubt that this island exists in your understanding, and 
since it is more excellent to exist not merely in the understanding, but also in 
reality, this island must also exist in reality. For if it did not, any land that exists in 
reality would be greater than it. And so this more excellent thing that you have 
understood would not in fact be more excellent.’—If, I say, he should try to 
convince me by this argument that I should no longer doubt whether the island 
truly exists, either I would think he was joking, or I would not know whom I 
ought to think more foolish: myself, if I grant him his conclusion, or him, if he 
thinks he has established the existence of that island with any degree of certainty, 
without first showing that its excellence exists in my understanding as a thing that 
truly and undoubtedly exists and not in any way like something false of uncertain. 
I want to call your attention to Gaunilo’s way of putting this. “This island,” he says, 
“more excellent than all others on earth …” There’s an important disanalogy between 
that and Anselm’s argument. Anselm’s argument, I said, was strictly negative. His 
formulation was “something than which nothing greater can be thought.” He studiously 
avoids saying this “something” is greater than other things; he says only—negatively—
that nothing is greater than it. Gaunilo fails to observe this nicety. He talks about his 
island as being positively “more excellent” than others. 
So there’s a lack of parallel here. Still, it’s easy enough to touch up Gaunilo’s actual 
argument, and put it in terms of “this island, than which no other more excellent can be 
thought …” In other words, I think this lack of parallel with Anselm’s strictly negative 
formulation is easily fixed. So let’s just tacitly fix it, then, and see what we can say about 
the “Lost Island” objection. 
If Gaunilo (so fixed) is right, Anselm’s argument in Proslogion 2 must fail. Why? 
Because it proves too much. For, Gaunilo says, exactly the same form of argument could 
be used to prove the existence of the Lost Island. 
It’s curious to look at Anselm’s reply to the Lost Island argument. It occurs in Chap. 3 of 
his response to Gaunilo (Basic Writings, pp. 107–08): 
I say confidently that if anyone can find for me something existing either 
in reality or only in thought to which he can apply this inference in my 
argument, besides that than which a greater cannot be thought, I will give 
him that Lost Island, never to be lost again. 
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That is, Anselm’s reply consists of remarking that the two arguments are not parallel. 
And that’s all he says about it! But, as I’ve just argued, you can make them fully parallel! 
Some people have tried to make it out that there really is a difference here, that 
“something than which nothing greater can be thought,” for example, is a consistent 
notion, whereas “some island than which nothing greater can be thought” isn’t, because I 
can always think of something greater than any island. But first of all, that misformulates 
the parallel. Anselm’s original argument runs in terms of “something than which nothing 
greater can be thought”—that is, an x than which no greater y can be thought, where ‘x’ 
and ‘y’ range over whatever I can think of. Gaunilo’s objection proceeds by narrowing 
down the range of discourse to whatever islands I can think of. So the proper way to think 
of it is “some island than which no greater island can be conceived,” not “some island 
than no greater anything can be conceived.” I think a lot of the secondary literature goes 
wrong on this point. (See § II of my paper “Anselm and Ambiguity” for the details.) 
But even so, perhaps you think “some island than which no greater island can be thought” 
is still not a consistent notion, because no matter how great an island I think of, I can 
always think of a greater island. (For example, John Hick, in the second edition of his 
Philosophy of Religion, makes this claim.) I’m not sure how you would argue for that, but 
it doesn’t matter because it’s irrelevant anyway. Anselm’s argument does not rest on the 
assumption that the notion of God is consistent, as we’ve seen.  And so, therefore, neither 
does Gaunilo’s (suitably fixed) parallel for the Lost Island assume the consistency of the 
Lost Island. Of course if Anselm’s argument works and really does prove the existence of 
God, then of course it follows that the notion of God is consistent, insofar as the possible 
follows from the actual. But so what? The objection surely can’t be saying that we have 
to regard as “implicit premises” of an argument whatever follows from its conclusion; 
that would mean every argument begs the question. I’m afraid what the objection really 
shows is that some of Anselm’s critics don’t really know how arguments work! 
Besides, it wouldn’t matter at all to either argument if you did add the explicit premise 
that the notion of “something than which nothing greater can be thought” (“some island 
than which no greater island can be thought”) is consistent. That premise is nowhere 
implicitly appealed to anywhere in the argument. If you think it is, then tell me which 
step makes that appeal! There isn’t one. (In fact, I think this is a crucial difference 
between Anselm’s version of the ontological argument and Descartes’s.) 
No, Gaunilo’s Lost Island argument can be constructed an exact parallel to Anselm’s, 
despite Anselm’s denial. And it shows that there’s something wrong with Anselm’s 
argument. It doesn’t, however, show what’s wrong. I’ve tried to that earlier in our 
discussion. 
Remarks on Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo 
We’ve already seen Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo’s “Lost Island” objection, and how I don’t 
think that reply works. Here I want to record my views on some of Anselm’s other 
arguments in his reply to Gaunilo. As before, let’s agree to abbreviate the long phrase 
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‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’ by ‘z’. And let’s continue to use 
the notions of being “really” and “conceptually” such and such, I discussed in talking 
about Proslogion, Chap. 2. 
a) First passage 
First, in Chap. 1 of Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo (Basic Writings, p. 105—in the last full 
paragraph on the page), we get the following argument: 
But I say with certainty that if it [= something than which nothing greater 
can be thought] can be so much as thought to exist, it must necessarily 
exist. For that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought of 
as beginning to exist. By contrast, whatever can be thought to exist, but 
does not in fact exist, can be thought of as beginning to exist. Therefore, it 
is not the case that that than which a greater cannot be thought can be 
thought to exist, but does not in fact exist. If, therefore, it can be thought 
to exist, it does necessarily exist. 
Note that in this argument, unlike what we saw in Prosl. Chap. 3, Anselm does explicitly 
twice say “necessarily.” He’s not only talking here about what can and cannot be thought, 
but also about genuinely modal notions. Nevertheless, I think the two occurrences of 
‘necessarily’ here refer to necessary inferences, not to a necessary conclusion of an 
inference. That is, I don’t see any argument here that our “something than which nothing 
greater can be thought” is a necessary being. 
What this argument tries to show that if z can exist even conceptually, then it exists 
really. 
Proof: 
1. z cannot conceptually begin to exist. 
2. For all x, if x can exist conceptually and yet does not exist really, then x 
can conceptually begin to exist. 
3. Therefore, if z can exist conceptually, then it exists really. 
The argument is plainly valid, and step 2 seems to me to be true on the general grounds 
that I can entertain the thought of anything as doing anything whatever, whether things 
can possibly be the way I’m thinking of them or not. But, unfortunately, the same general 
grounds that verify step 2 refute step 1. I know of no other plausible grounds to grant step 
2. 
b) Second passage 
In the same chapter, immediately following the previous passage (Basic Writings, pp. 
105–06): 
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Furthermore,  if it can be thought at all, it necessarily [same remark as 
before on this word] exists. For no one who denies or doubts that 
something than which a greater cannot be thought exists, denies or doubts 
that if it did exist, it would be unable to fail to exist either in reality or in 
the understanding, since otherwise it would not be that than which a 
greater cannot be thought. But whatever can be thought, but does not in 
fact exist, could (if it did exist) fail to exist either in reality or in the 
understanding. So if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be 
thought at all, it cannot fail to exist. 
Here we have an attempt to prove that if z can even be thought, then it must exist. 
Robert M. Adams, in his paper “The Logical Structures of Anselm’s Arguments,” 
interprets this argument as amounting to the modal argument for the existence of God I 
discussed in my handout on Descartes—even to the point of appealing to Brouwer’s 
Axiom. I don’t think that’s what’s going on, since—as we discussed in connection with 
Proslogion, Chap. 3, there’s no good reason to think that by “thinkable” Anselm means 
“possible”—that is, that by “can be thought” he just means “can be.” 
But whether Adams is right or not to interpret “thinkable” as “possible,” I don’t think 
he’s right to find the Cartesian modal argument in this passage. The Cartesian modal 
argument is valid (I don’t say it’s sound—see the Descartes handout), whereas this one—
as best I can read it—is fallacious. 
In skeletal form, the argument goes like this: 
Suppose z doesn’t really exist. Then nevertheless, if it did exist, its non-existence would 
be both possible and impossible.  
In fact the reasoning in the text is not all that clear here. Presumably the idea is that, on 
the one hand, being unable not to exist (i.e., being necessary) is “greater” than not being 
unable not to exist. So if there is any such thing as “something than which nothing greater 
can be thought,” it is unable not to exist. Hence, even if we assume it doesn’t really exist, 
we can agree that if it did, it would be unable not to exist. 
That’s how we get the one side of the conclusion. On the other hand, if we assume z 
doesn’t exist, then we’re assuming it’s at least possible that it not exist. Now what’s 
possible and what’s not possible shouldn’t depend on what does or doesn’t happen to 
exist. (This is the move I say isn’t entirely clear in the text. Some later authors, in the 14th 
century, explicitly argued this way.) Therefore, if we suppose z doesn’t exist, then even if 
it did exist, it would still be possible for it not to exist. 
Putting these two lines of reasoning together, the text concludes that, if we suppose z 
doesn’t exist, nevertheless if it did exist, its non-existence would be both possible and 
impossible. But that’s a contradiction, and therefore by reductio z does exist after all.  
But if that is the argument, it’s just a fallacy. Anselm seems to think that if we’re given a 
proposition of the form ‘If it’s not the case that p, then if it were the case that p, a 
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contradiction would follow’, we can infer that it is the case that p after all. But in fact all 
we can infer is that either it is the case that p or else it’s impossible that p.  
Consider an exactly parallel case: If a round square doesn’t exist (which of course it 
doesn’t), then nevertheless if it did exist, there would be a contradiction. But it doesn’t 
follow that a round square exists! 
c) Third passage 
The same kind of fallacy is committed in the third passage I want to focus on (Basic 
Writings, p. 106): 
But let us assume instead that it does not exist, although it can be thought. 
Now something that can be thought but does not exist, would not, if it 
existed, be that than which a greater cannot be thought. And so, if it 
existed, that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than 
which a greater cannot be thought, which is absurd. Therefore, if that than 
which a greater cannot be thought can be thought at all, it is false that it 
does not exist—and much more so if it can be understood and can exist in 
the understanding. 
(I’m not sure what that last part is supposed to add. Here’s one those places where 
Anselm and Gaunilo get into it about the distinction between thinking and understanding. 
As I indicated earlier in our discussion of Gaunilo, I’m not sure there’s really a coherent 
terminology in this exchange.) 
d) Fourth passage 
Again immediately following the last quoted passage, Anselm gives an extended 
argument (Basic Writings, p. 106): 
I shall say something more. If something does not exist everywhere and 
always, even if perhaps it does exist somewhere and sometimes, it can 
undoubtedly be thought not to exist anywhere or at any time, just as it 
does not exist in this particular place or at this particular time. For 
something that did not exist yesterday but does exist today can be 
conceived of as never existing in just the same way that it is understood as 
not existing yesterday. And something that does not exist here but does 
exist elsewhere can be thought not to exist anywhere in just the same way 
that it does not exist here. Similarly, when some parts of a thing do not 
exist in the same place or at the same time as other parts of that thing, all 
its parts—and therefore the thing as a whole—can be thought not to exist 
anywhere or at any time. Even if we say that time always exists and that 
the universe is everywhere, [recall our discussion of this way of speaking 
in connection with Monologion, Chap. 21] nevertheless, the whole of time 
does not always exist, and the whole of the universe is not always 
everywhere. And just as each individual part of time does not exist when 
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the others do, so each can be thought never to exist. And just as each 
individual part of the universe does not exist where the others do, so each 
can be thought to exist nowhere. Moreover, whatever is composed of parts 
can, at least in thought, be divided and fail to exist. Therefore, whatever 
does not exist as a whole in all places and at all times, even if it does exist, 
can be thought not to exist. But that than which a greater cannot be 
thought, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist. For otherwise, even if it 
exists, it is not that which a greater cannot be thought—which is absurd. 
Therefore, there is no time and no place in which it does not exist as a 
whole; it exists as a whole always and everywhere. 
This is a difficult passage, and I’m not sure I entirely follow the argument. First of all, it 
doesn’t seem to be an argument for the existence of God, but rather to presuppose the 
argument in Prosl. Chap. 3. [Look at the antepenultimate sentence: “But that than which 
a greater cannot be thought, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist.”] 
But, whatever it’s trying to argue, it seems to me it doesn’t show that z exists at all, much 
less that it exists always and everywhere. At best, all it could show is that if z exists, it 
exists always and everywhere. The action, it seems to me, comes in the last part: If it 
exists, it cannot be thought not to exist; but if it doesn’t exist always and everywhere, it 
can be thought not to exist. Hence, if it exists, it must exist always and everywhere. (The 
general form is: p → ~q, ~r → q,  p → r.) That’s a perfectly good argument, but it 
doesn’t show anything very much. 
e) Fifth passage 
In Chapter 5 of Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, we get the following argument (Basic 
Writings, p. 109): 
For if someone says that that than which a greater cannot be thought is not 
something in reality, or is capable of not existing, or can be thought not to 
exist [Note: here possibility ≠ thinkability], he is easily refuted. For 
whatever does not exist is capable of not existing, and whatever is capable 
of not existing can be thought not to exist. Now (a) whatever can be 
thought not to exist, if it does exist, is not that than which a greater cannot 
be thought. And (b) if it does not exist, it would not be that than which a 
greater cannot be thought even if it were to exist. But it makes no sense to 
say that that than which a greater cannot be thought, (a) if it exists, is not 
that than which a greater cannot be thought, and that (b) if it [does not 
exist but] were to exist, it would not be that than which a greater cannot be 
thought. It is therefore evident that it exists, that it is not capable of not 
existing, and that it cannot be thought not to exist. For otherwise, (a) if it 
exists, it is not the thing spoken of; and (b) if it [does not exist but] were to 
exist, it would not be the thing spoken of. 
 77 
 
This is again a difficult argument. (Notice that there some textual problems, which 
Williams has tried to fix in his translation.) 
But as I read it, once again we have a reductio argument. This time it goes more or less as 
follows: 
1. Suppose for reductio that z doesn’t really exist. 
2. Therefore, it’s possible for z not to exist. (Since if it’s actually so, it’s 
capable of being so.) 
3. Therefore, it’s thinkable for z not to exist. (Even if some thinkable things 
are impossible, nothing possible is unthinkable—at least that’s what this 
argument says.) 
4. If something x can be thought not to exist [and from Step 3 we know z is 
like that], then 
(a) if it nevertheless exists anyway, it isn’t z. (Presumably the idea 
here is that it’s “greater” not to be able to be thought not to exist—
as in Prosl., Chap. 3.) Again, 
(b) if it doesn’t exist, it wouldn’t be z even if it did exist. (For the 
same reason.) 
5. Therefore, either z isn’t z, or else z wouldn’t be z if it existed. (By 
instantiating step 4 to z and using step 3.) 
6. But this is contradictory, so that step 1 must be rejected by reductio. 
7. Hence, z really does exist. 
But despite what Anselm says, step 5 isn’t contradictory. It just means that it’s impossible 
for z to exist. All step 5 amounts to is saying that either we have a certain contradiction 
(z ≠ z)—which of course we don’t—or else we would have that contradiction if z existed. 
And that means z can’t exist. The reductio therefore fails, and all we get from steps 1–5 
is the conclusion that if we suppose z doesn’t exist, we can conclude it’s impossible, 
which is interesting enough, but not what Anselm was trying to show. 
Anselm on Truth 
We’re now reaching the Anselm material I’m not as familiar with as the Monologion and 
Proslogion material. So I’ll be eager to hear your own views on it. 
On Truth is the first of a cluster of three “dialogues” on more or less philosophical topics. 
As a kind of “preface” to the trilogy, Anselm tells us (p. 115) that over a period of several 
years, he wrote a series of four “dialogues.” One of them was the De grammatico (= On 
the Grammarian or better On the Literate—to preserve a crucial ambiguity in the Latin), 
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which we’ll talk about later. According to the chronology in Southern’s biography, this 
was the earliest thing we have from Anselm (1060–63), earlier even than the 
miscellaneous collection of Prayers and Meditations that led up to the Monologion. 
The other three “dialogues,” he says, were the ones we know as On Truth, On Freedom 
of Choice, and On the Fall of the Devil. They were written some twenty years later, 
between 1080 and 1086, according to Southern’s best estimate (which means according 
to the best estimate). Together, they are sometimes collectively known as the 
Philosophical Dialogues (an expression that typically doesn’t include the De 
grammatico, even though it’s just as philosophical—and in fact, along with the so called 
Lambeth Fragments, which are on various “modal” notions, is the only purely 
philosophical thing Anselm ever wrote). 
All four dialogues are pretty straightforward, as dialogues go. The two parties are 
identified simply as the “Teacher” and the “Student,” and although the “Student” gets a 
few good lines, there’s no doubt who’s in charge throughout. The Teacher is plainly 
speaking on Anselm’s behalf. 
Anselm doesn’t exactly say in what order he wrote the last three of these dialogues, but 
he does say they are meant to be read in the order just given: On Truth, On Free Choice, 
and then On the Fall of the Devil. So we’ll follow his wish. Let’s begin therefore with On 
Truth. 
There are several good secondary sources on this little dialogue. First of all, there’s 
Jasper Hopkins’s A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (cited on the handout of 
“Bibliography”), Chap. 5, which discusses the three Philosophical Dialogues as a unit. 
Another secondary source is the very ample “editor’s introduction” to Jasper Hopkins and 
Herbert Richardson’s translation of the three dialogues, from the 1960s. It’s about 75 
pages long, and includes a  bibliography. (Again, it treats the three dialogues as a unit.) 
But more recent—and I think better overall—are two articles devoted exclusively to 
Anselm’s theory of truth. One is Marilyn Adams’s “Anselm’s Theory of Truth” (1990), 
and the other is Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams’s “Anselm on Truth,” Chap. 9 of 
our Companion volume. 
I think the Visser/Williams paper is breathtakingly good. (I’m not sure I agree with all of 
it, but it’s very provocative and suggestive, and makes a lot of sense.) The Adams paper 
disagrees with Visser/Williams in certain respects, but has the added virtue that it links 
what is said in On Truth with what we’ve already heard about truth in the Monologion. 
Visser/Williams don’t talk about the Monologion in their article. (We’ll say more about 
this in a moment.) 
The Correspondence Theory of Truth 
In modern philosophical discourse, when we speak about theories of truth, we generally 
think of logic, the philosophy of language, or formal semantics. And if that’s what you’re 
used to, Anselm’s dialogue must come as something of a shock to you. 
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Those theories are for the most part theories of truth CONDITIONS—of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions under which we can say a statement or proposition is true. 
That’s not Anselm’s main agenda in this dialogue, although he certainly does talk about 
that too. Anselm’s is a much more metaphysical investigation. He’s not so much 
interested in formulating precisely when a statement or proposition is true as he is in what 
TRUTH is. If we just say that TRUTH is the satisfying of the conditions for being true, we 
haven’t said very much—and Anselm wants to go deeper than that. In the end, he’s 
talking about much more than truth conditions. 
At bottom, Anselm’s theory of truth is irreducibly teleological in nature. And this is 
surely what makes it look so strange at first. 
But be reassured. Anselm in no sense rejects the standard, traditional account of truth-
CONDITIONS, which we sometimes refer to as a “correspondence”-theory.  
The “correspondence-theory” of truth is perhaps formulated first and certainly most 
famously in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ.7, where he quite reasonably says: 
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to 
say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true. 
Note that what Aristotle is strictly saying here is about the true and the false, not truth and 
falsity. And in any case, Anselm didn’t know the Metaphysics because it wasn’t 
translated yet. 
But Boethius knew it (recall, he knew Greek) and paraphrases this passage very closely 
in his own Commentary on the Categories, which Anselm did have access to. 
Anselm is surely appealing to this Aristotelian/Boethian source near the beginning of the 
On Truth, when he asks (Chap. 2, p. 119): 
T. When is a statement true? [Note: Here he is asking about the conditions 
under which a statement is true, not about what truth is.] 
S. When what it states, either by affirming or denying, is the case. For I 
say that it states something even when it denies that what-is-not is, since 
that is the way in which it states what is the case. 
In short, a statement is true when it, so to speak, “corresponds to reality.” So Anselm 
(actually, it’s “the Student” formulates a “correspondence” theory of when a statement is 
true. 
Anselm never takes this back, and never says anything to suggest he doesn’t fully 
endorse it. So you can be assured that he’s still more or less in the familiar ballpark. 
On the other hand, this isn’t what he’s interested in. For he goes on immediately after this 
quotation to ask what the truth of a true statement is—and we’re off and running. 
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Background 
Now let’s back up for a moment and ask why the Student and the Teacher are having this 
little conversation in the first place. In Chap. 1 (p. 119), the Student reminds Anselm 
(= the Master) of what he had said back in the Monologion, Chap. 18. 
There, you’ll recall, Anselm had argued in effect that there never was a time in the past 
when it wasn’t true to say that I would be uttering these words today at such and such a 
time. Likewise, there never will be a time in the future when it won’t be true to say that I 
was uttering these words today. (He didn’t put it in terms of me, of course.) So, since 
there is always something true, therefore there is always truth as well. But truth = the 
supreme being, he claims, so that the supreme being must always exist. 
(Recall, I remarked at the time that Anselm doesn’t really need the claim that God is 
identical with truth, since all he needs is the claim that truth exists through God. 
Nevertheless, he does make the identification.) 
Well now, here in Chap. 1 of On Truth, the Student wants to know (p. 119—right at the 
beginning): 
Since we believe that God is truth and we say that truth is in many other 
things, I would like to know whether, whenever truth is said to be, we 
must acknowledge that God is that truth. 
In short, when we’re talking about the truth of a proposition, say, are we talking about 
God? 
Or should we be thinking of a more Platonic kind of view, according to which God is 
something like the Platonic Form of Truth, and when we speak of the “truth” of this or 
that proposition, we’re really talking about multiple instantiations or imitations of or 
participations in this Platonic Form? In that case, although God is always lurking not far 
in the background, we’re not always talking about God when we’re talking about truth; 
sometimes we mean those lesser instantiations. 
So this is the kind of thing the Student wants an accounting of. It’s a good question. 
The Truth of Statements 
We start with the easiest and most familiar cases of talking about truth: the truth of 
statements. The word translated as ‘statement’ in our translation is usually—but not 
always—Latin enuntiatio, which literally means “enunciation.” ‘Statement’ is probably a 
good enough translation. The point is it doesn’t mean “proposition” in the sense in which 
that word is used in recent “analytic” philosophy. Rather, a statement is a piece of 
language, not something in the world “expressed” by that piece of language. Statements, 
in other words, are in English or French or Latin. 
OK, now we’ve already seen (Chap. 2, p. 119) that a statement is true iff it states “what is 
the case.” Those are its “truth-conditions.” 
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This suggests, then, an obvious candidate for the truth of a true statement—namely, what 
it states: what is the case, the facts, the situation, reality (or at least the relevant portion of 
reality). 
But the Student rejects this candidate. He says (p. 120): 
… nothing is true except by participating in truth, and so the truth of what 
is true is in the true thing itself, whereas the thing stated is not in the true 
statement. 
That is, the fact or state of affairs asserted by a true statement is not something actually in 
the statement itself—so that the true statement doesn’t “participate” in that fact. 
Notice: This argument is interesting, because it indicates that the Student is starting off 
from exactly the kind of “Platonic” point of view I mentioned a moment ago. In fact, as it 
turns out by the end of the dialogue, Anselm (= the Master) doesn’t want to talk this way. 
He doesn’t think it’s really correct to speak of the “truth of the true” at all, or to think in 
terms of multiple instantiations of truth. (See Chap. 13, especially p. 144—the end of the 
whole dialogue, where he describes that way of talking as said “improperly.”) 
Nevertheless, this is how the discussion gets going, and Anselm would certainly agree 
with the Student’s conclusion here that “what is the case,” the facts or states of affairs 
stated by a true statement, are not its truth. 
The Student now (back in Chap. 2) makes the obvious move. No, he says, it’s not what 
the statement states that is its truth; rather, it must be something “in the statement itself” 
(p. 120). 
The Teacher then suggests: 
T. Then consider whether the statement (oratio) itself, or its signification 
(significatio) or any of those things that are in the definition of ‘statement’ 
(enuntiatio), is what you are looking for.. 
Notice that we’ve got a new Latin word here (oratio), although Williams doesn’t 
distinguish it from enuntiatio, and translates both as ‘statement’. OK, now we need a 
little lesson in terminology and definition. We’ve already seen the term ‘statement’ = 
‘enuntiatio’, and I’ve told you what it means.  ‘Signification’ is the obvious and correct 
translation of ‘significatio’. 
But what about this new word oratio? Obviously, we get “oration” from it. But in 
medieval grammatical theory, the word is used in a very broad sense to mean any piece 
of language. It doesn’t have to be a complete sentence the way an enuntiatio does; even a 
single word will suffice for an oratio. And it doesn’t have to be spoken language; it could 
equally well be written language, for example (although that’s not a complication that 
comes up here). I usually translate the word ‘oratio’ as EXPRESSION. 
OK, there’s one other piece of vocabulary you need, and then I’ll tell you why I’m 
belaboring all this. The word is Latin ‘propositio’ = proposition, and my point is that in 
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medieval usage the word means the same as ‘enuntiatio’. That is, it means a piece of 
language—in particular, a sentence, a declarative sentence. It does not mean, any more 
than ‘enuntiatio’ does, what is expressed by the piece of language. It’s OK to translate it 
as “proposition, as long as we don’t read that in the modern sense. 
Now here’s the point. Look back at the passage I just read, where the Teacher says (p. 
120): 
T. Then consider whether the statement (oratio = expression) itself, or its 
signification (significatio) or any of those things that are in the definition 
of ‘statement’ (enuntiatio), is what you are looking for.. 
What is the “definition” of an enuntiatio? What is he talking about? Well, I think I know, 
although I don’t know how I could prove it. 
Boethius had written a little work entitled De differentiis topicis (“On the Differences of 
the Topics”), which I’m not sure, but would have been a very likely work to have in the 
library at Bec, since it was a more or less standard work in the rhetorical tradition (and 
recall that Lanfranc taught rhetoric among other things at Bec). In that work, Boethius 
famously defines a propositio (“proposition”), which I’ve just told you is basically a 
synonym for ‘enuntiatio’ in the Middle Ages, as: 
A proposition is an expression (oratio) signifying the true or the false. 
(Propositio est oratio verum falsumve significans.) 
I suggest that this is the “definition of a statement” Anselm is referring to. 
The question he is now asking, therefore, is whether truth can be identified with 
something that enters into that definition? Well, what does enter into that definition? 
We’ve already rejected “the true” or “the false”—that is, what is stated by the statement  
or proposition—as a candidate for truth. What’s left? Oratio—i.e., an “expression”—and 
signifying.  
So that’s what’s going on here.  The Teacher’s suggestion, then is that perhaps the truth 
of a statement can be identified with either the expression or statement itself or else its 
signifying. 
Nevertheless, the Student rejects this hypothesis too. Why? Why can’t truth be one of the 
things that enter into this definition? The Student answers (p. 120): 
Because if that were so, the statement would always be true, since 
everything in the definition of ‘statement’ remains the same, both when 
what is stated is the case and when it isn’t. For the statement (oratio again, 
i.e., “expression”) is the same, its signification is the same, and so forth. 
(I’m not sure what other things he’s referring to by the phrase “and so forth,” and this 
may count against my suggested identification of the definition they are talking about.) 
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In any case the idea is this: A statement can change its truth value (from true to false or 
conversely), simply by there being changes only in the world. That is, first the truth can 
be in the statement, and then the truth is no longer in it, or conversely. And yet it’s the 
same sequence of words with the same signification throughout. That is, the features that 
enter into its definition remain invariant. Therefore, since the truth comes and goes in the 
statement while all the things that define the statement remain the same, truth cannot be 
any of the things that define the statement. 
Fair enough. So what then is truth? Here is where we see the teleological aspect of 
Anselm’s account coming out. 
Here we go (p. 120): 
T. For what purpose is an affirmation made? (I.e., an affirmative 
statement.) 
That’s the teleological question: what’s its purpose? 
S. For signifying that what-is is. 
And presumably the corresponding “purpose” of a negative statement is to signify that 
what-is-not isn’t, although that isn’t explicitly said here. In short, statements in general 
are made for the purpose of corresponding to reality. 
The translation here is a little awkward, but there’s nothing awkward about the Latin. It’s 
Ad significandum esse quod est = lit. “for signifying to be what is.” 
You might think this statement of purpose is already too quick. Sometimes we make 
statements for other purposes—for example, when we’re trying to deceive someone, 
where the whole point seems to be not to correspond to reality. Or perhaps we’re making 
a statement just to test the sound system in a performance hall. (After all, the purpose of 
the statement is not part of the definition we’ve seen.) But let’s just wait. 
To simplify matters, let’s just leave negative statements out of account for now, and focus 
on the affirmative ones, the purpose of which, we just said, was to “signify that what-is 
is.” 
T. So it ought to do that [i.e., to signify that what-is is]. 
S. Certainly. 
T. So when it signifies that what-is is, it signifies what it ought to. 
S. Obviously. 
The word here is ‘debet’. It means “ought” or “should”, and it also means “owe”—we 
speak of a “debt.” 
Notice what’s happened here. Anselm has just linked the notion of purpose or teleology 
with the notion of owing or “ought”—a normative notion. Things ought to do what they 
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were made for. (Remember the question “for what purpose is an affirmation made?”) 
Things ought to fulfill their purpose. 
There’s no argument given for this linkage here, but it’s a crucial move for Anselm’s 
whole picture. We will see it throughout the On Truth, and in fact throughout the 
Philosophical Dialogues as a whole. 
We now get an additional linkage (still on p. 120): 
T. And when it signifies what it ought to it signifies correctly. 
S. Yes. 
T. Now when it signifies correctly, its signification is correct. 
S. No doubt about it. 
The point here is merely to link all the previous stuff up with the notion of being correct. 
The Latin here is simply ‘rectus’ (or one of its inflected variants), and just means “right.” 
So all we’re saying is that when a statement signifies what it ought to, it signifies 
“rightly,” and its signification is “right.” 
We talk the same way when we agree with something by saying, “That’s right.” 
So we’ve got two link-ups here: (i) the link between the teleological notion of what a 
statement (or, for that matter, anything) is made for and the normative notion of what it 
ought to be or to do; and (ii) the link between what a thing ought to be or to do and its 
being right. 
As far as I can see, the second link is purely terminological, and doesn’t really add much 
in the way of theory, although it will be important for the way Anselm puts the theory, as 
we’ll see. In other words, the notion of being right is not really a third substantive notion 
in addition to the notions of a thing’s purpose (“what is it made for”) and what it ought to 
do. 
OK, but still, let’s put the two links together. The purpose or teleology of a statement is to 
signify what is the case, and when it does that, it does what it ought to and its 
signification is correct. 
But we also said that, when it does that, the statement is true. (Recall the Teacher’s 
originally asking—p. 119—when a statement is true.) That is (p. 121): 
T. Furthermore, when it signifies that what-is is, its signification is true. 
And so we get the conclusion (p. 121): 
T. Then its being correct [= right] is the same thing as its being true; 
namely, its signifying that what-is is. 
S. Indeed the are the same. 
T. So its [the statement’s] truth is nothing other than its rectitude 
[= rightness]. 
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So the upshot of all this is that for Anselm the truth of a statement is its rightness in a 
normative sense, cashed out in terms of a kind of correspondence-notion and linked with 
the thing’s purpose or teleology. 
As we’ll see in a little while, there’s another clause that has to be added here, but we’ll 
deal with that later. 
Now you might this is an awful lot of labor for a result that isn’t really very impressive in 
the end. But be patient. I’ve dwelt on this for so long because I want to be sure you see 
the progression here: the progression from (a) a thing’s teleology or purpose to (b) what it 
ought to be or to do, and from there to (c) what is normatively right for it to be or to do, 
and from there finally to (d) what the truth is for it. 
We will see this pattern repeated in a variety of contexts in the On Truth. Let’s look at 
some of them. 
Truth in Other Contexts 
In Chap. 2, we talked about the truth of statements. We go on in Chap. 3 to talk about the 
truth of opinion—that is, in the mind. Notice the same progression (p. 123)—by this time 
the Student seems to have caught on, and now he gets to say: 
S. According to the reasoning we found persuasive in the case of 
statements [NB: HE ACTUALLY SAYS ‘PROPOSITIO’ HERE, EVEN THOUGH 
THE PRECEDING CHAPTER WAS ABOUT AN ‘ENUNTIATIO’. THIS IS PERHAPS 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FOR MY SUGGESTION THAT THE “DEFINITION OF A 
STATEMENT (ENUNTIATIO)” ANSELM REFERRED TO BACK IN CHAP. 2 IS 
REALLY BOETHIUS’S FAMOUS DEFINITION OF A PROPOSITION.], nothing can 
be more correctly [= “rightly”] called the truth of a thought than its 
rectitude [= “rightness”]. For the power of thinking that something is or is 
not was given to us (a) in order that [= there’s the teleological move] we 
might think that what-is is, and that what-is-not is not. Therefore, if 
someone thinks that what-is is, he is thinking (b) what he ought to think 
[there’s the move from teleology to the normative “ought” again], and so 
his thought is (c) correct [= “right”]. If, then, a thought is true and correct 
for no other reason than that we are thinking that what-is is, or that what-
is-not is not,  (d) its truth is nothing other than rectitude. 
So we have the same progression as in Chap. 2: from (a) teleology to (b) the 
normative ought, and from there to (c) what is normatively right, and finally from 
there to (d) truth. 
In Chap. 4 (pp. 123–24), we get the same theme in connection with “truth” for the will. 
John’s Gospel says that the devil did not “remain steadfast in the truth,” and this can only 
be because of what he willed. So there must be a notion of “truth” that applies to the will 
as well. And you can anticipate how this goes: in the case of the will, (d) truth is simply 
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(c) rectitude (i.e., “rightness”), which is a matter of doing (b) what it ought, which is in 
turn cashed out in terms of (a) for what a will was given in the first place (its teleology). 
In Chap. 5 (pp. 124–26), we get the same thing applied to “natural and non-natural” 
actions. (“Non-natural action” doesn’t mean “unnatural acts,” but voluntary action.) So 
we can speak, for example, of fire as “doing the truth” when it does what it ought (i.e., it 
heats things up) = what it was made for doing: 
S. If the fire received the power to heat from the one from whom it has 
being, then when it heats, it is doing what it ought to. So I do not see what 
is inappropriate about saying that the fire does the truth and acts correctly 
when it does what it ought to. (p. 125.) 
That’s an example of natural action. So too for voluntary actions when we do what we 
ought. 
In Chap. 6 (pp. 126–27) we learn that there is truth in the senses—even in the case of 
sensory illusions. They are working as they were made to work, and any falsehood comes 
only in our judgment about what the senses report. 
Finally, in Chap. 7 (pp. 128–29), we get the rather esoteric notion of the truth of the being 
of things. Things truly are when they are the way they ought to be, when they fulfill the 
purpose for which they were created—which they can’t help but doing insofar as God’s 
providential plan is not to be thwarted. 
OK, now let’s pause before we get too carried away, and notice some complications that 
emerge back in Chap. 2, on the truth of statements or propositions. (What I’m trying to 
do now is to set up some points of comparison and contrast between Adams’s paper and 
the Visser/Williams chapter in the Companion. This is a bit of a grab-bag.) 
First of all, the Student notes that there’s a potential objection to—or at least a surprising 
consequence—of our claim that the truth of a statement or proposition is its rightness—
that is, its doing what it ought to do, which in turn is its fulfilling the purpose for which it 
was made. 
Remember how the Student, back in Chap. 2, had rejected the earlier suggestion that the 
truth of a statement could be identified either with the statement itself (the actual words, 
the expression or oratio) or with its signification—because those remain invariant 
although the statement can change from true to false or vice versa. In fact, isn’t the 
statement—the actual piece of language, the expression—designed in such a way as to 
have precisely that invariant signification? So when it signifies that way, isn’t it doing 
exactly what it’s supposed to—that FOR WHICH IT WAS MADE? (Made by whom? We’ll 
see in a moment.) And if that’s so, does it then follow from our account of truth that the 
statement is true whenever it signifies the way it does—regardless of the facts? But in 
that case the statement would be both true (in that sense) and yet false (since it fails to say 
“what is the case”—and we said that Anselm never abandons that “correspondence” 
notion of truth). 
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Anselm’s reply (p. 121) is that yes, we can say that if we wish. We don’t usually do so, 
but we can. In fact, we can distinguish two ways in which a statement can do what it 
ought to do (and so be true)—because there are two things it ought to do. 
(1) First of all, it ought signify the way it does. 
(This is not to suggest, of course, that there’s any danger it’s not going to signify the way 
it does—as though the statement ‘The cat is on the mat’ were suddenly, in a fit of 
perversity, just to get it into its head that it’s going to signify that the moon is made of 
green cheese. No, that’s not going to happen. But still, when the statement signifies the 
way it does, it’s doing what it was designed to do, it’s fulfilling its purpose.) 
(2) But a statement ought also to signify “as is the case.” That’s what statements are 
made for, as we said at the outset, and that’s what we normally have in mind when we 
talk about the truth of a statement. 
So there are really two kinds of truth for a statement, although we’re usually only talking 
about the second kind. 
There are still problems, though—AND NOW I’M “FREEWHEELING.” Suppose that in fact 
the cat is not on the mat (it’s gone out the door). Now the statement ‘The cat is on the 
mat’, we said, was designed (made) to signify exactly the way it does, that the cat is on 
the mat. On the other hand, we also said that all statements are designed or made to 
signify the way things are, to “correspond to the facts.” Unfortunately, as long as our cat 
is somewhere else, the statement cannot fulfill both purposes. 
Does this mean that in such a case the statement was made with inconsistent purposes? 
Or that the statement-maker intended the two purposes to be consistent and just slipped 
up? That he intended the statement to mean something other than what it does? Or that he 
intended the cat to get back on the mat? Or what? How do we sort this out? 
Let’s look more closely. We asked early on what the purpose of a statement is—“for 
what was a statement made?” And now let’s ask: made by whom? 
The obvious answer would seem to be: made by the speakers who are actually using the 
language—in short, that the relevant makers of statements here are you and me and other 
ordinary human beings. 
But there’s a problem if that’s what we mean: The claim that all statements are made for 
the purpose of signifying the way things are unfortunately seems to be just not so for all 
too many human statement-makers (to wit: liars)! 
So maybe—and again I’m freewheeling here—what we want to do here is to say that 
we’re not talking about individual human beings so much as about the linguistic 
community at large. After all, statements get to have the meaning or signification they do, 
we may say, not because of individual acts of “meaning-legislation” on my part. No, it’s 
more of a communal, cultural process. That’s how language comes to signify the way it 
does. By the same token, perhaps we can say that while there are—alas!—far too many 
liars in the world, and for that matter lots of other individual reasons for making 
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statements, still overall the function of language at large is to communicate, and 
preeminently to communicate the way things are. 
Perhaps. But my reason for bringing all this up is to set the background for some of the 
discussion in the Visser/Williams article in the Companion and for Marilyn Adams’s 
paper, “Saint Anselm’s Theory of Truth.” 
Visser and Williams make an interesting claim. They’re quoting from On Truth, Chap. 2, 
the passage where the Teacher (= Anselm) is explaining the two kinds of purposes I just 
distinguished, although in the passage I’m about to read only the second purpose for 
statements (to “signify the way things are”) is at stake. The passage is on p. 122 in Basic 
Writings, and is quoted in the Visser/Williams article on p. 207 of the Companion: 
T. For example, when I say “It is day” in order to signify that what-is is, I 
am using the signification of this statement [oratio—we’ve talked about 
that word before—I like to translate it as “expression”] correctly, since 
this is the purpose for which it was made; consequently, in that case it is 
said to signify correctly. But when I use the same statement [oratio] to 
signify that what-is-not is, I am not using it correctly, since it was not 
made for that purpose; and so in that case its signification is said not to be 
correct. 
So far, so good.  
Now Visser and Williams argue: Look, the passage is talking about using the same oratio 
“It is day” on two different occasions—once during the daytime, when the statement is 
true, and once during the nighttime, when the statement is false. 
This implies, they go on, that what Anselm means by an “oratio”—and hence, notice, by 
an enuntiatio or propositio, which is defined as a subcase of oratio—is not a token. It is 
not a particular occurrence of uttering or speaking; it’s rather an utterance-type or 
speaking-type—something that can be repeated on distinct occasions. It is, in short, a 
kind of nature. (A kind of universal that can be shared.) 
So—when we’re talking about the purpose or that for which an oratio or enuntiatio is 
made, we’re not talking about making tokens but about making types. It’s not about 
whatever purpose I might have in uttering the expression “It is day” on a particular 
occasion—for example, my purpose of deceiving you about what time it is. Rather, it’s 
about the purpose for making that expression-type. 
But who makes expression-types? And so who is in a position to make them for a 
purpose? Certainly I don’t, although I do produce particular tokens. 
Perhaps here is where we might appeal to the linguistic community or something like 
that. Visser and Williams suggest (although they reject) a variation on this approach 
when they say (p. 208): 
One can build the teleology into our God-given power to use language, 
rather than into the statement-types themselves. Such a move allows one 
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to recognize the conventionality of natural languages—to acknowledge, in 
other words, that it is human beings who make natural-language 
statement-types [i.e., human beings as a group]—but insist that our ability 
to make and use such languages was given to us by God for the purpose of 
signifying that what-is-is. Thus, we use our power of speech correctly 
when we use conventional natural-language statement-types in order to 
signify that what-is is. 
I’m not sure how far we can get with that. But nevertheless, they reject this plausible 
hypothesis on interesting grounds (p. 208–09): 
Unfortunately, Anselm himself cannot take this approach, since it involves 
conceding that creatures do have a limited power to create natures and 
confer purposes on them. 
So, who does make these statement-types? God—the only one who can! And since he 
makes them, they are made for the purposes he has in making them. In short, the 
teleology built into Anselm’s theory of the truth of statements is a teleology provided by 
God. 
Notice what this account requires: it requires God to create statement-types. And we’re 
talking about natural-language statement-types. It’s not just a theory that God creates 
propositions in the modern sense, entities expressed by statements in language. No, what 
we’re talking about is God’s getting down-and-dirty in the grimy details of English and 
French! Visser and Williams are right, I think, to hesitate a little to attribute that kind of 
view to Anselm (they speak on p. 208 of the “strangeness of this view”)—although they 
nevertheless do it. 
But let’s look more closely. Notice why Visser/Williams feel pushed into this 
interpretation: 
 Anselm would deny that human beings have even a limited power to create 
natures. And that’s certainly correct; only God can create anything—natures or 
otherwise. But we’re not talking about creation here—that is, creation ex nihilo. 
We’re talking about something less than that—merely a kind of productive 
causality (efficient causes). And Anselm does not deny that human beings can 
make things, and can make them for something (for a purpose) in that sense. So 
why would making statement-types be a case of creation, as they think? 
 Nevertheless, statement-types are a kind of universal nature, they say, and it’s 
probably still true that Anselm doesn’t think human beings have the capacity to 
make NATURES—even if that doesn’t amount to creation. 
On the other hand, why do Visser/Williams think that statement-types are natures? Their 
reading seems automatically to read statement-types as natures, but why? Because they’re 
repeatable? It’s a little hard to know how to answer this, since it’s hard to know how to 
read natures, types and tokens back into Anselm at all. 
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In this connection, it’s interesting to contrast Adams’s paper “Saint Anselm’s Theory of 
Truth.” 
Adams isn’t the slightest bit worried about the distinction between tokens and types, and 
is quite happy to acknowledge that human beings assign language its purpose and 
function. Thus (Adams, p. 361): 
For example, the spoken and written statements ‘It is day’ have been taken 
over by the linguistic community to signify that it is day 
Again (ibid.): 
Apparently assuming that the linguistic community has thus endowed such 
conventional signs with a natural telos,  
(Even if “the linguistic community” isn’t any single individual, it’s definitely not God. So 
God isn’t the only source of things’ teleologies for Adams.) 
Besides, it would be pretty hard to make the claim that, for Anselm, creatures (in 
particular human beings) don’t have the power to produce things as efficient causes, 
although of course that wouldn’t amount to full-fledged creation. For Anselm is 
continually using the example of the human artisan who produces something in 
accordance with his pre-existing mental plan. 
He does this, e.g., in Monologion, Chap. 11 (p. 19), where he is explaining further the 
third of the three kinds of “utterances” he distinguished back in Chap. 10: 
… a craftsman first conceives in his mind what he afterwards makes into a 
completed work in accordance with the conception in his mind. 
Again, in the “ontological argument” in Prosl., Chap. 2, we get the following little 
explanation of the difference between merely “existing in the mind” and “being 
understood to exist in reality” (p. 82): 
When a painter, for example, thinks out in advance what he is going to 
paint, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand that it 
exists, since he has not yet painted it. But once he has painted it, he both 
has it in his understanding and understands that it exists because he has 
now painted it. 
So, unlike Visser/Williams, Adams is perfectly happy to grant that human beings can 
produce things, and that they can assign them a teleology—including natural-language 
statements (whether types or tokens she’s not concerned). 
Again, in a somewhat surprising endnote in their Companion article (pp. 220–21 n. 10), 
Visser/Williams say: 
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Note that if Anselm thought of propositions as a kind of mental language, 
as some later medieval thinkers would, then he would have no need to 
suppose that God creates natural-language statement-types. For then 
utterances would express mental language or thought, which is the same in 
all human beings because it is a function of the powers we were given by 
God. In this way the truth of statements could be analyzed in terms of the 
truth of thought or mental language. Unfortunately, Anselm does not think 
of propositions in this way. 
I called this “surprising” because, while it may be true that Anselm doesn’t usually talk in 
terms of a mental language for human beings, he most definitely does have the notion of 
mental language—because God thinks in it. Recall Monologion, Chap. 10, where Anselm 
talks about God’s “utterance” or “word” as proceeding purely conceptually, “in his 
reason” (Monologion, p. 17). 
Adams picks up on this in her paper (p. 355): 
Hence, speech is preeminently mental, the speech of reason thinking the 
essences of things  
Again, I’m not sure how all this shakes out in playing off Adams’s paper against the 
Visser/Williams paper in the Companion. 
The Supreme Truth 
OK, now we’ve talked about truth in the context of statements, opinion (that is, 
judgments), the will, actions, the senses, and the being of things. What about the highest 
truth, the supreme truth? Recall, back at the very beginning of the dialogue, the Student 
reminded Anselm (= the Master) of what he had said back in the Monologion, Chap. 18, 
where the supreme being = the supreme truth. The Student wanted to know whether 
that’s the truth we are talking about in all cases. 
In all the other contexts we’ve talked about, we’ve seen that truth turns out to be rectitude 
(rightness). So it’s not surprising that, right at the beginning of On Truth, Chap. 10 (p. 
133), we extrapolate and say that the highest truth is likewise rectitude. 
But there’s a problem. In all the earlier contexts, we said, we had two linkages: (a) the 
link between a thing’s teleology, “what it was made for,” and what it ought to be or do—
and recall, the word is ‘debet’, which means “owes” and from which we get “debt.” And 
(b) the link between what a thing ought to be or do and rectitude or “rightness.” The latter 
link, I suggested, was—as far as I could see—purely a terminological matter. 
But God of course owes nothing to anything, and isn’t in debt to anything; it would even 
be hard to make sense out of saying God is in debt to himself. 
Again, it doesn’t make any sense to talk about what God was “made for”; he wasn’t made 
at all. So God doesn’t really have any teleology in that sense. It does make sense, of 
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course, to talk about the purpose or teleology God has in doing things, a purpose he’s not 
assigned but adopts for himself. This is the purpose of creation, and of the various things 
in creation. But of course that purpose is just another way of talking about the purpose 
“for which” those other things were made. So we’ve made no progress if we’re trying to 
explain how God can be the supreme truth. 
As Visser/Williams observe, the problem here is whether we’re just equivocating 
between (i) when we talk about the truth of statements or opinions or whatever in terms 
of their rightness and (ii) when we’re talking about God’s truth in terms of rightness—
whether we mean one thing when we’re talking truth in the case of creatures and another 
thing entirely when we’re talking about truth in the case of God. 
In fact, I think we can put the point more sharply: It’s not just whether we’re talking 
about two different things but whether we’re talking about anything at all when we’re 
talking about God’s “rightness.” Earlier, “rightness” was just another way of talking 
about what a thing ought to be or do, but that certainly doesn’t apply to God.  
Again, through the earlier “linkages,” rightness was another way of talking about a 
thing’s teleology. But that doesn’t apply to God either, except as just a roundabout way 
of talking about the creature’s teleology—which, again, means we’ve not really made any 
progress. 
So what’s left? 
Visser/Williams try to explain this in terms of the supreme truth’s being the cause of 
other truths. See Visser/Williams p. 217 and Basic Writings p. 133 (Chap. 10): 
Do you also see that this rectitude is the cause of all other truths and 
rectitudes, and nothing is the cause of it? [And the Student says “yes.”] 
But what are we talking about when we talk about the supreme truth’s “rectitude”? 
Perhaps we can view this in roughly Platonic fashion, so that the supreme being is 
“rightness” only in the sense that it serves as the exemplar and standard by which other 
things are judged to be more or less right, as they ought to be and as they are made to be 
(teleologically). And this seems to be approximately the way Visser and Williams are 
arguing. 
But that broadly Platonic picture seems to conflict with another thing Visser/Williams 
argue (p. 217): The supreme Truth is in fact the ONLY truth. In other words, in response to 
the Student’s question at the outset of the dialogue (Basic Writings, p. 119), whether 
we’re always talking about God when we’re talking about truth, the answer is yes. As 
Visser and Williams say (p. 218), this: 
 is not a standard Platonic maneuver of the sort that we see in his 
account of goodness [e.g., in Monologion, Chap. 1]. That is, he is not 
arguing that since various things are true, there must be something that is 
true in the highest degree and has its truth from itself rather than from 
another. Anselm in fact never argues in this way that God is true, as he 
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argues that God is just, good, and so forth.  So the unity of truth is not 
the unity of a property in its various instances [the “Platonic” approach], 
but strict numerical unity. There is one truth because Truth is God, who is 
one. 
See also On Truth, Chap. 13: “That there is one truth in all true things.” 
In the end, Anselm doesn’t like to talk about the truth of this or of that if that is taken to 
imply that there are multiple truths. He seems to be happier talking about the truth for this 
or that. For Anselm, there is only one truth, but with respect to x it works one way, and 
with respect to y it works another. 
Loose Ends in On Truth 
Earlier we said that truth is not just rightness, but that there is something else we need to 
take account of. This comes up in On Truth, Chap. 11. 
It turns out that truth is not just any old rightness, but (p. 135), “rectitude perceptible only 
by the mind.” (In other words, we’re not talking about the “rightness” of a right angle, for 
instance.) 
I should also point that there is an extremely interesting discussion in Visser/Williams, 
pp. 210–13, that I don’t know quite how to evaluate. They argue that Anselm is 
committed to holding that the same situation both ought and ought not to be, although 
from different perspectives. As they quote Anselm (p. 212—from On Truth, Chap. 8, 
Basic Writings, pp. 129–30): 
Then the same thing both ought to be and ought not to be. It ought to be, 
in that God, without whose permission it could not come about, acts 
wisely and well in permitting it, but if we consider the one whose evil will 
instigates the action, it ought not to be. 
Generalizing, they observe (p. 213): 
So we are left with a theory of truth according to which one and the same 
statement is true or false depending on the context of assessment. 
In this connection, recall our discussion of the two truths of statements back in On Truth, 
Chap. 2. This is similar, but not quite the same sort of thing. Here we have the truths of 
actions. 
They also argue (p. 212) that neither of these “contexts” of assessment or perspectives is 
to be privileged, so that we really are left with a perspectivalist theory of truth. I don’t 
know what to make of this, but I find the following suggestion extremely provocative (p. 
213): 
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We do not have the space in this essay pursue these implications, but we 
will note that there can be no fully adequate account of Anselm’s views on 
human freedom, grace, providence, and divine foreknowledge without a 
recognition that modal statements do not, for Anselm, have context-
independent  truth values. Indeed, if Anselm’s perspectivalism can be 
defended, it opens up philosophically promising avenues for discussions 
of those perennially vexing issues. 
They also point our in footnote 18 at the end of their chapter (p. 221): 
It is important not to confuse this claim with the superficially similar (and 
relatively uncontroversial) claim that propositional content, and hence the truth-
value, of an utterance can change depending on the circumstances of the 
utterance. Anselm holds the much stronger and counterintuitive view that one and 
the same utterance, with just one determinate propositional content and in one 
determinate set of circumstances, can have different truth-values according to 
different ways of assessing the utterance. 
Justice 
Finally, I want to call your attention to what appears to be a side-issue in On Truth, but 
will come up essentially in the other “Philosophical Dialogues”: the notion of justice. 
Anselm argues in Chap. 12 to the conclusion that justice is “rectitude of will preserved 
for its own sake” (p. 139). 
Note that rectitude of will is not something perceptible by the senses, and must therefore 
be rectitude perceptible by the mind alone. Therefore, it must be truth; in fact, it is a kind 
of truth in the will (Chap. 4)—preserved for its own sake. 
To say justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake is just to say that it doesn’t 
count as justice (although it would still count as truth) if you preserve rectitude of will 
because it’s the policy that PAYS, or for some other reason. 
This is a very Kantian notion, the idea of doing your duty because it’s your duty. 
Anselm on Free Choice 
In this connection, I want to talk about two works of Anselm’s more or less 
simultaneously: (a) On Freedom of Choice (which I’ll probably end up calling On Free 
Will, because that’s the translation of the title I’m most used to—even though Williams’s 
is strictly more correct), and (b) On the Fall of the Devil. 
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Secondary literature: 
 Visser/Williams in Companion, Chap. 8: “Anselm’s Account of Freedom.” (This 
is a good paper, but not as provocative perhaps as their chapter on truth.) 
 Several items you can find by looking through the list of things on E-Reserves. 
But I want to call your particular attention to two items by Calvin Normore: 
o “Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice.” 
o “Goodness and Rational Choice in the Early Middle Ages.” 
Both of these (and a lot of the rest of the secondary literature on this) are on Anselm and 
other people—usually later people, since Anselm’s views here are innovative (not just 
variations on themes seen earlier in the Middle Ages, as for instance the Monologion is), 
as well as being influential. 
The question that leads off On Freedom of Choice is what free choice is, and in particular 
whether it requires the ability to sin. The On the Fall of the Devil is not so much about 
what free choice is as about the philosophical psychology of free choice in actual 
practice. 
Here’s the opening of On Freedom of Choice (p. 147): 
Student. Since free choice seems to be INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE GRACE, 
PREDESTINATION AND FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD [NB: Compare the full 
title of the so called De Concordia (p. 361): “On the Harmony [i.e., 
compatibility] of God’s Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace with 
Free Choice], I want to know what this freedom of choice is, and whether 
we always have it. [Note there are two questions here.] For if freedom of 
choice is “the ability to sin and not to sin,” as some are accustomed to say 
[I have no idea who says that], and we always have that ability, then how 
is it that we ever need grace? [This is the problem of Pelagianism: if we 
always have free choice, and free choice includes the power of not 
sinning, then we can save ourselves from sin under our own power, so 
what is the use of grace?—St. Augustine got very exercised about this, and 
wrote a lot about what he thought of as the perils of this view.] On the 
other hand, if we do not always have it, why is sin imputed to us 
[= blamed on us] when we sin without free choice? [I.e., why are we 
blamed if we can’t help it?] 
Teacher. I don’t think freedom of choice is the power to sin and not to sin. 
[So he’s disagreeing with the suggested definition.] After all, if this were 
its definition, then neither God nor the angels, who cannot sin, would have 
free choice—which it is impious to say. 
Note some things by way of background here: 
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 Obviously God can’t be said to be able to sin, even though we do say God is 
omnipotent and also want to say God has free choice. On the first point, we’ve 
already seen to some extent in Prosl., Chap. 7, how God is omnipotent even 
though there are lots of things he can’t do. For present purposes, however, the 
point to note is that Anselm wants to say that God has free choice in exactly the 
same sense we do. There’s no appeal here to the “mysterious ways of God,” as we 
seem to get, for instance, back in the Proslogion when we’re talking about how 
God’s justice is compatible with his mercy. And there’s no implicit doctrine of 
analogical predication with respect to God, famous to fans of Thomas Aquinas. 
No, there’s a univocal notion of free choice applicable to God and to human 
beings. 
 He talks about God or the angels. He means “good angels” here, not the devils, 
who are “fallen angels.” The picture here is this: To begin with, all the angels 
were both able to sin and able not to sin. Some angels chose to sin, and they are 
now what we call devils. Other angels chose not to sin, and they are the good 
angels. But the crucial point is: the latter, the good angels, have now been 
confirmed in their choice, and are no longer able to sin—even though, Anselm 
insists, we want to say they still have free choice! 
 An analogous thing holds for the devils: once they sinned, they are now no longer 
able NOT to sin, even though Anselm will say they still have free choice. And, 
although he doesn’t mention the devils in these opening lines, they too would 
provide counterexamples to the claim that free will is the ability both to sin AND 
not to sin. 
So what is free choice? That’s the real question of the dialogue. 
The question of On the Fall of the Devil is in a way more interesting. The question why 
the Devil fell [= sinned] is much harder than the question why Adam and Eve fell in the 
Garden of Eden. They were tempted by the Devil in the guise of a serpent. But there was 
nobody to tempt the Devil himself. 
Furthermore, to begin with the angels were not created in some kind of neutral state. No, 
they were initially all in a state of happiness or blessedness. And the Devil—i.e., Satan, 
traditionally the chief of the fallen angels—was a very high ranking angel and suffered 
from no lack of good sense. The angels, of course, aren’t omniscient (that’s reserved for 
God), but they’re definitely not stupid. So here was the Devil, who was sitting there to 
begin with in a state of happiness. He had a very good deal going for him, was smart 
enough to know it, and had nobody around to tempt him. So how could he have managed 
to sin? It’s a very good question! 
That’s the agenda for our two dialogues. Let’s turn back now to On Freedom of Choice. 
In Chap. 1, as we’ve seen, Anselm maintains that the ability to sin cannot be implied by 
free choice. In fact, he argues, you’re freer if you will the right way and cannot go wrong 
(= sin) than you are if you will the right way and can go wrong. (In other words, the good 
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angels are freer now than they were at the outset.) The Student at first doesn’t see this 
point (p. 147): 
S. I don’t see why a will isn’t freer when it is capable of both. 
T. Do you not see that someone who has what is fitting and expedient 
[roughly = “beneficial”—and note that ‘fitting’ and ‘expedient’ here are 
supposed to more or less interchangeable, so that we’re not talking about 
two things] in such a way that he cannot lose it is freer than someone who 
has it in such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is 
unfitting and inexpedient? 
For example, suppose you have a fabulous fortune, but are in a position where you could 
lose it any moment by a rash financial decision. Aren’t you in a sense less free than you 
would be if you didn’t have to worry about all that and your fortune were in the form of 
an iron-clad, guaranteed trust fund? 
You may not find that exammple persuasive, since it suggests that being free for Anselm 
isn’t so much a freedom to do various things as it is a kind of freedom from worry. In any 
case, let’s go on. 
In Chap. 3, Anselm asks (p. 150): 
T. For what purpose do you think they [= angels and human beings] had 
this freedom of choice: in order to attain what they willed, or in order to 
will what they ought and what was expedient for them to will? 
S. In order to will what they ought to and what was expedient to will. 
T. So they had freedom of choice for the sake of rectitude of will—since 
as long as they willed what they ought to, they had rectitude of will. 
Note the link-ups once again, as we saw back in On Truth: between teleology (“for what 
purpose”) and normativity (“ought”), and between both of those and rectitude 
(“rightness”). 
And all of these are here linked with what is “expedient” for a thing. I’m not quite sure 
what ‘expedient’ means in this context. 
Now we’re told (p. 150) “they”—i.e., angels and human beings (at least Adam and Eve)
—were initially given this rightness of will, although Adam and Eve and some of the 
angels lost it (“abandoned” it, as the text says). (There are special problems of “original 
sin” in connection with US, who inherit the sin of Adam and do NOT start off with a “right 
will.”) 
Now (p. 151): 
S.  And they didn’t receive freedom in order [NB: teleology again] to 
reclaim, by their own power, the rectitude they had abandoned, since such 
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rectitude was given to them in order that they might never abandon it … 
The only remaining possibility, then, is that freedom of choice was given 
to the rational nature in order that it might preserve the rectitude of will it 
had received. 
Furthermore, the Student and the Masster go on to agree that this freedom of choice is 
given for the purpose of retaining or preserving rectitude of will for its own sake. It won’t 
do to say that free choice was given for the purpose of preserving rectitude of will 
because that’s what pays, let’s say, or because if you don’t you’ll go to hell, or for any 
other extraneous reason. 
So, the Teacher concludes (p. 151): 
T. Therefore, since every freedom is a power, freedom of choice is the 
power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself. 
This is Anselm’s definition of freedom of choice. (See also Chap. 13.) Notice what he’s 
done: he has defined freedom of choice in terms of its teleology. Freedom of choice is the 
ability or power to do what it was made for. And that’s not just a vacuous move, since 
we’re told what it was made for: to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake. 
Despite Anselm’s declared intention of finding a definition of free choice that applies 
univocally to God and rational creatures, it’s a little hard to see how this definition 
applies to God. As we saw in discussing On Truth, it’s hard to see how the notion of 
rightness makes any sense when applied to God, particularly if it’s linked to the notion of 
ought and the notion of a thing’s teleology or what it was made for, since neither of those 
applies to God. The definition of free choice, then, inherits these problems from the On 
Truth. 
In any case, this is Anselm’s definition of free choice. 
Recall, back in On Truth, Chap. 12, we defined justice (p. 139) as: rectitude of will 
preserved for its own sake. 
Put this together now with our definition of freedom of will, and you get the result that 
free choice = the capacity for justice, the power to be just, and the purpose of free choice 
is in order for its possessor to be just. 
But how can we be said to have the power to be just if we’ve lost justice by sinning and 
can’t get it back without special help (“grace”) from God? Or, to put it another way, how 
can we be said now to have the power to preserve rightness of will if we don’t even have 
rightness of will? And how can the Devil be said still to have the power of preserving 
rightness of will if he no longer has it to preserve? As the Student says (p. 151): 
S. It is indeed clear. Now as long as the rational nature had rectitude, it 
could preserve what it had. After it has abandoned rectitude, however, 
how can it preserve what it does not have? Therefore, if there is no 
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rectitude that can be preserved, there is no free choice that can preserve it. 
For one cannot preserve what one does not have. 
The Teacher replies with an answer that sounds promising but that leaves out an 
important factor. He gives a parallel (p. 152): 
T.  No one who has vision is said to be entirely unable to see a 
mountain. 
And he goes on to say that if we have vision [i.e., the sense faculty], there’s a perfectly 
good sense in saying we have the power to see a mountain even if there’s no mountain 
there. 
This highlights the fact that, for Anselm, the question what powers or abilities a thing has 
is an ontological matter, not just a matter of what we can stick in the direct object of a 
judgment about possibilities. Granted, if there’s no mountain there, I can’t see it no 
matter how good my eyesight. Still, adding a mountain wouldn’t change the ontology of 
me in the slightest, and in that sense wouldn’t change the powers I have. 
I have the power of seeing a mountain in the sense that I could see it if one were there. So 
too, I have the power of preserving rectitude of will, even though I don’t have rectitude of 
will—in the sense that if I DID have it, I COULD preserve it. 
This sounds like a promising approach. But I said it leaves out an important factor. In 
fact, on p. 153 (Chap. 4) the Teacher says something that may be confusing: 
T. So when there’s nothing there for us to see, we’re in total darkness, and 
our eyes are closed or blindfolded, we still have the power to see any 
visible thing—so far as it pertains to us. What, therefore, is there to 
prevent us from having the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake 
of rectitude itself, even in the absence of rectitude, as long we have reason, 
by which we can know rectitude, and will, by which we can retain it? … 
What’s perhaps confusing here is the talk about the case where I can’t see the object 
simply because it’s not there in front of me, I’m in darkness, or I’ve shut my eyes or 
blindfolded myself. In that case, all I have to do to see the object is just go to where it is, 
wait until daylight or carry a torch, and open my eyes or take off my blindfold. So too in 
the case of the mountain. I can always see the mountain if I go to where the mountain is, 
in the daytime and open my unblindfolded eyes. 
But in the case of rectitude of will I can’t do that. Once I lose rectitude of will, there’s 
nothing I can do to retrieve it. And yet, Anselm says, I still have the power to preserve it. 
Take another example: Suppose I have a stone and also have the the power to keep it. 
Then if I throw the stone across a big ditch so that I can’t go retrieve it, I nevertheless still 
have the power to keep the stone in the sense that nothing has changed ontologically in 
me. 
 100 
 
In fact, Anselm somewhat boldly claims that not even God can take away rectitude of 
will (Chap. 8, p. 159): 
T.  He can indeed reduce to nothing the whole substance that he has 
made from nothing, but he cannot take away rectitude from a will that has 
it. 
The Visser/Williams Paper in Companion,  “Anselm’s Account of Freedom” 
Notice what is not suggested anywhere in Anselm’s definition of free choice: alternative 
possibilities, the ability to do otherwise. Anselm simply doesn’t think this is necessary for 
free will. 
In modern discussions, there are two competing notions of free choice or free will: 
 Compatibilism: free choice is compatible with causal determinism. (Freedom = 
ability to do what you want, or something like that, whether you’re able to do 
anything else, or able to want anything else, or not.) 
 Non-compatibilism: free choice requires the real ability to do otherwise. Visser 
and Williams refer to what is sometimes called the Principle of Alternative 
Possibilities (PAP) (p. 186). 
Anselm rejects non-compatibilism (PAP) as part of the notion of free choice, even though 
in many typical cases we do have alternative possibilities open to us (as all the angels did 
at the outset, but don’t any longer). 
But it doesn’t follow that Anselm is a compatibilist. Visser and Williams argue that 
causal determinism is in fact incompatible with free choice. This will take us in just a few 
moments into the dialogue On the Fall of the Devil. 
But basically, Visser and Williams argue that while causal determinism is incompatible 
with Anselm’s notion of free choice, Anselm’s notion doesn’t require alternative 
possibilities (PAP). What it requires is only that the agent be the initiator of its own 
actions. (So this is a third account of free choice, in addition to compatibilism and non-
compatibilism.) 
Ultimately, a free agent for Visser/Williams is an agent that stands at the head of a causal 
chain. This is sufficient for the kind of freedom we need for moral responsibility, they 
think. But what kind of causality are we talking about? Certainly not Humean mechanical 
causality—billiard balls bumping into one another. Rather, it’s an almost juridical notion
—who’s responsible? (There is a similar notion of free choice in St. Augustine.) That’s 
what is appropriate here. It doesn’t require alternative possibilities. 
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On the Fall of the Devil 
It’s not clear to me this really is the best way to think of Anselm’s notion of free choice. 
It seems to me one might very well argue Anselm is a compatibilist after all, that free 
choice really has to be compatible with causal determinism for him. 
The difficulty here is in figuring out exactly what it would mean for Anselm to say that 
we are at the head of the causal chain of some of our actions. That’s not a notion that’s 
altogether clear. 
One Classical Picture 
Let’s go back and look at a fairly familiar and traditional medieval ethical picture that can 
be found quite definitely in Augustine, and in Boethius’s Consolation. It has its roots in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and—even further back—in Plato. 
The picture is this (I am NOT saying this is Anselm’s picture—we’ll have to see): 
According to this picture, the ultimate goal of all our actions, whether we realize it or not, 
is the good. For Augustine and Boethius, of course—and ultimately for Anselm too—the 
“good” is going to turn out to be God, but that doesn’t matter for now. We might, for 
instance, think instead that different kinds of things have different “goods,” depending on 
their natures—what kind of thing they are—and that their “good” is simply to fulfill their 
nature, or something like that, without putting that in terms of God. It doesn’t matter for 
now. 
The point is that, on this view, our ultimate goal is not something we choose. It’s 
something given to us, assigned to us from outside (by God or nature or whatever). We 
can’t help but pursue the good. 
Choice, then, is not a matter of choosing our end or goal, but of choosing the means to 
achieve that end. We don’t deliberate about ends, but only about how to get there from 
here. 
On this picture, the only thing for us to do in a practical context is to decide on the 
means. Once we’ve done that, the action follows inevitably; nothing more is needed. 
There’s nothing more that has to happen before we move into action. That doesn’t mean 
we will succeed in achieving our goal, of course; there may well be obstacles. But we 
will automatically move into action once we’ve settled on the means to achieve the goal 
we automatically have. 
On this picture, the only place where we have any real input into this process—and so the 
only place where we stand a chance of standing at the head of a causal chain (if that’s the 
way to look at it)—is in picking the means. 
Notice: There is nothing about this picture so far that requires that there be more than one 
means to the end (that requires PAP). It may very well be that there is only one way to 
get to our goal from here, but we still have to settle on what that one way is. Or, even if 
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there are in fact many means to the end, it may appear to us that there’s only one means, 
and we have to settle on that. 
The problems with this picture are well known. A person with a goal he does not get to 
choose will end up making a “wrong choice”, in the sense of choosing a means that will 
not lead to his goal, only if he is either misinformed or confused. 
This is what makes akrasia (= weakness of will) so mysterious in the Aristotelian 
tradition. 
To sum it up, on this picture the will is the slave of the intellect. We have the so called 
Socratic Paradox: “No one knowingly does evil.” Evil is the result of ignorance, either 
from a lack of information or from a lack of reasoning skills. 
In fact, on this picture it’s not even clear why we should continue to talk in terms of two 
mental faculties at all—the intellect and then, in addition, something else called the will. 
Other Views 
But there are other pictures too. (Again, I’m still not saying where Anselm fits here. I’m 
just setting out a range of theories.) 
In the later Middle Ages, some people thought the picture we just described didn’t give 
enough power to the will. 
John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308), for example—see Adams’s paper in The Cambridge 
Companion to Ockham, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality”—argued that while we 
can’t help desiring the good and automatically have a tendency toward the good, WE 
DON’T HAVE TO ACT ON THAT TENDENCY. We don’t have to make the good the end of an 
action. We might, for instance, just refrain from acting altogether. This is what makes the 
difference between a natural agent, which always and necessarily acts the same way 
when under the same conditions, and a voluntary agent which doesn’t necessarily do that. 
So, for Scotus, the outcome of deliberating about the means to achieve our natural telos is 
not inevitably followed by going into action. And this is so no matter what our intellect 
tells us, even if our intellect is right! The will is not the slave of the intellect. 
William of Ockham (c. 1285–1347)—see Adams’s paper again—went even further. For 
him, not only can we refrain from acting in accordance with the outcome of our 
deliberation about the means to our telos. We can also act contrary to that telos. I can, 
with full knowledge and recognition of what I’m doing, deliberately act against my own 
self-interest (my own orientation). I can deliberately make myself unhappy. For Ockham, 
that’s exactly what happened in the case of the Fall of the Devil. For Ockham, therefore, I 
choose the goals of my action, not just the means to those goals—not just the means but 
the ends as well. Nevertheless, he agrees that we still have a natural tendency toward the 
good. 
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The Theory of the Two Wills 
Where does Anselm weigh in on all this? Well, Anselm does not think we can choose not 
to act at all (contrary to Scotus). In a sense he does think we get to choose what end or 
goal to follow (in agreement with Ockham), but only in a sense. For, contrary to Ockham, 
Anselm holds that we do not choose our goals at random. Instead, we select from two 
orientations given us by God himself. 
Anselm has a theory sometimes called the two will theory. Rational agents have, so to 
speak, two wills. See, e.g., On the Fall of the Devil, Chap. 12 (Basic Writings, p. 191): 
… we commonly speak of two goods and of two evils that are contrary to them. 
One good is that which is called “justice,” whose contrary evil is injustice. The 
other good is what I think can be called “the advantageous”; its opposite evil is 
the disadvantageous. Now not everyone wills justice, and not everyone avoids 
injustice, whereas not merely every rational nature, but indeed everything that can 
be aware of it wills the advantageous and avoids the disadvantageous. 
Again, Chap. 4 (p. 177): 
Now he [= the Devil] could not will anything but (1) justice [which he DIDN’T end 
up willing] or (2) something advantageous. 
Now, to begin with, all the angels (including those who would ultimately fall), as well as 
Adam and Eve, had both wills: 
 a will for justice, and 
 a will for the advantageous—what we might familiarly call “self-interest.” 
Note also in the passage from Chap. 4 (p. 177) I just read you, Anselm goes on 
immediately to say: 
For happiness (beatitudo = “blessedness”), which every rational creature wills, 
consists in advantageous things. 
So happiness just consists of having your interests fulfilled. Self-interest or the will for 
the advantageous, therefore, is just another way of talking about the will to be happy. 
A long digression. To begin with, then, all rational creatures (angels, Adam and Eve) had 
both kinds of wills: the will for justice and the will for happiness or the advantageous—a 
will based on “self-interest.” 
Of course, that doesn’t mean they have two mental faculties known as “will,” as if they 
all started off with some kind of multiple-personality disorder. 
So what might it mean instead?  
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Well, one thing it might mean is that rational creatures have two distinct natural 
teleologies built into them. 
Recall how we said back in On Truth, Chap. 2, all statements are made for the purpose of 
signifying what is the case. On the other hand, a statement is designed to signify the way 
it does, no matter what is the case. So a statement has two purposes for which it is made, 
two teleologies, and they may conflict. 
So too, remember how in On Truth, Chap. 8, where we were talking about what ought 
and what ought not to be the case, we said that evil deeds ought not to be the case, since 
they are evil, after all, and yet from the point of view of God’s overall providential plan, 
they ought to be the case. (This is gthe “perspectivalist” theory of truth that Visser and 
Williams talk about.) Insofar as ought in On Truth is cashed out in terms of a thing’s 
teleology, once again we have multiple teleologies for a thing. 
Visser and Williams emphasized this point, and suggested that this kind of 
perspectivalism might well have important applications in other areas of Anselm’s 
thought—including the matter of free choice. 
So, therefore, perhaps that’s what’s going on here in On the Fall of the Devil. Rational 
agents have two natural tendencies, two teleologies, and in that sense two wills: 
 a will for advantage (what’s in my interest, a selfish will). In effect, a will to be 
happy; and 
 a will for justice. 
In both cases, of course—the will for happiness and the will for justice—what we’re 
really willing all along is the good = God. Either willing God as “what will make me 
happy” or else willing God as “where justice is ultimately going to be based,” or 
something like that. (I’m not quite sure how to work that out.) 
In short, we have willing the good under the aspect of advantage (happiness) and willing 
the good under the aspect of justice. (The metaphysics of this “under the aspect” talk is 
mysterious to me.) 
Nevertheless, while I think we can make good sense of two-will talk in teleological terms 
like this, and it does fit in with a lot of other things Anselm says throughout these 
“Philosophical Dialogues,” I don’t think this can be what Anselm is talking about here in 
On the Fall of the Devil. 
For Anselm thinks that now, after the Fall of the Devil, he no longer has the will for 
justice and has only the will for advantage or happiness (which he’s conspicuously not 
getting, since he’s damned forever to hell). See On the Fall of the Devil, Chap. 17 (p. 
199): 
T. Now that he [= the Devil] has forsaken justice and retains only the will for 
happiness that he had before, can the angel who abandoned justice return by his 
own power to the will for justice …? 
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And the answer is going to be no, he’s stuck! Notice that at first, Anselm says justice has 
been abandoned, not the will for it. But he goes on to say that only the will for happiness 
remains, and he can’t go back to the will for justice. So it seems he abandons not only 
justice, but the will for it as well. 
But surely this can’t mean the Devil has somehow got rid of his natural God-given 
teleology. This would mean that the creature can change God’s purposes. 
So what does Anselm mean by this talk of two wills? It doesn’t mean two distinct 
faculties or powers. And I just argued that it doesn’t mean two God-assigned teleologies 
either. 
Rather, I suggest, it means two psychological drives—desires. 
It’s easy to recognize the desire for advantage in ourselves. That’s just self-interest. But 
do we all also have a drive for justice—psychologically? 
No—but then Anselm doesn’t say we do. Rather, all he says is that the angels did at first, 
and so did Adam and Eve. End of digression. 
Still, how do these “two wills” (drives) help us to explain the fall of the Devil—or how 
free choice actually works in practice? 
Well, in On the Fall of the Devil, Chaps. 13–14, Anselm performs an interesting thought-
experiment: 
Suppose an angel was created with only the will for happiness—only the will for 
advantage, only self-interest. (We could also use a human being as an example here. In 
fact, in Chap. 12, Anselm says this is exactly the way brute animals actually are.) 
Such a will, he says, is not really a morally judgeable will. It’s neither just nor unjust—in 
the blameworthy sense. 
It’s not just because it doesn’t want to be; all it wants, by hypothesis, is its own 
advantage. Even if it somehow wanted rectitude of will, it would want it only for the sake 
of its own advantage, not because it was right.  Therefore, it would not be just because 
justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake. (Compare On Truth, Chap. 12, p. 
139.) 
And it’s not unjust in the sense of being blameworthy. Why not? Because (On the Fall of 
the Devil, Chap. 14, p. 195), its choice would be necessitated. It couldn’t refrain from 
choosing its own advantage. 
And the same thing will apply if we assume an angel that is created with only a will for 
justice! Its choice too would be necessitated. 
For Visser and Williams, the point here doesn’t seem to be the lack of real alternatives. 
That’s not why its choice is necessitated. Rather the point is that, in either case, the 
angel’s decision is not its own. It doesn’t stand at the head of a causal chain. 
It acts only as the result of its desires. It’s not praiseworthy or blameworthy, but purely 
natural and automatic. 
 106 
 
Anselm argues (Chap. 14, p. 195), it has to want both justice and happiness. Then it can 
choose which one to give priority to. If an angel choose to prefer justice, its rewarded 
with both justice and happiness. If it chooses advantage, it ends up getting neither. 
Why isn’t this the “Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (PAP) we discussed earlier in 
connection with the Visser/Williams paper? It may look very much like it. But  Visser 
and Williams argue that this isn’t the point. Rather, the point is that the angel’s decision 
is its own. 
If it chooses justice, then anything it does to go after justice is merely following out its 
innate inclinations (provided by God). That by itself is no more meritorious than a stone’s 
falling. 
Likewise, if it choose to go after advantage, all it does to pursue advantage is just 
following its innate disposition. 
Still—why isn’t this PAP? Well, watch: 
Here’s the crucial move: The angel does not realize that if it gives priority to advantage 
over justice, it’s doing to be punished, so that it doesn’t get either advantage or justice. 
It’s like the Socratic Paradox—except that here it’s not just that ignorance is required for 
choosing evil, but also for morally praiseworthy choice. 
The angel has got to think that maybe it’s to its advantage not to choose justice! 
Once it chooses, of course, it sees that the wrong choice is punished, and at that point it 
knows that it’s to its advantage to choose justice, and therefore there’s no longer any 
drive to lead him to the wrong choice. Not a drive for justice (because it isn’t just), and 
not a desire for advantage (because there’s no advantage in it). 
So a good angel cannot now sin, any more than a fallen angel can act justly. But they are 
still free because the choice was still theirs. 
So, alternatives are needed at first (for creatures, not for God), but are not needed any 
longer once the choice is made. 
A problem for this theory: How does it apply to us—now, after the Fall (of Adam and 
Eve)? Now we postlapsarian humans have only the will for advantage, and always did. 
Why aren’t we therefore exactly in the morally neutral position of the brute animals? I 
don’t know the answer to this. 
We have then: 
 an analysis of freedom of choice; 
 an analysis of the “fall of Satan”—both of how it happened and of why he is 
blameworthy for his fall (because he is at the head of the causal change in that 
decision); 
 a similar analysis of the goog angels—why they are praiseworthy (for the same 
reason); 
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But we have no analysis of how postlapsarian humanity (that is, human beings born after 
the “Original Sin” of Adam and Eve) is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. 
The De Concordia 
Now I want to talk about the De concordia, the full translation of the title of which is On 
the Harmony of God’s Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace with Free Choice, in 
Williams’s Basic Writings, beginning on p. 361. 
Recall, at the beginning of On Freedom of Choice, the Student asks (p. 147): 
Since free choice seems to be incompatible with the grace, predestination, 
and foreknowledge of God, …  
That was in 1080–86, while Anselm was still at Bec. Much later, after he had moved over 
to England and had become Archbishop of Canterbury, he returned to the topic in his De 
Concordia (= “The Harmony of God’s Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace with 
Free Choice”). 
Let me say some things about the title. First of all, notice that there’s nothing in the title 
about human freedom. As far as the actual content of the book is concerned, the part 
about free choice will apply equally well to angelic freedom and even to divine freedom 
Second, the word Concordia, which Williams translates as “harmony.” Literally, it means 
“concord”—that is, for all three of these topics, their hearts are together. 
Except for some letters, this is the very last thing Anselm wrote. It was done in 1107–08. 
He was increasingly troubled by his health at this time, and died in 1109. 
Although the work is obviously intended as a kind of follow-up to the Three Dialogues, 
and particularly to On Free Choice, the De Concordia is not in fact a dialogue at all; it’s 
a piece of sustained argumentation. 
The work is divided into three sections (or “questions” or “articles”), each one trying to 
reconcile free choice with one of the other three notions mentioned in the title: God’s 
foreknowledge, predestination and grace, respectively. 
What is the difference among these three questions? 
The first one, foreknowledge vs. free choice, is just the classical old question: How can 
God know what we’re going to do before we do it? If he now knows I’m going to rob a 
bank tomorrow, then in what sense do I now have any choice about it? For that matter, 
since God has forever known I’m going to rob a bank tomorrow, in what sense did I ever 
have any choice about it? And, likewise, if God has always known what he is going to do 
tomorrow, then in what sense is he free about it? 
We’ll discuss this more fully in a moment, but for now let’s just acknowledge that the 
problem of foreknowledge vs. free choice is often put in terms of causality—as if God’s 
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knowledge were somehow the cause of our actions. And that would be perhaps a problem 
for human free choice. But as I say, we’ll talk more about that in a little while. 
The second problem, discussed in De Concordia, q. 2, is predestination vs. free choice. 
The difference between foreknowledge and predestination is, roughly speaking, the 
difference between God’s knowledge and his will—or perhaps God’s knowledge and his 
action. That is, in predestination, God actually does something. 
As usually used, the term means that God actually does something to select who is going 
to be saved and who isn’t. (Sometimes it’s used in a narrower sense of selecting for 
salvation, whereas selecting for damnation is called reprobation. But in both cases, God 
does something.) 
At the beginning of q. 2, Anselm says (p. 372): 
Predestination seems to be the same thing as preordination or 
predetermination [= praestitutio—the word is closely related to Leibniz’s 
expression when he’s talking about the “preestablished harmony”]. So 
when God is said to predestine something, we understand this to mean that 
he preordains it: that is, he determines that it will happen in the future. 
Whatever we do about the previous problem, foreknowledge vs. free choice, this second 
question seems to be inescapably about causality, and so certain potential solutions to the 
first problem seem perhaps to be closed off for this second one. 
The third question is about free choice vs. grace, and is very closely tied to the second 
article, about predestination. It applies to the particular case of human beings. 
As we know from On the Fall of the Devil, Satan—and by extension, Adam and Eve after 
the Fall, and all subsequent human generations as the result of original sin inherited from 
them—have lost the will for justice, retaining only the will for advantage or happiness. 
Furthermore, we can’t get it back under our own power. 
Now Satan and his fellow-devils are stuck; there’s nothing going to be done for them. But 
for human beings there is the possibility for grace. With God’s extra help, we can get 
back the will for justice, and get back justice itself. St. Augustine, in his On Free Choice 
of the Will, describes a master who has a servant. The master tells the servant to perform 
a certain task. But instead of obeying, the servant jumps down into a deep ditch, and can’t 
get out. If the master punishes the servant, the servant cannot complain that the 
punishment is unjust since, after all, he can’t get out of the ditch, and so can’t obey the 
master. That’s the situation we’re all in now, after the fall of Adam and Eve. Now with 
grace (a “gratuity,” a kind of divine “tip”), the master reaches down into the ditch and 
offers a hand to lift the servant out. This extra helping hand is what we call a “grace.” 
(There are other kinds of “graces” too, but this is what we’re talking about in the present 
context.) 
Now the point is, predestination works through grace. God helps through grace those he 
predestines to salvation, and doesn’t help those who are damned to hell. 
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So q. 3 is really a continuation of q. 2, with more emphasis on the mechanisms of 
predestination and reprobation. 
I won’t be talking about q. 3 in my discussion. 
Future Contingents 
All of the issues Anselm discusses in the De Concordia are variations on a common 
theme, one that Anselm does not explicitly address there but that he plainly knew and that 
is obviously in the background of what he does discuss there. This is the so called 
problem of future contingents. 
Let me begin by reading to you a section of Calvin Normore’s chapter on “future 
contingents” from The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 358–81 
(not on E-Reserves). I am reading from pp. 358–59: 
There is more than one problem of future contingents. There is first the 
problem raised by Aristotle—that of reconciling the principle of bivalence 
(the principle that for any sentence P either P is true or not-P is true2) with 
the view that some claims about the future are contingent, are such that 
neither the claim nor its denial is necessarily true. Medieval discussions of 
this problem often rely on our intuitions that the past and the present are 
‘fixed’ in some way in which the future is not, and so these discussion 
often illuminate medieval views on tense and modality. [Note that there’s 
nothing whatever about KNOWLEDGE in the statement of this background-
problem.] 
A second problem has to do with the possibility of foreknowledge. Can 
one hold both that some future event is contingent and that it is 
foreknown? [Here we ARE talking about knowledge.] 
A third problem is specifically theological. Can complete knowledge of 
the future by an immutable, infallible, impassible God be reconciled with 
the contingency of some aspects of the future? [THIS is the problem with 
which Anselm starts off De Concordia.] 
These are distinct problems. Theories which solve the problem of 
contingent truth may fail to account for foreknowledge, and theories 
which account for both future contingent truth and foreknowledge may yet 
fail to explain how contingent future events, e.g., sins, can be known by a 
knower who cannot be causally acted upon. 
                                                 
2 That’s not strictly the “principle of bivalence.” The principle of bivalence says there are two 
truth values—truth and falsehood, no more and no fewer, and that every sentence has one or the other of 
those truth values. The principle Normore describes here would, as it stands, allow there to be more truth 
values than two, provided only that, for any sentence P, either P or not-P has the value “true.” (Never mind 
what truth value the other one has, if any.) 
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Yet all three problems are variations on a single theme. We are inclined to 
think that there is an objective difference between the past and the future. 
What has happened happened as a result of earlier events including 
perhaps actions of our own but now that it has happened it does not 
depend on anything agents will do. An adult may regret his misspent 
youth but cannot prevent it. On the other hand what will happen is 
dependent on what is happening and is, we think, in part dependent on 
what we and other agents will do. We think that some of what we will do 
we could avoid. [Notice again: nothing about KNOWLEDGE here.]The 
problems [note the plural] of future continents arise because there seem to 
be various principles which connect every statement about the future with 
a corresponding statement about the past in such a way that it is 
impossible for one of the statements to be true and the other false. If any 
such principle is accepted, our intuitions about the objective difference 
between past and future may have to be reversed. 
This basic problem of future contingents is plainly the background in terms of which 
Anselm discusses the particular problems of foreknowledge, predestination and grace in 
the De Concordia. And, I say, Anselm knew the general problem. He knew it because it 
comes up in Aristotle’s On Interpretation, Chap. 9, a text Anselm knew in Boethius’s 
translation, together with Boethius’s commentary on it. In fact, Anselm cites this passage 
in the Cur Deus Homo, Book II, Chap. 17 (p. 318). 
This is the famous problem about whether there will be a “sea battle” tomorrow. Without 
worrying about what exactly Aristotle had in mind (which is not altogether clear), we can 
motivate the general problem like this: 
Let’s start with three principles (DISTRIBUTE HANDOUT ON “FUTURE CONTINGENTS”): 
1. If it will be the case that p, then it was the case that it will be the case that p. We 
saw Anselm himself accept something like this back in Monologion, Chap. 18, 
when he argues that truth always exists. Remember, we said, if it is true that I am 
uttering these words now, then it always was true that I would be uttering these 
words now. By the same token, although this isn’t quite the same thing, it would 
seem to follow that if I will be uttering different words in our next lecture, then it 
always was true that I will be uttering those words then. Thus: 
 
Fp → PFp 
2. Necessarily, if it was the case that it will be the case that p, then it will be the case 
that p. That is: 
 
□(PFp → Fp) 
 
If it was the case that I will be uttering certain other words in our next lecture, 
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then it necessarily follows that I will be uttering them. This is an instance of what 
we sometimes call conditional necessity; it states a necessary connection. 
3. The crucial one. If it was the case that p, then necessarily it was the case that p. 
This is not just “conditional necessity”; that is, we’re not just saying it’s a 
necessary truth that if it was the case then it was the case. No, we’re saying 
something stronger: 
 
Pp →□Pp 
 
This is not logical necessity. We’re not saying it’s an analytic or a priori truth that 
Columbus sailed to America in 1492, for instance. All we’re talking about is the 
what Normore described as our sense “that there is an objective difference 
between the past and the future.” Even though the facts about Columbus are not 
analytic or a priori, it’s too late to do anything about them now. The past is now 
settled and nonnegotiable in a way that perhaps the future is not. And in that 
sense, the past is necessary. This is a perfectly traditional way of talking. You 
may regret your misspent youth, but it’s too late to prevent it. 
Note: There’s not one work in any of these three principles about knowledge. 
OK, now let’s put our three principles together. 
Let’s take some proposition Fp about a future event—say, “I am going to rob a bank 
tomorrow.” And let’s suppose by hypothesis it’s true. By principle (1), therefore, it was 
the case earlier that I will rob a bank tomorrow. By principle (3), therefore, necessarily it 
was the case that I will rob a bank tomorrow. That is a necessary truth about the past. 
Now look at principle (2). There we have a conditional necessity, remember: we can’t 
have the antecedent without having the consequent. But, we’ve just seen, we can’t help 
but have the antecedent; it’s a necessary truth about the past. Therefore, we can’t help but 
have the consequent too. That is, necessarily I am going to rob a bank tomorrow. Even if 
it’s not an analytic or a priori truth, it’s too late to prevent it now. (What we just did here 
is called distribution of necessity across implication. That’s a very weak move; there’s no 
controversy over the legitimacy of that.) 
Of course, all this was on the hypothesis that it’s true that I’m going to rob a bank 
tomorrow. But let’s suppose instead that it’s false. In that case, it’s true that I’m not going 
to rob a bank tomorrow, and we can run exactly the same argument again, this time with 
the result that necessarily I am not going to rob a bank tomorrow. It’s too late to do 
anything to bring it about now. 
So no matter how it turns out, whether I will or won’t rob a bank tomorrow, it seems it’s 
too late to do anything about it now. In fact, we can go further back into the past, with the 
result that it was always too late to do anything about it. This is the problem Aristotle 
seems to be talking about in On Interpretation, Chap. 9. 
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This is a doctrine known as logical fatalism. Notice how little it really requires, and how 
it doesn’t require any claims about knowledge. 
Medieval Discussions 
Now, what does all this have to do with the problems Anselm is discussing in the De 
Concordia, beginning with the problem of foreknowledge vs. free choice? 
First of all, we can put the problem of foreknowledge and free choice much more simply 
than we did the general problem of future contingents a moment ago (see the handout on 
“Future Contingents”): 
1. What must be the case is not subject to our free choice. 
2. What God knows must be the case. (There’s an ambiguity here, to be sure, and 
we’ll discuss that shortly.) 
3. God knows our future actions (since he’s omniscient). 
4. Therefore, our future actions are not subject to our free choice. 
(Notice, incidentally, that exactly the same kind of argument would seem to yield the 
conclusion that God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with his free choice too, not just 
ours.) 
Now I said at the outset that the problem of reconciling foreknowledge with free choice is 
often put in terms of causality. And you might well think causality is already involved in 
the earlier problem of future contingents, before we ever bring knowledge into the picture
—causality may be involved insofar it’s too late now to prevent some future event from 
occurring, too late to do anything about it now. “Preventing” and “doing,” at least in the 
most familiar cases, sound like matters of causality. 
If that’s right, then of course the particular problem of foreknowledge vs. free choice, 
whatever additional features are introduced by bringing knowledge into the picture, is 
also going to be a causal issue insofar as it inherits that from the more basic problem of 
future contingents. 
Well, maybe, maybe not. But in any case, that’s what a lot of medieval authors thought, 
and Anselm himself speaks this way, as we’ll see. 
But before we consider Anselm, let’s look at Augustine for background and context. One 
of the earliest discussions of foreknowledge and free choice occurs in Augustine’s On 
Free Choice of the Will, III, Chap. 1–4. (There are other discussions in Augustine, but I 
want to focus on this one.) 
Like Anselm’s On Free Choice, Augustine’s On Free Choice of the Will is a dialogue, 
and in III.1 his interlocutor (Evodius) remarks (translation in the “Library of Liberal Arts” 
series, p. 85): 
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if free will has been given in such a way that this movement [of the will] is 
natural to it, then it [the will] is turned to lesser goods by necessity. [That 
is, it turns away from the PRIMARY good, God, to lesser goods, and so 
SINS.] There is no blame to be found where nature and necessity rule. 
That is, for Augustine’s interlocutor, the notion of moral responsibility, and therefore the 
notion of praise and blame, require that our wills be free and not such that they make 
their choices out of necessity. 
Well, Augustine and Evodius go on to discuss this, and the question of course arises 
whether God’s foreknowledge of human actions somehow causes them to occur, so that 
they cannot be free actions in the morally relevant sense. In the course of this, Augustine 
makes an interesting comment. He says (p. 95): 
Your recollection of events in the past does not compel them to occur. In 
the same way God’s foreknowledge of future events does not compel them 
to take place. 
Now the interesting thing about this passage is not whether it answers the question, or 
even whether it has a hope of answering the question, but the double-occurrence of the 
word ‘compel’ in it. Augustine seems to think the question is one of compulsion. The will 
is free in the relevant sense, and its choices are not necessary in the problematic sense, 
provided the will is not compelled to choose the way it does. 
This makes sense only if Augustine is appealing to a causal notion of necessity here. That 
is, for Augustine, 
x is necessary iff some other y causes x. 
And in that case we can say that for Augustine, x is necessary in the sense of being 
necessitated (caused) by some y. 
Now that’s Augustine. I brought him up mainly to contrast this view with a much more 
relevant discussion for Anselm, and that is Boethius’s treatment of foreknowledge and 
free will in The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V. 
For Augustine, the issue seems to have been one of causality. And Anselm too will 
continue to link necessity and causality. But for Boethius (who came before Anselm, 
remember), this is simply irrelevant. It’s not a question of which causes which, whether 
God’s foreknowledge causes events to occur, or whether the fact that they are going to 
occur somehow causes God to know them. Causality simply doesn’t come up at all. For 
him, it’s purely a matter of inference and reasoning. 
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Boethius (Bk. V, pr. 33) says he rejects one attempted way out of this problem, the 
attempt that says it is not because (note the causal term) events are foreseen that they will 
occur, but rather it is because they will occur that they are foreseen. (Augustine accepts at 
least the first part of this, although not explicitly the second.) 
Again, Boethius says causality is simply not the issue here. He gives an analogy (ibid.). If 
a person is sitting, then the claim that he is sitting must be true. And conversely, if the 
claim that he is sitting is true, then he must be sitting. And this is so—that is, we have this 
necessity both ways—regardless of your theory about which causes which, if indeed you 
think causality is involved here at all. 
Furthermore, he goes on, it obviously doesn’t make any difference if you plug in the 
future tense here instead of the present. If a person will sit, then the claim that he will sit 
must be true, and conversely, if the claim that he will sit is true, then he must be going to 
sit. 
Besides, if you are going to appeal to causality at all in this kind of context, then the view 
that says it isn’t because God foresees my future free actions that they will occur but 
rather the other way around—it’s because they’re going to occur that God foresees them
—runs into a serious theological problem. It would mean that God’s knowledge, which is 
identical to God himself, is causally dependent on creatures. (This is Calvin Normore’s 
third problem he distinguished above: how an impassible, immutable God can know 
future contingent events.) 
Another problem, which Boethius doesn’t mention, is that this view would seem to have 
the effect precede the cause in time—if that bothers you. 
No, Boethius says, let’s just leave causality out of the picture. 
So what does he do instead? Well, he does two things, both of which we find in 
approximately the same form later on in Anselm. One of them is to bring the notion of 
eternity into the picture. We’ll discuss that later on. But let’s look at the other one for 
now. 
To begin with (Book V, pr. 6), Boethius distinguishes two kinds of necessity, which we 
might call simple and conditional necessity. This is a pretty elementary distinction, but 
let’s be clear about it. As an example of conditional necessity, let’s use Boethius’s own: 
If someone is sitting, then necessarily he is sitting. 
As an example of simple necessity, we can take: “Necessarily, 2 + 2 = 4.” Or—in the 
sense in which we just saw we can speak of the past as being “necessary”—“Necessarily, 
Columbus sailed to America in 1492.” (It wasn’t necessary in 1491—in fact, it wasn’t 
even true in 1491 that Columbus sailed [past tense] to America in 1491. But now it is 
true, and unavoidable. It’s “too late” to do anything about it now.) 
                                                 
3 Boethius’s Consolation, besides being divided into five books, is further divided into alternating 
passages of prose and poetry. The standard way of referring to the Consolation is by book number, and 
then by either “prose” number (“pr.”) or “metrical” number (“m.”). 
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In general, we can say the difference between the two kinds of necessity is just that 
conditional necessity is the simple necessity OF A CONDITIONAL. That is, in the case of 
simple necessity we have a proposition of the form: 
□p, 
whereas in the case of conditional necessity what we have is a special case of this, 
namely: 
□(p → q). 
In short, conditional necessity is just the simple necessity of a conditional. 
Now this is all very elementary, but it’s important to be aware of the distinction. For back 
in our argument that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will, step 2 is ambiguous: 
“What God knows must be the case” can be read in the innocuous and true sense in 
which what we have is conditional necessity (‘K’ = ‘God knows that’): 
□(Kp → p). 
This is true on the general grounds that knowledge implies truth. (You can’t know 
something if it’s not even true.) In fact, this is so no matter who does the knowing, 
whether God or anyone else, and no matter what the tense of ‘p’ is; there’s nothing 
special about the future here. 
But, read in this sense, step 2 will not support the above argument that purports to show 
foreknowledge is incompatible with free will. The argument will be just invalid. In order 
to get it to work, we need to read step 2 in the stronger sense: 
Kp → □p. 
That is, what we need is not just conditional necessity—the simple necessity of a 
conditional—but rather a conditional the consequent of which is simply necessary. And, 
it seems we have no reason to believe this stronger claim when ‘p’ is about the future. 
We can accept this stronger reading where ‘p’ is about the past, since we’ve seen that 
there’s a sense in which the past is necessary. (This is because it’s past, not because it’s 
known.) But this doesn’t mean the past event wasn’t contingent earlier. 
We may even want to say the same thing where ‘p’ is about the present. (The present is 
no longer avoidable.) There’s a famous passage in Aristotle (On Interpretation, 19a23-
24]) where he says “Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is.” But again, this doesn’t 
mean it was always unavoidable. 
Yet we have no reason to hold this about the future. 
So it looks as if Boethius has a distinction here that will go a long way toward solving our 
problem of reconciling foreknowledge with free choice. 
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There’s more to the story here, but before we go on, let’s pause to see how this 
distinction plays out in Anselm. 
Anselm on Antecedent and Consequent Necessity 
Boethius has no actual names for what we’ve called simple and conditional necessity, 
although he does draw the distinction. But Anselm draws a similar if not actually the 
same distinction, and does have names for the two parts of it. He calls them “antecedent” 
and “subsequent” or “consequent” necessity. 
 “Antecedent” necessity is not entirely clear in Anselm. (Simple necessity is not 
particularly clear in Boethius either, but only because he never really analyzes the notion. 
The problem with Anselm, however, is that he seems to say different things about 
antecedent necessity in different places. We don’t have that kind of problem with 
Boethius.) 
In Cur deus homo II, Chap. 17, Anselm says this (pp. 317–18): 
You see, there is antecedent necessity, which is the cause of something’s 
being; and there is subsequent necessity, which the thing itself brings 
about. It is a case of antecedent and [= that is] efficient necessity when it is 
said that the heavens revolve because it is necessary that they revolve, 
whereas it is a case of subsequent necessity—and [= that is] necessity that 
brings nothing about but rather is brought about—when I say that you are 
speaking of necessity because you are speaking. For when I say this, I 
signify that nothing can make it the case that while you are speaking you 
are not speaking, but not anything is compelling you to speak. For the 
violence of their natural condition compels the heavens to revolve, 
whereas no necessity brings it about that you speak. Now wherever there 
is antecedent necessity there is also subsequent necessity; but it is not the 
case that where there is subsequent necessity there is automatically also 
antecedent necessity. For we can say, “It is necessary that the heavens 
revolve, because they revolve”; but it is not similarly true that you are 
speaking because it is necessary that you speak. 
This is a complicated text, and isn’t altogether clear. 
First of all, notice the pretty clear linkage of modal notions with causality, as we saw with 
Augustine. (Boethius didn’t actually deny this linkage, but only said it wasn’t the issue.) 
We’ll return to this in a moment. 
But for now, note that at first it’s hard to figure out just what it is that Anselm says is 
necessary here. 
In his example of antecedent necessity, “The heavens revolve because it is necessary that 
they revolve,” it looks as if it’s the second part of the claim that is being called necessary. 
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That is, the heavens have to revolve (by antecedent necessity, the laws of nature), and 
that’s why they do revolve. 
And that seems to be repeatedly confirmed throughout the passage when Anselm talks 
about “antecedent necessity, which is the cause of something’s being.” So it seems that 
Anselm accepts the following reasoning: p causes q. But p is antecedently necessary. 
Therefore, q.) 
In other words, it seems that the picture we have here is that we have something p that is 
said to be “antecedently necessary,” and it’s because of that that something q comes 
about. And what’s confusing here in the example is just that p = q. 
But I don’t think that’s the right picture, and the point comes out in the contrast between 
antecedent and subsequent necessity. 
There, in talking about subsequent necessity, he gives the example, “You are speaking of 
necessity because you are speaking.” That is, given that you are speaking, it’s impossible 
for you also to be not speaking. 
We’ll talk about subsequent necessity in a moment. But what I want to emphasize for 
now is what Anselm says immediately after giving his example of subsequent necessity: 
For when I say this [= “You are speaking of necessity because you are 
speaking”], I signify that nothing can make it the case that while you are 
speaking you are not speaking, but not anything is compelling you to 
speak. 
Now if antecedent and subsequent necessity are meant to exhaust the alternatives (and it 
seems it is so meant), this means that, where we don’t have subsequent necessity (that is, 
don’t have the kind that doesn’t involve being compelled), we do have antecedent 
necessity—which does involve being compelled. 
But if that’s right, then when we have a case of something p that causes something q to 
come about, it’s the q that is being caused or compelled, not the p, and therefore the q 
that is antecedently necessary, not the p. 
So what I’m suggesting is that, despite the way Anselm talks here—as if what is 
antecedently necessary is the cause of other things—what he really means is that the 
antecedently necessary is what is caused or compelled by something. 
Now let’s look at subsequent necessity in more detail. His example, recall, is “You are 
speaking of necessity because you are speaking.” And what he says about it makes it 
clear that this is something pretty close to what we earlier calling “conditional necessity” 
in the case of Boethius—that is, the necessity of a conditional where, when □(p → q), we 
say that if p, then necessarily (that is, conditionally necessarily) q. 
This is close to Anselm’s picture, but—again—I don’t think it’s quite right. Notice that 
nowhere in the passage from Cur dues homo does Anselm mention anything about 
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conditionals. There are no examples of conditionals anywhere in his discussion, for 
instance. 
So what I think he has in mind here is instead the sense in which we earlier said that the 
past is “necessary,” and for that matter the present is “necessary” too. That is, it’s 
unavoidable now—it’s too late to do anything about it. 
If I am speaking now, then it’s not just the conditional “If I am speaking then I am 
speaking” that is necessary, but the categorical statement “I am speaking” that is 
necessary (in this “consequent” or subsequent” sense). It is unavoidable. 
This need not involve any kind of causality or compulsion at all, as Anselm himself 
points out. The fact that I am now speaking doesn’t cause the fact that I am now speaking
—it is that fact. 
This makes sense out of what he says at the end of the passage in the quotation: 
Now wherever there is antecedent [that is, compelled] necessity there is 
also subsequent [that is, settled] necessity; but it is not the case that where 
there is subsequent [= settled] necessity there is automatically also 
antecedent [= compelled] necessity. 
Look at his examples. We already know the laws of nature compel the heavens to 
revolve, and so the fact that the heavens do revolve is antecedently necessary. And, he 
now says, “wherever there is antecedent necessity there is also subsequent necessity.” 
Thus (his example), 
It is [subsequently] necessary that the heavens revolve, because they 
[antecedently] revolve. 
[This is an example of subsequent necessity’s following from antecedent 
necessity.] 
In other words, the laws of nature make it antecedently necessary that the heavens 
revolve. And so they do revolve. And given that they do revolve, it’s now unavoidable 
that they revolve (subsequent necessity). 
On the other hand, he goes on: 
 it is not similarly true that you are speaking because it is [antecedently] 
necessary that you speak. 
[Here we have an example of antecedent [= compelled] necessity’s not 
following from subsequent [= settled] necessity.] 
It isn’t antecedently necessary. On the contrary, as he says, “not anything is compelling 
you to speak.” 
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Let’s bring this to a conclusion. The basic idea is that antecedent necessity is the kind that 
is caused or compelled to occur. Subsequent necessity may or may not be caused or 
compelled to occur, but in any case that’s not what it’s about; it’s rather about being 
settled. 
Now Anselm argues at some length in the De Concordia that subsequent necessity—i.e., 
unavoidable, settled necessity, whether caused or not—applies not only to the past and 
the present, BUT ALSO TO THE FUTURE. You might think that admitting this amounts to 
reintroducing the problem of doing away with our future free actions all over again—it's 
all settled already. But Anselm argues that it doesn’t. Here’s the situation: 
If it’s now a fact that Columbus sailed to America in 1492, then it’s subsequently or 
consequently necessary that he did so; it’s now settled. Similarly, if it’s a fact that I’m 
speaking right now, at the present, then that’s settled, and it’s consequently or 
subsequently necessary that I am speaking right now. 
So too—and here things get dicey—if it’s now a fact that I am going to rob a bank 
tomorrow then, Anselm says, in just the same way it’s subsequently or consequently 
necessary that I will rob a bank tomorrow. And if it’s now a fact that I’m not going to rob 
a bank tomorrow, then it’s subsequently or consequently necessary that I won’t rob a 
bank tomorrow. 
But it’s either now a fact that I will rob a bank tomorrow or it’s now a fact that I won’t 
rob a bank tomorrow, one or the other—so that, whichever way it goes, it’s now 
consequently or subsequently necessary. I don’t know which way it will turn out, but God 
does. 
Why doesn’t that interfere with my free choice? Because, Anselm argues, what God 
knows is that I will freely rob a bank tomorrow, or that I will freely not rob the bank 
tomorrow. 
A problem with free will would arise only if my future actions were antecedently [= by 
compulsion] necessary, and they aren’t. 
Causal Necessity 
Let’s put aside for now the question whether this will work or not (I don’t think it does), 
and let’s also put aside for now the whole notion of subsequent necessity. Instead let’s 
think for a while about the notion of antecedent necessity in terms of causality or 
compulsion. Anselm seems to agree with Augustine: x is necessary (in that sense) iff 
something else y causes x. 
This is a classical, traditional notion, and there’s nothing wrong with it. BUT—it isn’t the 
only notion of causal necessity operative in Anselm. 
This does seem to be what he has in mind in Cur Deus Homo, II.17 (or at least part of 
what he has mind there). But in certain parts of On Freedom of Choice, and more clearly 
in the so called Lambeth Fragments (we have no idea when the latter were drafted), 
Anselm seems to have a different notion of causal necessity (he doesn’t use the term 
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“antecedent” necessity in the latter places). The causal notion we’ve just been looking at 
(and that we have been calling antecedent necessity) is: 
(1) x is necessary iff something else y causes x. 
The other notion, in the other places just mentioned, seems to be: 
(2) x is necessary iff nothing has the causal power to prevent or undo x. 
As Normore points out in his Cambridge History article (p. 360), these are not equivalent 
notions. For example, suppose nothing at all existed, not even God. Then in sense (2) it 
would be necessary that nothing at all existed. But not in sense (1). 
Which of these is Anselm’s “preferred” view? It’s hard to say. But it is clear that, one 
way or another, Anselm has a causal notion of necessity—and correspondingly of 
possibility. 
Let’s dwell on this for a moment. The main thing about a causal notion of modality is that 
it’s metaphysical. Whatever the details, I think this much is right—not just historically 
accurate to the period we’re studying, but also the philosophically correct approach to 
modality. 
We like nowadays to think of possibility and necessity in terms of logic. Something is 
impossible, for instance, if it implies a contradiction of the syntactical form p & ~p. 
Something is possible if it doesn’t. Something is necessary if its denial implies a 
contradiction, etc. 
But “implies” according to what logic? There are lots of logics. Are we talking about 
“classical” logic, the logic of countless introductory logic courses? But that’s not the only 
one. There are lots of other logics: intuitionistic logic, relevance logics of various kinds, 
positive logic (without negation), Fitch-style logics, “free” logics, paraconsistent logics, 
etc. In fact, so called “classical” logic isn’t even classical. Aristotle didn’t believe it (he 
famously said that no proposition can imply its own negation, for instance—which would 
pretty much rule out reductio as a valid argument form, even though he himself 
cheerfully uses reductio), and neither did anyone else—with three small exceptions 
before the time of Boole and Peano (both of them mathematicians): Philo of Megara, the 
“Parvipontani” (from the Petit Pont in Paris) in late 12th century, and John Buridan and a 
few of his students in early-14th century Paris. And virtually everyone else in their times 
thought they were crazy, so that their views were very soon abandoned. 
The tendency nowadays is to dismiss all those “other” logics as “deviant” logics (see 
Susan Haack’s book Deviant Logic), and to say that what we’re talking about is the “real” 
logic—the logic really matches the way the world works. AND NOW WE’RE TALKING 
METAPHYSICS, AREN’T WE? 
Causal theories of modality have the virtue of facing this fact at the outset. And Anselm 
has one, although—as we’ve seen—there is some murkiness about the details of what it 
is. Let’s explore this a bit. 
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Powers 
And let’s start with the notion of possibility. Possibility is based on the powers of things. 
(Power = potency = Latin potential, from potens = the active participle of posse, from 
which we get “possibility.”) 
Let’s sketch how this goes. (Note: This sketch will look more like the theory suggested in 
the Lambeth  Fragments than the theory in Cur Deus Homo II.17—see above.) 
1. x is possible for y = y has the (causal) power to do or bring about x. 
2. x is possible (unqualifiedly) = something or other has the power to do or bring 
about x. 
(Note: From this much it follows that if nothing at all existed, nothing 
would be possible. Compare above on necessity, p. 120. 
Also note that in this sense, to say God is omnipotent—that is, that God 
can do anything possible—is just to say that, whatever it is, if anything at 
all can do it, God can do it.) 
3. x is impossible (not possible) for y = y does not have it in its power to do or bring 
about x. 
4. x is impossible (unqualifiedly) = nothing has the power to do or bring about x. 
Now something is necessary iff it’s impossible that it not be so (□p = ~◊~p). (This is just 
a terminological convention.) Hence 
5. x is necessary for y = y does not have the power to do or bring it about so that x 
not be so. That is, x does not have the power to prevent or undo x. 
6. x is necessary (unqualifiedly) = nothing has the power to prevent or undo x. 
Notice what we’ve just done: we’ve defined the usual modal notions—possibility, 
impossibility, necessity—in terms of the powers of things. There’s nothing at all here 
about logical “contradictions.” 
Back to Boethius 
Let’s back up and look again at Boethius. When we left him last, we had said that 
Boethius did two things in the context of divine foreknowledge and future contingents. 
The first was to draw the distinction between simple/absolute necessity and conditional 
necessity. Now I want to talk about the second one. 
It seems, Boethius suggests, that there’s still a problem, even after distinguishing simple 
or absolute necessity from conditional necessity. Recall the so called “proof” we gave 
that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will (see the handout, and p. 112 above). 
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We said that step 2 of that argument was ambiguous, and could be read either in the 
obviously true but innocuous sense that 
□(Kp → p) 
(innocuous because the argument won’t go through on that reading), or in the much 
stronger and more dangerous sense that 
Kp →□p, 
which we have no reason to believe. 
But, Boethius objects in the Consolation, perhaps we do have a reason to accept the 
latter, stronger reading after all, where p is about the future. For it seems that the only 
things that can be known about the future are necessary truths about it. I can’t know, let’s 
say, that you’re going to rob a bank tomorrow, and I can’t know that you’re not, because 
(let’s say) that’s something you have free will about. But I can know that either you will 
or you won’t, because that’s a necessary truth and not subject to your free will. 
So the problem is that it looks as if perhaps the only things that can be known about the 
future are necessary truths in the sense that is not subject to free will. 
The same point can perhaps be put a little more clearly if we remember how Anselm  
argued: If it’s a fact now that I’m freely going to rob a bank tomorrow, then that’s what 
God knows, and if it’s a fact now that I’m freely not going to rob a bank tomorrow, then 
that’s what God knows. One or the other of them is a fact now, but Anselm thinks that if 
it’s a fact about my free action tomorrow, then my freedom is not compromised. 
But perhaps he’s wrong. After all, if it’s a fact now that I’m freely going to rob a bank 
tomorrow, then it’s still a fact that I’m going to rob it, and if it’s a fact that I’m freely not 
going to rob it, then it’s still a fact that I’m not going to rob it. And just insisting that 
whichever way it turns out is going to be done freely won’t do any good, because it looks 
as if it’s not going to be done freely. 
The problem is that, if we’re talking about facts of the matter now, then it’s settled now. I 
won’t settle it tomorrow when I make my decision; it’s already settled today and has been 
from the very beginning. The fact that is the case now is not just that I’m going to decide 
tomorrow; no, it’s also a fact now what my decision is going to be. Or at least it is if God 
knows it now. And so tomorrow I will not be able to make the opposite choice, because 
that would require me to change the past. 
If I’m really going to be free tomorrow when I decide, then there can’t be anything 
ontologically about the state of reality today from which it follows what my decision is 
going to be. If I’m really going to be free tomorrow, there cannot be any “fact of the 
matter” today—and therefore nothing for God to know today. 
This is in effect the problem Boethius raised too almost 700 years before Anselm. In 
short, all our distinctions between simple/absolute necessity and conditional necessity, or 
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between antecedent necessity and subsequent necessity, aren’t enough to solve the 
problem. 
Here’s where Boethius makes his second important move. In Consolation V pr. 4, Lady 
Philosophy (a personification of philosophy, who appears to Boethius while he in jail 
awaiting execution) says (p. 110): 
The cause of your error lies in your assumption that whatever is known is 
known by the force and nature of the things that are known; but the 
opposite is true. Everything which is known is known not according to its 
own power but rather according to the capacity of the knower. 
In other words, the way we know things—and, for that matter, which things we can know
—is determined not only by the things themselves, but also by our cognitive powers. 
And, Lady Philosophy goes on, we should not suppose the faculty of divine cognition is 
as weak as ours. 
We know things, it turns out, she says, through: 
1. the senses (which know particulars that are present) 
2. imagination (which knows particulars but even when they are absent) 
3. reason (which knows all of the above, but also universals). 
But God’s knowledge, Lady Philosophy says, proceeds not by any of these ways but by 
means of intelligence or understanding, which grasps the “pure form itself” (i.e., a divine 
Idea). 
Just as imagination can know everything the senses can know but more besides (namely, 
absent particulars), and just as reason can know everything imagination and the senses 
can know, but knows more besides (namely, universals), so too God’s intelligence or 
understanding can know everything we can know by reason, but more besides. So from 
the fact that we cannot know anything about the future that isn’t already necessary, it 
doesn’t follow that God can’t. 
Lady Philosophy goes on to tell us that God’s knowledge, which proceeds by 
intelligence or understanding is—like God himself, with which it is identical—eternal. 
And what is eternity? Eternity is (Book V, pr. 6, quoted in Williams’s Basic Writings, at 
Monologion, Chap. 24, p. 35 n. 2): 
the whole and perfect possession of illimitable life all at once. 
This is a famous definition. 
Anselm knew this Boethian definition, and in effect quotes it. See Monologion, Chap. 24, 
pp. 34–35, where Anselm is talking about how it’s better to say the supreme being exists 
always than to say it exists at every time: 
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 Therefore, if he is said to exist ‘always’, this is best understood as 
meaning that he exists or lives eternally; in other words, that he enjoys 
illimitable life as a whole, perfectly, and all at once. For his eternity 
appears to be an illimitable life existing, as a whole all at once and 
perfectly.  
Now you may well wonder what life is doing in this definition, and that’s a good 
question. But for now the important thing to note is that the key notion here is not 
‘illimitable life’ but ‘all at once’. That is, God is not spread out over time the way we are, 
with the result that at the present we don’t have the whole of God existing but only a 
time-slice of God. No, God doesn’t come in time-slices. God exists as a whole all at once. 
And that is what it is to be eternal. See Monologion, Chap. 21. (Eternity, then, is not just 
omnitemporality.) 
Now we’ll talk about Anselm on this in a moment. But for now let’s finish up Boethius’s 
view, which is the background to Anselm. 
Since God is eternal, Boethius says, then, his knowledge—that is, his understanding or 
intelligence—is eternal too. Hence it does not proceed, as our reasoning does, in terms of 
past, present and future. For the divine knowledge, there is at it were only a kind of 
eternal present—all at once. Hence, just as our reason has no problem with knowing 
present contingencies (i.e., things that occur in the present and that are not settled before 
they occur), so too God’s knowledge has no problem knowing future contingencies. They 
are future, and therefore hidden, only from the point of view of reason. For God, they are 
all present. 
No doubt, you’ve heard this line before: the way to solve the problem of divine 
foreknowledge and human freedom is to move God outside time entirely. Well, here it is, 
in Boethius. (It’s not the first, but is certainly the most famous presentation of this view.) 
In De Concordia, Anselm pretty clearly adopts this Boethian line. For example, q. 1, § 4, 
(p. 365): 
… whether we say this according to the unchangeable present of eternity 
in which nothing is past or future, but all things are at once without any 
motion [i.e., change] … or according to time 
Again, q. 1, § 5 (p. 366): 
For because God does not err and sees nothing but truth, whether that truth 
comes about by freedom or by necessity, something is said to be 
immutably fixed with regard to him that, with regard to human beings, is 
subject to change until it happens. 
Again (ibid., p. 367): 
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And in just the same way, something that in eternity cannot be changed is 
proved, without any inconsistency, to be changeable in time until it exists, 
thanks to free will. 
And there are many other such passages in the De Concordia as well. 
Note that this notion of God’s not being in time is something we’ve not seen before in 
Anselm. Despite Anselm’s quoting Boethius’s definition of eternity in Monologion, 
Chap. 24, we’ve not seen anything so far that really commits Anselm to saying that God 
is not in time like anything else. The most we’ve seen before is that God doesn’t change 
in time the way creatures do. But that’s not the same thing. 
Back in Monologion, Chaps. 20–22, we saw Anselm say that God is always and 
everywhere, but not that he was outside space and time altogether. In fact, we saw 
Anselm explain a kind of “inclusive” sense of being “wholly in” a place and time, a sense 
that would apply to God. 
But now, in De Concordia, we do clearly get Anselm espousing the Boethian notion of 
eternity, with its full implications. Is this a change of mind on Anselm’s part? That’s not 
clear. It’s almost as if, while he quotes the Boethian definition of eternity in Monologion, 
Chap. 24, he doesn’t quite realize its full implications (the “all at once” in the definition). 
If this does represent a change of mind in Anselm’s thinking, it is one of the few points 
where he does change his mind. For the most part, Anselm shows a remarkable 
uniformity of thought throughout all his writings. 
Now for some evaluation: It’s not clear to me whether the Boethian/Anselmian strategy is 
going to work. There are at least two things wrong with it, it seems to me. (1) First, it’s 
not clear God can be omniscient if he’s eternal in the Boethian sense. (2) And second, 
even if he can be, it’s not clear how this is going to solve the problem of reconciling 
divine foreknowledge with human freedom. 
Let’s look at the first problem. The Boethian/Anselmian strategy can be put like this: 
You may be familiar with the way W. V. Quine translated tensed sentences into what he 
called “eternal” sentences, by substituting a “tenseless” verb for the tensed verb of the 
original, and adding an explicit time-rider if one is needed. For example, “It is now 
raining,” said at time t, is translated into “At time t, it rains,” where the verb is taken in a 
tenseless sense. (So too, Leibniz’s strategy.) 
The Boethian/Anselmian strategy, then, amounts to claiming that the truths God knows 
are all of this tenseless, “eternal” variety. (Non-eternal truths, tensed-truths, can change 
their truth-value over time, so that if they were what God knows, his knowledge—and so 
he himself—would change over time. And that would violate divine immutability.) 
Now this claim, together with the thesis of divine omniscience (that God knows all truths, 
everything there is to know), entails that all truths can be translated into eternal-truths in 
this way, without loss of content. 
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And that, of course, is purely a question of tense-logic. Like many topics in “fringe”-
areas of logic like this, it’s not entirely uncontroversial, but I think there is pretty general 
agreement that it can’t be done. Consider this: 
There are two ways of looking at time: 
When we try to visualize time, we usually picture it in spatial terms—for instance, as a 
line, running from earlier to later. Point X is earlier in time than point Y, for example: 
 
From this point of view then, all temporal events can be arranged on the temporal 
continuum, and can be related to one another as earlier than, later than, or simultaneous 
with. Furthermore, those relationships never change. World War I is always earlier than 
World War II, for instance—from any point on the temporal continuum. 
In effect, then, both the statement that WWI will be earlier than WWII (which was a true 
statement in Anselm’s day, although he of course couldn’t have known that), and the 
statement that WWI was earlier than WWII (which is a true statement in our own day), 
can be translated into the tenseless (“eternal”) truth “World War I earlier than World War 
II.” 
Temporal notions like earlier than, later than, simultaneous with, belong to what is 
sometimes called the “B”-series of temporal notions. The terminology comes from the 
British philosopher John McTaggert Ellis McTaggert (1866–1925), who distinguished 
what he called the “A”-series and the “B”-series as two ways of dividing up times, or 
events in time. The latter, the “B”-series, as we’ve just seen, is the division in terms of 
earlier, later, simultaneous. 
The former, the “A”-series, however, divides events in terms of past, present, and future. 
And those divisions are constantly changing, depending on where you are in time. What 
was future is now present, and a moment from now it will be past. (So too for expressions 
like “tomorrow,” “now,” “last year.”) 
The “A”-series captures the notion of the flow of time. The “B”-series, however, presents 
all of time at once in a way that doesn’t depend on your vantage point from within time. 
Now we can ask various questions about time, and we can know various facts about time, 
from the “A”-series point of view and the “B”-series point of view. The fact that event X 
comes before event Y, for example, is a “B”-series fact. And, as we’ve just seen, that fact 
can be expressed tenselessly, in a “eternal” proposition. 
So there’s no particularly theoretical difficulty in saying God can know “B”-series facts 
about time, even if he himself is not in time at all. 
Earlier Later 
X Y
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But a question like “What time is it?” is an “A”-series question, the answer to which is 
constantly changing. And it’s not at all clear that all “A”-series questions or statements 
can be translated without loss of content into “B”-series statements. “It is now time t,” for 
instance, does not amount to “At time t it (tenselessly) is time t”—not even at time t! The 
latter statement is a mere tautology, whereas the former might actually be used to tell 
someone what time it is. 
Consider another example. Suppose you’re at a bus stop, and wonder whether you’ve 
missed your bus. You consult a timetable, which tells you that at 2:10, for instance, bus 
#1 leave for downtown, while at 2:14 but #5 leaves for the west side, and so on. All that’s 
very good, but—even if all the busses are on schedule—you still don’t know whether 
you’ve missed your bus! The timetable gives you a series of “B”-series facts, whereas 
what you want to know is an “A”-series fact. 
The upshot is: If God’s knowledge works in terms of eternity, then even if can know 
some things about time (the “B”-series facts), he can’t be omniscient since he can’t know 
the “A”-series facts—he doesn’t know what time it is! 
The second problem with the Boethian/Anselmian approach is this: Even if God is 
omniscient, and his knowledge does proceed in terms of eternity, how does this solve the 
problem? How does this prevent God’s omniscience from interfering with our free will? 
Anselm repeatedly says we have these two ways of talking about human action and 
temporal events in general: from the point of view of eternity and from the point of view 
of time. From the point of view of eternity it’s settled whether I’m going to rob a bank 
tomorrow; from the point of view of time, it isn’t (at least not if we want to say it’s a free 
act). 
Which point of view is right? If we say both of them (and Anselm does—see p. 367, 
quoted above), then we’ve got the awkward view that it’s both settled and not settled 
whether I’m going to rob a bank tomorrow. 
Perhaps, you say, this is one of those perspectival truths Visser and Williams talk about 
in their Companion chapter on truth. After all, there’s nothing wrong with saying 
something is true from one perspective but false from another perspective. A task may be 
difficult, for instance, from the point of view of requiring great physical strength, and yet 
not difficult at all from the point of view of being particularly complicated or requiring 
any special endurance. 
OK, are both points of view legitimate, then? If so, then fine—let’s talk then from the 
temporal point of view, since it’s legitimate. Is it settled now whether I’m going to rob a 
bank tomorrow? If so, then that means there’s nothing I can do about it now. (Note all the 
“A”-series temporal specifications here.) And in fact, there is nothing I was ever able to 
do about it. And therefore, whichever way it turns out tomorrow, I’m not at the head of 
the causal chain. Likewise, it doesn’t seem that I have now, ever had, or ever will have 
any alternative possibilities available to me about robbing a bank tomorrow. In short, 
there doesn’t seem to be any sense in which I ever was, am now, or ever will be free 
about robbing that bank tomorrow. 
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On the other hand, if from the temporal point of view it is not settled now whether I’m 
going to rob a bank tomorrow, then from the temporal point of view God can’t know now 
which way it’s going to turn out (since there’s nothing there to be known now). And 
therefore, from the temporal point of view, God’s not omniscient. 
So, from the temporal point of view, God’s omniscience and foreknowledge do conflict 
with my future free decisions, don’t they? And we just said there is nothing wrong with 
the temporal point of view. So fine, we really do have our problem then, don’t we, and 
there’s nothing wrong with the way we set it up! 
It doesn’t do any good to insist that there’s another point of view from which the problem 
doesn’t arise. That’s just an attempt to distract us from the fact that the problem does 
arise from our (legitimate) point of view. 
The only way to avoid this result, it seems to me, is to downplay the legitimacy of either 
the one point of view or the other, either the temporal perspective or the eternal one. 
What usually happens is that the talk about the distinction between the temporal and the 
eternal perspectives ends up downplaying the reality of time. Time is really just an 
illusion, a distorted perspective. But Anselm doesn’t ever suggest that! 
The De Grammatico 
(Distribute handout: “Passages Relevant to Anselm’s De Grammatico.”) 
The De Grammatico is early. It’s in fact the earliest more or less datable work we have 
from Anselm, coming from 1060–63, before he had even been named Prior—much less 
Abbot—of the Abbey of Bec. (Recall, Anselm became a monk at Bec in 1060, and was 
named Prior in 1063.) It is even earlier than the various prayers and meditations that 
come before the Monologion. 
As you’ll recall, Anselm mentions this dialogue in his Preface to On Truth (p. 115). Like 
the “Three Philosophical Dialogues” (On Truth, On Freedom of Choice, On the Fall of 
the Devil), the De Grammatico is a dialogue between a Teacher and a Student. But unlike 
those other dialogues—and in fact unlike everything else Anselm wrote, with the 
exception of the so called Lambeth Fragments (= Philosophical Fragments, or 
Unfinished Work), which we can’t date at all, it has nothing whatever to do with 
theological topics. It is a pure piece of semantics and philosophy of language. 
The work has been translated and studied extensively by Desmond Paul Henry, the 
translator of the version found in the volume Anselm of Canterbury: Major Works (edited 
by Brian Davies and G. R. Evans), which I used to use for this course. But Henry also 
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published essentially the same translation as early as 1964 in The De Grammatico of St. 
Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy, which includes an ample theoretical discussion of 
what’s going on in the work. In 1967, he published The Logic of St. Anselm, which is in 
effect more about the De Grammatico. In 1974, he did it again in Commentary on De 
Grammatico: The Historical-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselm’s. 
(Bibliographical details on all these works may be found on the handout on 
“Bibliography” I gave you at the beginning of this course. There are also two papers by 
Henry on the De Grammatico on E-Rreserves: “Saint Anselm’s De ‘Grammatico’,” and 
“Saint Anselm’s Nonsense.” And there are other places where he treats the work too. 
Be warned: Although Henry says a lot of helpful things about this dialogue, he also has 
some pretty non-standard—and, in my view, weird—views about medieval logic, 
semantics and philosophy of language, and about logic, semantics and philosophy of 
language generally (whether medieval or otherwise). He seems to have taken it as his 
mission in life to resurrect not only the De Grammatico but also the logical theories and 
notation of the twentieth-century Polish logician Stanisław Leśniewski. Leśniewski was a 
brilliant logician who did some very interesting work—particularly on the theory known 
as “mereology” (the theory of “parts”—part/whole theory—but the benefits of imposing 
his views and his very idiosyncratic notation on Anselm seem to me minimal. 
Henry’s translation of the De Grammatico is divided into numbered sections, after the 
fashion of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which was all the rage when Henry started working 
on Anselm. So understand: The section numbers are not Anselm’s, but Henry’s. 
Nevertheless, they are handy. I will be using my own translations of passages from the 
De Grammatico throughout our discussion, but I will also refer to Henry’s section 
numbers, so you should have no trouble locating the corresponding passages in Henry’s 
translation. 
The De Grammatico is particularly interesting to me, insofar as it represents an early—
but already quite sophisticated—stage in what later on in the Middle Ages became known 
as the theory of connotation—or connotative names. This is a topic on which I at one 
time did a lot of work. But the real heyday of medieval connotation-theory came only 
much later than Anselm, in the fourteenth century with people like William of Ockham 
(in London) and John Buridan (in Paris). 
I won’t of course be directly discussing those people, since that’s a different course, but I 
will occasionally remark on how things Anselm says will be developed later on in those 
later people. 
It is remarkable to me—and something of a great mystery—that although I know of no 
one in the later heyday of medieval connotation-theory who actually cites Anselm’s De 
Grammatico or shows any real familiarity with it (it seems to have had very little 
circulation), the views in it seem to have been influential. I don’t know how to explain 
this odd fact. 
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The Theory of Paronymy 
But before we start talking about the De Grammatico directly, I first want to look at some 
background: the theory of “paronyms” or “paronymous names” in Aristotle and 
Augustine (354–430). 
What are paronyms? Well, the classic text on this is found at the beginning of Aristotle’s 
Categories 1, 1a12–15 (Passage (1) on your handout—Anselm had this text in Boethius’s 
translation): 
Whatever get from something the names by which they are called, but 
differ in ending, are called “paronyms.” For example, a grammarian [is so 
called] from grammar, and a brave [person is so called] from bravery. 
Notice: Aristotle himself seems to be talking about the things—the grammarian, not the 
word ‘grammarian’ but the person. He says “whatever get from something the names by 
which they are called.” Still, the story I’m about to tell is mainly about names = nouns 
and adjectives, and it’s easy to see how that would be a natural transition to make. From 
now on, when I talk about “paronyms,” I’ll mean “paronymous names.” 
In any case, the quotation I just read you is pretty much all Aristotle has to say on the 
topic. 
From Aristotle’s remark, and particularly from his examples, you might get the idea that 
a theory of paronymous names [= nouns and adjectives] would be simply a theory of 
concrete and abstract names. 
If we follow this impression, and insist on the syntactic criterion Aristotle mentions—that 
is, that paronymous names differ only with respect to their endings—then what we will 
end up with is indeed probably only a theory of concrete and abstract names, and a pretty 
inadequate and cramped one at that. But if we relax that syntactical stricture and look at 
what is semantically interesting about paronymous names, we will find something of 
much more general interest. 
Consider, for instance, the case of ‘just’ and ‘justice’ (not one of Aristotle’s examples). 
When we call something just, we do so by making a kind of “oblique reference,” as it 
were, to something else—to the justice it exemplifies or has, in virtue of which we call it 
just. 
Similarly, when we call someone brave (this time one of Aristotle’s own examples), we 
do so with one eye, so to speak, on something else—on the bravery that person displays 
or possesses, in virtue of which we call him or her brave. 
On the other hand, when we call a certain virtue justice or bravery, we do not make this 
kind of oblique reference to something else. The justice or the bravery is all that is 
involved. The “brave” is a person who has bravery, but bravery itself is just bravery. 
What is semantically interesting about paronymous names, therefore, is this feature I 
have just called “oblique reference.” This is not yet a technical expression. I simply use it 
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as motivation for the points I’ll be making. Our task will be to specify as precisely as we 
can just what is going on there. 
So considered, the theory of paronymy is just a special case of the theory of absolute and 
connotative terms that was developed to a very high degree in the fourteenth century, 
particularly by Ockham and Buridan. The theory of connotation turns out to be exactly 
the theory of this kind of “oblique reference,” in contexts that include but go beyond 
paronyms in the sense Aristotle described. 
So my interest here is not so much in the theory of paronymy narrowly taken as it is in 
what might be called “early connotation theory,” although the term ‘connotation’ was not 
used until later. I will focus on two authors: (1) on St. Augustine, who does not so far as I 
know discuss paronymy anywhere directly, and certainly does not in the passages I will 
be considering, but who does have some things of great interest to say that bear on 
connotation-theory more generally; and (2) on Anselm, who has a great deal to say in the 
De Grammatico about a particular case of paronymy, which will also bear on later 
connotation-theory more generally. (But I’ll also want to talk about another passage from 
Anselm, one from his On the Fall of the Devil.) 
Augustine 
Let us look first then at Augustine. And let us begin by looking at a passage that 
concerns, of all things, the question how to define a human being. 
The passage is from Augustine’s On the Customs of the Catholic Church (Passage (2) on 
your handout), nowadays perhaps not among Augustine’s most widely read works. 
Augustine is discussing what the chief good is for human beings, and along the way he 
decides that in answering this question it would help to figure out just what a human 
being is in the first place. 
Augustine recognizes that somehow you need both soul and body to have a fully 
constituted human being. We do not, he says, properly call a corpse a human being, and 
neither do we properly call a disembodied ghost a human being. Somehow you need both 
body and soul in order to have a human being. 
But, given that you need both in order to have a human being, what more can we say? 
Does it follow that the human being somehow is both—that he is a composite of body 
and soul in some way, perhaps after the Aristotelian fashion in which the soul is the 
substantial form of the body? 
Well, no, not necessarily. Augustine considers three possible stories one might tell here. 
In effect, he is asking “What kind of word is ‘man’ (= ‘human being’, ‘homo’)? 
(1) Is it a “pair”-word? For example, we speak of a “team” of horses. Neither 
horse by itself is the team, but only the pair of them when they are 
somehow hitched together. 
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Is the word ‘man’ then like that, so that neither the body nor the soul is properly the man, 
but only the pair of them when they are somehow “hitched together”? This is more or less 
the Aristotelian theory, in a suitably loose sense: Body and soul are ingredients or parts of 
the composite whole we call a man, and the term we predicate of the whole is not truly 
predicable of either of its parts. Is the word ‘man’ then like this? 
(Augustine also mentions the word ‘centaur’ as being another example of this kind of 
word. But that seems to be based on the odd view that a centaur is not half horse and half 
man, as is usually thought, but somehow a combination of a complete horse and a 
complete man. See n. 2 on your handout. It’s probably best to disregard the example.) 
(2) Or is the word ‘man’ more like the word ‘lantern’ (lucerna)? Two things 
are required in order to make a lantern. First of all, you need the container 
or case, the material artifact made out of metal and glass, let’s say. But if 
that case did not support a flame, so that it is somehow in the service of 
the flame, then what you have is not a lantern, but a piece of hardware that 
is at most “potentially” a lantern, as Aristotle might have put it. 
Conversely, if you have a flame without the case, then you don’t have a 
lantern either; you have a fire on your hands! 
Both case and flame are required in order to have a fully functioning lantern. 
Nevertheless, when you do have a lantern, it is not the pair consisting of the case and the 
flame that is the lantern. It is only the case that is properly speaking the lantern, although 
it is called a lantern only with a kind of “oblique reference” (and that is the notion we 
want to investigate) to the flame it supports. 
The example is perhaps a bit strained, but its application to Augustine’s main question is 
clear. Is the word ‘man’ like the word ‘lantern’? That is, is only the material casing—the 
body—properly speaking the man, even though it is called a man only when it contains 
and supports a soul, so that it is the body that we call the man, but only with an “oblique 
reference” to the soul? (Otherwise, it’s just a corpse.) 
(3) Or finally, is the word ‘man’ more like the word ‘rider’? (That is, ‘eques’ 
= ‘horseman’. I don’t want to translate this word as ‘horseman’, since in 
English that word has ‘man’ built into it, and so perhaps skews the point 
Augustine is making. Note that ‘eques’ is etymologically related to 
‘equus’ = ‘horse’, so that the word means someone who rides horses—not 
someone who, say, rides a bicycle or is a passenger in a boat. You don’t 
have a rider unless you have a man who rides horses. You need both the 
man and the horse. Yet the rider is not the pair man-and-horse, somehow 
hitched together. And the rider is certainly not the horse considered as 
supporting and at the service of the man. Rather it is only the man who is 
properly speaking the rider, although we only call him a “rider” with a 
kind of “oblique reference” to the horse, which he governs and rules. 
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Is the word ‘man’ then like this? Is it really only the soul that is the man, even though it is 
only called a man insofar as it is supported by a body, which it governs and rules? (The 
notion of “governing” and “ruling” is a characteristic Augustinian phrase that often 
occurs when he is describing the proper relation of the soul to the body. But there is no 
need to go into that here.) 
There is another passage from Augustine, this time from his On the City of God (Passage 
(3) on your handout), where he lists the same three alternatives (in reverse order) and at-
tributes them to the Roman pagan Eclectic philosopher Varro (116–27 BCE), whom 
elsewhere he calls “most learned” (De civitate dei III.4.2). And he says that Varro chose 
the first alternative (the third in the ordering of Passage (3)): that ‘man’ is a pair-word. 
Hence, according to Varro, the highest good for man is to lead a “mixed” life, that is, a 
mixture of the contemplative and the active life, so that the goods of both soul and body, 
and thus of the whole man, will be accommodated. 
Much later in On the City of God (XIX.4.132–80—I’ve not quoted this in your handout 
because it’s a long passage), Augustine says he thinks Varro treated the whole question 
superficially, because he tried to find the highest good of man in this life rather than in 
the next. And indeed, later in On the Customs of the Catholic Church Augustine makes it 
quite clear that he himself accepts the third of the alternatives he lists there, that it is the 
soul that is the man, but it is called a “soul” only insofar as it governs and rules a body. 
He says (I.27.52): 
Therefore man, as he appears to man, is a rational, mortal and earthly soul 
using a body. 
(Text (7) on your handout. There are some textual problems here—an “earthly soul”? 
“man as he appears to man”? But I have translated as best I could.) 
Augustine therefore accepts a basically Platonic picture of body and soul. For him they 
are like two distinct substances, not linked as matter and form, as they are for Aristotle, 
but by a relation of “governing and ruling,” as the rider dominates his horse or—to use 
other familiar similes from the Platonic tradition—as the ruler is in his city or as the 
captain is in his ship. And if you ask what, properly speaking, is the man, Augustine will 
answer that it is the soul, but only when it is doing its job of governing and ruling the 
body. 
Semantical Implications 
Now you may think it is straining things a little to find much of logical or semantical 
importance in these passages. But if you do, you are wrong. 
Although the technical machinery is not there, Augustine is in effect claiming here that 
the term ‘man’ is what later authors will call a “connotative” term, that it names or is 
truly predicable of souls, but only by making in addition a kind of “oblique reference” to
—“connoting,” as they will later say—the bodies those souls rule. 
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On the second theory Augustine considers (and rejects), the theory that the term ‘man’ is 
like the term ‘lantern’, ‘man’ is likewise a connotative term. But this time the semantic 
situation is just the reverse. This time the term names bodies, but only by making in 
addition an “oblique reference” to—“connoting”—the souls those bodies support and 
serve. 
On the other hand, on the first theory Augustine considers (and likewise rejects), the 
theory that ‘man’ is a pair-word like ‘team’ or ‘centaur’, ‘man’ is not a connotative term 
at all, but what later authors will call an “absolute” term. It names composite wholes 
consisting of bodies and souls put together, but it does not do so by making any “oblique 
reference” to—“connoting”—either the body or the soul, or for that matter anything else. 
It is perhaps hard to see what is different in this case, to see why on this first theory the 
term ‘man’ does not make an “oblique reference” to both bodies and souls. The problem 
here is that we do not yet have any general answer to the question: How do we 
distinguish absolute from connotative names? How do we know when we have what I 
have been calling “oblique reference”? That is a very difficult and delicate matter even 
for the later authors like Ockham, who was pretty technically-minded, so that we should 
hardly expect a precise answer from Augustine—who was after all an extraordinarily 
deep and profound thinker, but scarcely a technician. 
Nevertheless, I think I can explicate the difference in a preliminary, rather non-technical, 
but still revealing, way by appealing to the notion of what I shall call “conditional 
naming.” (Do not expect too much from this theory of “conditional naming.” I am 
making it up solely for the purpose of illustrating a point.) 
Consider any name that names—that is, is truly predicable of—an object x. Now some 
names name an object x only under the condition that x satisfy certain requirements. For 
instance, the name (or description) ‘the President of the United States’ names a certain 
individual person—as I’m speaking, Barack Obama. But it only names him under the 
condition that he occupies the office of President. After he leaves office, that same term 
will no longer name him because he will no longer satisfy the condition. 
On the other hand, other names name objects without any condition at all—or, if you 
will, they name those objects only under the condition that those objects exist, but under 
no further condition. For example, the name ‘Barack Obama’ names a certain individual, 
and will continue to name that same individual—that is, to be truly predicable of him—
provided only that he continue to exist, and (depending on your theory of naming) 
perhaps even after that. (For present purposes, we will ignore the possibility that he might 
change his name. That is, the “conditions” we are concerned with here pertain only to the 
situation in the world; we hold the language—the assigning of terms—fixed.) 
Now a term that names objects only under the one condition that those objects exist will 
be called an “absolute” term. A term that names objects only under the condition that 
those objects exist and also satisfy some further requirement will be called “connotative.” 
Once again, this terminology is not in Augustine, or even in Anselm, but it will prove 
convenient. 
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What makes this distinction so hard to pin down precisely is that some terms perhaps 
name objects under some further condition, where that further condition is nevertheless 
automatically or necessarily satisfied, given that the objects exist at all. That doesn’t 
necessarily mean the further condition is not there, or that it isn’t really a further 
condition. (So called “natural kind” terms may be like this, if natural kinds are such that a 
thing of one natural kind cannot change into a thing of another natural kind without 
losing its identity and becoming a different individual altogether.) 
In effect, then, the difference between absolute and connotative terms—in effect, two 
kinds of naming—and the difficulty in distinguishing them, is a little like the situation 
with Kant’s distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. A categorical 
imperative is a pure imperative, with no condition attached to it explicitly or even 
implicitly. (“Act only in such a way that the maxim of your action can be universally 
applied.”) A hypothetical imperative, however, does have some condition attached to it, 
even if the condition is only implicit. For example, the sign on the door: “Push.” 
Understand the implicit condition “if you want the door to open.” 
A hypothetical imperative is still hypothetical even if the condition, implicit or explicit, is 
one that is automatically and necessarily satisfied, given the kinds of beings we are. For 
example, various commands based on an understanding of human nature. “If you want to 
be happy—and of course we all do, since that is part of human nature, at least on certain 
theories—then cultivate a circle of friends.” Such hypothetical imperatives with 
guaranteed conditions Kant calls “precepts of prudence.” 
These broadly “Kantian” considerations will perhaps suffice to give you a kind of rough 
and ready sense of the distinction between absolute and connotative terms. The exact 
specification of that distinction need not concern us here. For now, let’s just see how the 
distinction can be applied to the texts we have been considering from Augustine. 
On the second and third theories Augustine considers in Passage (2)—the “lantern”-
theory and the “rider”-theory—it is clear that we are treating ‘man’ as a connotative term 
in the sense just described. On the second theory, the term names bodies, but does so only 
under the condition that those bodies support and serve souls. If they do not do that, as 
for instance they will no longer do after the departure of the soul at death, then the term 
‘man’ no longer names—can no longer be truly predicated of—those bodies, even though 
those bodies continue to exist and to retain their identity, but now as corpses. 
On the third theory Augustine considers, the one he ACCEPTS, the term ‘man’ names 
souls, but only under the condition that those souls inhabit and rule a body. If they do not 
do that, as for instance they will no longer do after death, then the term ‘man’ no longer 
names—can no longer be truly predicated of—those souls, even though the souls 
continue to exist and to retain their identity as disembodied spirits. They are souls, and in 
fact the same souls they were all along, but they are no longer human beings. 
On the first theory, however, the pair-word theory, things are different. There the term 
‘man’ names a whole composed of body and soul. It does not name either the body or the 
soul individually—either when they are separated from one another or when they are 
together—any more than the word ‘man’ names my foot, whether severed or attached. 
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Now the term ‘man’ on this first theory names the whole composite of body and soul, 
provided only that that whole exists. If the composite is broken up, so that body and soul 
are separated, then the whole no longer exists, so that there is no longer anything for the 
term to name. The term ‘man’, therefore, names the composite objects it does, on this 
theory, only under the condition that those composites exist. There is no further 
condition, implicit or explicit. Hence the term is not connotative, but “absolute.” 
Of course, you might insist that there is an implicit further condition after all, one that is 
automatically and necessarily satisfied—namely the condition that those composites 
consist of body and soul, or some other such condition. But this just brings us back to the 
point that an exact and technical distinction between absolute and connotative terms is a 
complicated and delicate matter. We’re trying to motivate the distinction here, not to 
come up with a rule of thumb or infallible decision procedure for telling which is which. 
This then is our first pass at the distinction between absolute and connotative terms. It’s a 
good start, but clearly much remains to be done. 
Anselm 
Now let’s turn to Anselm. There are two texts from Anselm I want to consider. The first 
does not deal with paronymous terms especially, but more generally with “connotative” 
terms in the sense we have just discussed. The second text however, the De Grammatico, 
does deal specifically with paronymy. 
Ontological Implications 
The first text is from Anselm’s dialogue On the Fall of the Devil, Ch. 11. Here it is (Basic 
Writings, pp. 186–87, although I am here using my own translation—see Passage (8) on 
your handout): 
You see, the form of an expression often doesn’t match the way 
things are in reality. For example, ‘to fear’ is active according to the form 
[it’s an active infinitive] of the word even though fearing is passive in 
reality. And in the same way, blindness is something according to the form 
of the expression, even though it is not something in reality. For we say 
that someone has blindness and that there is blindness in him in just the 
way that we say someone has vision and that there is vision in him, even 
though blindness is not something, but instead not-something, and to have 
blindness is not to have something but rather to lack that which is 
something. After all, blindness is nothing other than non-vision or the 
absence of vision where there ought to be vision; and non-vision or the 
absence of vision is not something in cases where there ought to be vision 
any more than it is in cases where there ought not be vision. Therefore, 
blindness is not something in the eye, just because there ought to be vision 
in the eye, any more than non-vision or the absence of vision is something 
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in a stone, where there ought not to be vision. And there are many other 
similar cases in which things that are not something are called something 
according to the form of the expression, in that we speak of them as we 
speak of things that really exist. 
Now let’s discuss it. In the dialogue as a whole, Anselm is concerned among other things 
with the problem of evil, and he is at pains to maintain the basic Augustinian line that evil 
is not a thing, not a reality in its own right. Nevertheless, Anselm wants to maintain also 
that the word ‘evil’ has a legitimate use (as Augustine would of course also say), and 
Anselm wonders how that can be. 
His analogy with the term ‘blindness’ is instructive. When we say of someone that vision 
is in him or there is vision in him, or simply that he has vision, the structure of our 
sentence is, as it were, a kind of “picture” of what it is that makes that sentence true. That 
is, just as we use the word ‘vision’ and the word ‘him’ and the linking expression ‘is in’, 
so too, on the side of reality, we have the real property vision, a real entity in the 
ontology, and we also have the real person, and the former really inheres in or belongs to 
the other. 
But when we say of someone that blindness is in him or there is blindness in him or that 
he has blindness, our sentence—even though it may well be true—is not in this same kind 
of way a picture of what makes it true. What makes it true is not that there is some 
mysterious property blindness that really inheres in that person, but rather that the same 
property we dealt with before—namely, vision—is not in that person. 
In effect then, for Anselm the term ‘blindness’ is a connotative term (although he doesn’t 
use that expression). It does not name (cannot be truly predicated of) anything at all, 
since blindness is not an entity in its own right. But we can truly say that blindness is in a 
person—not by referring to blindness, since there isn’t any such thing, but by making a 
kind of “oblique reference” to the vision that is not there. 
For Anselm then, despite its apparent simplicity, the term ‘blindness’ is really what 
logicians sometimes call an “incomplete symbol.” The expression ‘Blindness is in x’ is 
really just a shorthand or abbreviated way of saying that vision is not in x. (Or actually, 
that vision is not in x and ought to be in x, as Anselm makes clear in the passage just 
quoted. But I am not concerned with the “ought”-claim here.) The latter expression, 
‘Vision is not in x’, unlike the former, does provide an accurate picture of what it is that 
makes it true. We have vision, which really is something (although not in x), and we have 
x, which is also really something, and we have the ontological relation of “being in,” 
which really does not hold in this case. 
The details don’t need to detain us. But the moral of the story is already a rich and 
complex one. First of all, it means that not all the terms we can use in true affirmative 
statements name things. That is, our terminology is not a reliable guide to ontology. 
In effect, we already knew this moral from what we saw in Augustine. If you want an 
inventory of the entities in the world, you would surely list bodies and souls, but you 
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would not in addition list men separately. Men just are souls, if we follow Augustine; 
they are souls that satisfy certain conditions. 
Absolute terms, then, are the ones that are linked to an inventory of the world. 
Connotative terms add nothing new to the ontology. 
This suggests that connotative terms are in principle eliminable from our vocabulary, as 
the term ‘blindness’ can be dispensed with in Anselm, and as the term ‘man’ in 
Augustine could always be replaced by its definition: “a rational, mortal and earthly soul 
using a body”—in which all the terms are absolute (or, if they are not, can be replaced in 
turn by their definitions until we ultimately come to absolute terms). This will be an 
important feature of fourteenth-century connotation-theory. 
A second and related moral to Anselm’s story is then that connotation-theory may be 
used as a vehicle for reducing the number of entities in one’s ontology. Thus, just as 
Anselm observes that we do not need to allow blindnesses (or evils) in our ontology, so 
too it may turn out that we do not need lots of other things for which we have putative 
names. They can be parsed away, as Anselm did to blindness (and to evil). This is a 
program the fourteenth-century connotation-theorists will adopt with a vengeance. 
Anselm’s Semantics of Paronymy 
Let us turn now to the second Anselmian text I want to consider, the De Grammatico, and 
with it from blindness to literacy. 
The topic that sets the stage for Anselm’s dialogue concerns the Latin term 
‘grammaticus’, which means “grammatical” or even “grammarian.” Nevertheless, 
Desmond Paul Henry suggests that, in order to catch the nuances of the term in the 
dialogue—and the nuances are quite important here—it is perhaps best to translate 
‘grammaticus’ as “literate,” and to allow it to be used nominally, so that we can call 
someone A literate (note the article), just we might call someone AN illiterate, without 
requiring any further noun. I think Henry’s suggestion is a good one, and we’ll follow it. 
In any case, the choice of the term ‘grammaticus’ as the vehicle for the dialogue is no 
accident. First of all, it is a stock example of a paronymous term. Aristotle, for example, 
in Passage (1) on your handout, says that a grammarian is so called from grammar—or, 
as we should now say, the literate from literacy. 
But second, and of special importance given that ‘grammaticus’ was taken as 
paradigmatic of paronymy, is the fact that there seems to be some disagreement among 
the traditional authorities over just what the term ‘grammaticus’ signifies. On the one 
hand, in Chap. 4 of the Categories, where Aristotle is giving examples of the various 
categories, he lists ‘γραμματικòν’ for the category of quality (Categories 4, 1b25–29—
Passage (9) on your handout): 
Each of what are said without any composition either signifies substance, 
or quantity, or quality, or relation, or where, or when, or situation, or 
having, or acting or being acted on. [That’s just a list of the ten 
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categories.] Substance is, to give an example, like a man, a horse; 
quantity, like two cubits, three cubits; quality, like white, γραμματικòν … 
So ‘grammaticus’ (switching now from Greek back to Latin) signifies a quality, 
presumably grammar or literacy, considered as a quality in the soul. 
On the other hand Priscian, the famous Latin grammarian (c. 500 CE), says this about 
adjectives (Priscian, Institutionum grammaticarum II.58.20.24—the Latin text may also 
be found in Henry, Commentary on De Grammatico, p. 213) (Passage (10) on your 
handout): 
Adjectives are so called because they are usually adjoined to other 
appellatives [i.e., common names] that signify a substance, or to proper 
names as well, in order to make manifest their qualities or quantities, 
which can grow or diminish without the destruction of the substance. For 
example, ‘good animal’, ‘big man’, ‘wise grammaticus’, ‘great Homer’. 
Here the term ‘grammaticus’—by coincidence one of the terms Aristotle picked as 
signifying a quality—is used by Priscian as one of those “appellative” terms, i.e. terms 
“naturally common to many,” as Priscian says elsewhere in the same text (ibid. 
II.58.14.15—Passage (11) on your handout), to which adjectives are attached and which 
signify substances. Hence according to Aristotle ‘grammaticus’ signifies a quality, but 
according to Priscian a substance. Which is it? That is the stage on which the dialogue 
takes place, although the lessons of the dialogue apply to other terms besides 
‘grammaticus’. 
Now I am not certain that Anselm actually knew the text of Priscian; I know of no 
decisive evidence that he did. But he certainly knew this issue of the conflict of 
authorities, since it’s exactly the topic of the dialogue. I suspect he got it from other 
authors of the day. Recall that Lanfranc had been teaching grammar and logic, in addition 
to theology, at the Abbey of Bec 
Now, as you might expect, the solution to this apparent conflict is going to have to do 
justice to both our authorities, both to Aristotle and to Priscian. That is, we are going to 
have to find a way in which ‘grammaticus’ and similar terms can be said to signify both a 
substance and a quality. And Anselm does this, in good Scholastic fashion, by making a 
distinction. He distinguishes two kinds of signification, which he calls signification per se 
(= “through itself”) and signification per aliud (= “through something else”). 
Signification per aliud is linked with what Anselm calls “appellation,” although not every 
case of appellation is a case of signification per aliud. We must therefore look at 
appellation. 
Appellation is what appellative terms do. And an appellative term is, according to 
Priscian, one that is “common to many” (Passage (11) on your handout—I just mentioned 
it a moment ago): 
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This is the difference between a proper and an appellative [name], that an 
appellative is naturally common to many. 
Now the only plausible way a term can be “common to many” is by being truly 
predicable of many. (We’re not talking here about being “common to many” in the way a 
universal is common to many.) Hence common nouns and adjectives are said to 
“appellate” the several things they are truly predicable of. Appellation is therefore what I 
earlier called “naming.” (Strictly speaking, we need to be careful of our terminology here. 
The noun ‘appellation’ seems to be used sometimes in cases where a name names only 
one thing, even though the phrase ‘appellative name’ seems to be reserved for common 
nouns and adjectives.) 
According to Anselm, the term ‘grammaticus’ (= “literate”) appellates human beings—
but only literate ones—at the same time it per se signifies the literacy those human beings 
possess. Like ‘brave’ and ‘bravery’ in the passage from Aristotle that started this 
discussion.  (See Passage (4), 2nd paragraph—the “Teacher” is speaking): 
But ‘grammaticus’ (= ‘literate’) does not signify man and grammar 
as one. Rather it signifies grammar per se and man per aliud. The name 
[‘grammaticus’], even though it is appellative of man, nevertheless cannot 
properly be called significative of him; and although it is significative of 
grammar, nevertheless it is not appellative of it. I am now calling an 
“appellative name” of any thing [that] by which the thing itself is 
appellated [= called] in common usage. For [there is] no common usage 
by which it is said that grammar is grammaticus (= literate), or a 
grammaticus (= literate) is grammar. Rather, a man is grammaticus 
(= literate), and a grammaticus (= literate) a man. 
The concrete term ‘grammaticus’ (= ‘literate’) therefore names or appellates human 
beings, but only under the condition that they possess literacy. It is therefore what will 
later be called a “connotative” term. It names or appellates men, but makes an “oblique 
reference” to literacy, an oblique reference that Anselm calls signification per se. (By 
calling it “per se” he indicates that he doesn’t think there’s anything “oblique” about it; 
it’s the main kind of signification. We’ll see why a little later.) Similarly, the concrete 
term ‘white’ names or appellates white things, but per se signifies whiteness. (Passage (6) 
We’ll look at the passage more in a moment.) (Note that in Latin the words for “white” 
and “whiteness” are quite distinct but related words. In Latin you would never way that 
white is a color; you would say that whiteness is a color.) 
On the other hand, the corresponding abstract names ‘grammatica’ (= literacy, grammar) 
and ‘whiteness’ appellate or name literacy and whiteness, respectively, but also signify 
them per se. In these cases, then, what the names appellate and what they signify per se 
are the same. The things the names name they name provided only that the things exist, 
and under no further condition. The names are therefore what will later be called 
“absolute” names. 
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For absolute names, therefore, appellation and per se signification coincide. For 
connotative names, appellation and per se signification do not coincide, and in that case 
what the names appellate they are also said to signify per aliud. To put it in a formula, for 
Anselm signification per aliud is the APPELLATION of what will later be called 
connotative names. (That’s what I meant earlier when I said that signification per aliud is 
linked with appellation, but not the same as it.) 
Now if you concentrate on the examples (‘grammaticus’, ‘white’) we have looked at so 
far, you might suppose that in general concrete names are connotative while their corre-
sponding abstract forms are going to be absolute. But we already know that can’t be 
right. We have seen that for Anselm the abstract name ‘blindness’ is not absolute but 
connotative. 
There are also cases in which this neat division breaks down the other way too, where we 
have concrete names that are absolute. For example, Anselm tells us that the concrete 
name ‘man’ both appellates and signifies—that is, per se signifies—a substance, the 
actual man. It is therefore an absolute name and not a connotative one. 
It “signifies per se and as one the [things] of which the whole man consists” (from the 
beginning of first paragraph of Passage (4)). 
Note that this means that Anselm disagrees with Augustine, for whom ‘man’ is in effect a 
connotative name. (For Anselm, it is absolute.) Note also that the concrete name ‘man’ is 
absolute for Anselm even though the word does have a corresponding abstract form, 
‘humanity’, and did in the Latin of Anselm’s day too. 
We may parse this fact as follows: The things named by the name ‘man’ will indeed 
automatically possess humanity provided only that they exist, since humanity is essential 
to them. But the condition that they possess humanity is not explicitly or implicitly a 
condition built into the name ‘man’ itself. Thus the name ‘man’ names what it does 
unconditionally. We now want to try to see why. 
Signification per se and Signification per aliud 
Let us now look more closely at the notions of signification per se and signification per 
aliud. They are both said to be kinds of signification. And so now we need to look at the 
medieval notion of signification. 
The Latin verb ‘significare’, and its corresponding noun ‘significatio’, are frequently 
translated by “to mean” or “meaning.” I think this should be avoided in almost all 
technical contexts. The term ‘meaning’ is a notorious one in modern philosophical 
vocabulary. It suggests a connection perhaps with the “ordinary language” philosophers’ 
doctrine that “the meaning is the use,” or with various Montague-grammar versions of 
meaning, or Fregean “senses,” or Quinean “stimulus-response meaning,” or even the 
notion of lexical meaning in the sense of what you look up in a dictionary. Any one of 
these notions of meaning may be quite respectable in its own right, but there are so many 
of them. And besides, none of them is very much like what the mediaevals called 
significatio or “signification.” 
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There was a perfectly clear notion in the Middle Ages of what signification is. Authors 
tell us quite explicitly. We don’t gain anything by translating that quite clear notion into 
the obscure, or at least controversial, modern notion of “meaning.” 
Well, what was this mediaeval notion of signification that I said was so clear?  
There was a great disagreement in the Middle Ages about what it is that linguistic units 
signify, but there was universal agreement over the defining criterion, and that is what we 
are interested in now. 
The criterion comes from Aristotle’s On Interpreation 3, 16b19–21. Here is my 
translation, directly from Aristotle’s Greek (see n. 16 to Passage (6) on the handout): 
Therefore, verbs spoken by themselves are names, and signify something. 
For the speaker halts his thinking and the listener pauses. 
But of course the Middle Ages, after the very beginning, didn’t read Greek. They read 
their Aristotle in Latin, and in particular they read the De interpretatione in Boethius’s 
Latin translation. In the passage just quoted, Aristotle is talking about verbs. And he says 
that verbs, like nouns, are names. That is, they signify something. And why does he say 
that? Well, here is his reason, in Boethius’s translation (n. 16 to Passage (6) again): 
Indeed verbs, when uttered by themselves, are names and signify 
something. For he who says [a verb] establishes an understanding, and he 
who hears it rests. 
The part about the hearer’s “resting” is rather obscure. Presumably it means roughly that 
the hearer’s mind stops and fixes on something when he hears a verb. But in any case, 
that’s not the important part of the passage. The important part is the phrase ‘establishes 
an understanding’. Someone who utters a verb establishes an understanding. 
Thus: 
To signify x =df. to establish an understanding of x. 
‘Understanding’ (= ‘intellectus’) in this context does not necessarily imply any kind of 
theoretical knowledge; to “understand” x, in the sense relevant here, is simply to have a 
concept of x. In the end, therefore, the general idea is that a thing signifies what it makes 
us think of. 
(Presumably this isn’t supposed to be construed so loosely that just any old random 
“association of ideas” or “that reminds me” kind of thinking will do. We want something 
more rule-governed than that. But we don’t have to worry about the complications now.) 
So, both signification per se and signification per aliud are kinds  of signification and 
make us think of things. How do they work, and what is the difference? 
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We will begin by looking first at signification per se, or simply “signification.” (Anselm 
sometimes drops the ‘per se’ where it can be taken for granted.) Consider the following 
extract (from near the end of Passage (6)): 
For since (a) the name ‘white’ does not signify anything else than does the 
expression ‘having whiteness’ [NB: this is not the gerund, so that it would 
mean “to have whiteness,” but the participle, so that something that has 
whiteness can be described as “having whiteness”], [therefore] (b) just as 
the expression [i.e., ‘having whiteness’] by itself (per se) establishes an 
understanding of whiteness for me, and (c) not of the thing that has 
whiteness, so does the name [i.e., ‘white’]. 
I want to extract three claims (marked by superscripts) from this text: (a) The name 
‘white’ signifies the same as does the expression ‘having whiteness’. Moreover, just as 
the latter expression (b) “establishes an understanding” in me of whiteness, but (c) not of 
the thing that has the whiteness, so too does the simple name ‘white’. 
This is a rich passage. In claim (b), Anselm says that what the name ‘white’ makes me 
think of, and so signifies, is just whiteness. But that is true of the abstract name 
‘whiteness’ too. So why does Anselm say ‘white’ signifies the same as does the 
expression ‘having whiteness’—claim (a)? Why does he not simply say it signifies the 
same as the name ‘whiteness’ does all by itself? 
Well, as far as what the name signifies is concerned, both claims are true. I think what 
Anselm has in mind is not just the view that ‘white’ signifies the same things as ‘having 
whiteness’ does, but that the former is somehow just a shorthand abbreviation of the 
latter. There is some further evidence for this in an argument we will look at in a 
moment. 
If this is right, it is important. For in later connotation-theory, a connotative name was 
said to have only “nominal” definitions (plural—it can have more than one), whereas an 
absolute name did not but instead had something called a “real” definition. (The exact 
specification of this difference is a complicated matter we can avoid here.) 
Now ‘having whiteness’ will later be taken as a nominal definition of the connotative 
name ‘white’. So if connotative names are regarded as simply shorthand abbreviations for 
their nominal definitions (plural again), all those nominal definitions must somehow 
amount to the same thing—they must in effect be synonymous. Whenever I use a 
connotative name, then, I am in effect using an abbreviation for all those synonymous 
nominal definitions, so that the connotative term signifies—I am made to think of—
whatever those synonymous definitions signify. 
Now think: What does a complex expression signify? It’s reasonable to say that a 
complex expression signifies the sum total of what its constituent parts signify. After all, 
the signification of an expression is just what it makes you think of when you hear it. So 
a word like ‘man’ signifies and so makes you think of all men and the word ‘dog’ 
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signifies and so makes you think of all dogs, then the complex expression ‘man and dog’ 
will signify all men plus all dogs. 
By the same token, the complex expression ‘man or dog’ signifies the very same things: 
all men and all dogs. The difference between ‘and’ and ‘or’ is of course terribly important 
for certain purposes, but does not affect the signification of either expression. They are so 
to speak “logical particles”—syncategoremata. Other words, the ones that do contribute 
to an expression’s signification are called categorematic expressions. 
OK, now back to our example. The expression ‘having whiteness’, we said, is a nominal 
definition of the name ‘white’, and the latter name serves as simply a kind of shorthand 
abbreviation for the former. 
Now nominal definitions are complex expressions, and so signify the sum total of 
whatever their constituent categorematic names signify. In our example, ‘having 
whiteness’ has only one constituent categorematic name, ‘whiteness’, which makes one 
think of whiteness—and that is all. (The ‘having’ there seems to be regarded as a 
syncategorema—without any independent significative function.) 
Hence, as Anselm says (see above): 
For since the name ‘white’ does not signify anything else than does the 
expression ‘having whiteness’, [therefore] just as the expression by itself 
(per se) establishes an understanding of whiteness for me, and not of the 
thing that has whiteness, so does the name. 
Contrast this now with the absolute name ‘man’. That name likewise has a definition, but 
this time a so called “real” definition: ‘rational animal’. Now if absolute names were 
regarded as simply shorthand abbreviations of their definitions in the way connotative 
names are of theirs, then whenever I used the name ‘man’, I would be in effect using in 
abbreviated fashion the expression ‘rational animal’. But in virtue of the “add them up” 
principle we saw just a moment ago, the expression ‘rational animal’ not only signifies 
rational animals—i.e., men—but also signifies all animals in virtue of the second 
component of the definition. Hence if absolute names were simply abbreviations of their 
real definitions, as connotative names are of theirs, then whenever I used the name ‘man’ 
I would be made to think of all animals whatever. 
Worse, ‘animal’ itself has a real definition: ‘sensitive organism’. (That is, endowed with 
sensation. We’re not talking here about delicate emotions or poetic souls.) 
And ‘organism’ does too, and so on until we come to a fully expanded real definition of 
man as a “rational, sensitive, living, corporeal substance.” (The sequence ends there, 
since substance is an Aristotelian category and cannot be defined in terms of a higher 
genus. We won’t worry about the reasons for that here.) Thus if absolute names were 
simply abbreviations of their definitions, then whenever I used the name ‘man’ I would 
be made to think of all substances whatsoever. And this is just not so. 
It follows then that absolute names are not just abbreviations of their real definitions. 
Real definitions do not therefore just introduce a more abbreviated terminology, as for 
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instance definitions do in certain styles of modern formal logical systems. Something else 
is involved. Real definitions are supposed to have something to do with the internal 
metaphysical structure of the thing defined. 
Hence, since absolute names are not just abbreviations, they may have alternative, non-
synonymous real definitions. Those definitions must pick out the same things—and 
indeed, necessarily pick out the same things, since we’re talking about definitions after 
all. But they need not have the same constituent expressions. 
This is why I said a little while ago, when we were talking about Augustine, that even 
though what the (absolute) name ‘man’ names automatically has humanity (and therefore 
rationality, animality, substantiality, etc.), it doesn’t name man under a condition. The 
name ‘man’ is not simply an abbreviated formula for some condition like that. 
In drawing these consequences, I am of course going way beyond anything explicitly 
found in Anselm’s De Grammatico. But I do not think I am violating that text. I’m 
simply drawing out some of the implications in it, implications that will be articulated 
explicitly in the later development of connotation-theory. 
One other complicating point is worth noting here. Although I said that in the later the-
ory, connotative names are simply shorthand abbreviations of their nominal definitions, 
we have already seen a case where this will not work without some adjustments. 
‘Blindness’, to use one of Anselm’s examples from On the Fall of the Devil, does not 
have a nominal definition. It cannot be regarded as simply an abbreviation of a more 
complex expression. ‘Blindness’, we said, is only a kind of “incomplete symbol”; it can 
only be defined in context. That is, it is not the single name ‘blindness’ that can be 
regarded as an abbreviation for something else; rather it is the construction ‘x has 
blindness’ or ‘blindness is in x’ that can be regarded as an abbreviation for ‘x does not 
have sight’. 
This is also something that will be developed in the later Middle Ages, sometimes as part 
of a theory of connotation and sometimes as part of a related logical theory known as 
“exposition.” We won’t pursue the point here. 
There is one other important thing to be learned from Anselm’s remark about ‘white’ and 
‘having whiteness’. Both expressions, he says (claim (c) above), signify—that is, per se 
signify—only whiteness. They do not signify per se the thing that has the whiteness. That 
is to say, the nominal definition of ‘white’ is simply ‘having whiteness’; it is not ‘thing 
having whiteness’ or ‘substance having whiteness’ or anything like that. And Anselm 
insists on this pretty strongly. 
Similarly, the nominal definition of ‘literate’ (grammaticus) is ‘having literacy 
(grammatica)’, not ‘man having literacy’. Otherwise, if the nominal definition did 
include the word ‘man’, then when we say ‘He is a literate man’—as we certainly can say 
with grammatical propriety—then, since connotative terms are just abbreviations of their 
definitions, we would in effect be saying ‘He is a man having literacy man’, or something 
like that. (See Passage (5). The technical word for this kind of “pointless repetition” is 
nugation.) And that is something we certainly cannot say with grammatical propriety. 
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Hence the fact that connotative adjectives, at any rate, can grammatically modify nouns 
implies that those nouns cannot be already built into the nominal definitions of those 
adjectives. (Whether the same point can be made in general, for words other than 
adjectives, is perhaps open to question, but Anselm apparently thinks it can.) 
Now this raises an obvious question. If ‘white’ does not contain in its nominal definition 
a name for the bearer of whiteness, then how can the name ‘white’ be said to signify that 
bearer per aliud? In short, how in the case of connotative names does appellation get to 
be a kind of signification at all? 
We are now in a position to see what signification per se is: An ABSOLUTE name signifies 
per se (= is truly predicable of) just what it APPELLATES. A CONNOTATIVE (= “shorthand”) 
name signifies per se just what the absolute names in its NOMINAL DEFINITION (= fully 
expanded form) appellate. But, again, what is signification per aliud—and how is it a 
kind of signification? 
On this point, Anselm gives a very curious illustration (Passage (6)). Suppose you saw a 
white horse and a black ox, and someone told you “Strike it!,” and you asked “Which 
one?” If he then said “The white” (I want to leave out the noun in virtue of the above 
argument), you would know which one he meant; you would think of the white horse. 
Now in a sense it is by means of the word ‘white’ that you are made to think of the horse; 
it’s the only word in the sentence, after all. (In English, I added the definite article ‘the’. 
But there is nothing corresponding to it in the Latin. And in any case, it’s not the definite 
article that is making me think of the horse.) But the word ‘white’ cannot all by itself 
make me think of the horse. If you couldn’t see the horse, say, you wouldn’t know what 
the fellow meant. It is only in virtue of something else—in virtue of your seeing the white 
horse, and the other circumstances of the story—that the word ‘white’ can make you 
think of the horse and know it is what is meant. 
Hence the term ‘white’ does not per se—by itself—signify the bearer of whiteness, but 
only with the help of something else—per aliud, only with the help of the circumstances, 
the context. 
Signification per aliud is therefore a thoroughly context-dependent notion. It depends on 
appellation or naming in the occurrent sense, what a term is actually used to appellate or 
name on a given occasion. 
In Anselm’s semantics, therefore, signification per se is the dominant notion. 
Signification per aliud is a definitely subordinate, and indeed rather strained and 
contrived, kind of signification. 
Trinity, Incarnation, Original Sin 
I now want to turn to talk about a cluster of inescapably theological topics: Anselm’s 
views on the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation (that Jesus was both God and man), 
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and original sin. (I am no theologian, so I’m only going to spend a short time on these 
themes. But they are very rich themes!) 
At the very end of the course, I want to talk about the Cur Deus Homo, which contains 
Anselm’s so called soteriology (= theory of salvation), which is an extremely interesting 
and influential work. But for now, I want to treat the theological issues that come up in a 
number of other works, or places in works. 
When we were talking about the Monologion early in this course, I mentioned that after 
introducing the notion of the Divine Word (what Williams translates as the “divine 
utterance”) in Monologion Chaps. 10–12—which is going to lead him into a head-on 
discussion of the Trinity—Anselm digresses to talk about all sorts of other things, before 
returning to a discussion of the Trinity in Chap. 29 or thereabouts (it’s not clear exactly 
when we start talking about the Trinity again). The Trinitarian discussion then continues 
through Chap. 63. 
So we’ll want to talk about this long passage in the Monologion. There’s also some 
Trinitarian discussion in the Proslogion, but I won’t talk about that separately, since I 
don’t think it really adds anything significant to what we already have in the Monologion. 
But there also several other texts where Anselm discusses the Trinity and the related 
issues I want to talk about: 
 A letter On the Incarnation of the Word (completed in 1094, within a year after 
he was made Archbishop of Canterbury). 
 On the Virginal Conception and on Original Sin (1099). 
 On the Procession of the Holy Spirit (1102). This is not in the Williams volume 
of Basic Writings, but there is a copy of it in the earlier Davies/Evans volume of  
Anselm’s Major Works. 
All of these works involve the crucial distinction between Person and nature, which 
comes up in two central Christian theological doctrines: the Trinity and the Incarnation. 
So we need to set up some background. 
The doctrine of the Trinity is based on some very puzzling Scriptural passages. For 
example, Jesus says both “I and the Father are one,” and yet “The Father is greater than 
I.” Again, Jesus is going to depart but will also send the “Spirit” to his disciples. At first, 
no one knew quite what to make out of these passages 
Eventually, through a series of great doctrinal ecumenical Councils of the early Church 
(4th-6th centuries), some ground-rules were established for how to treat these things. To 
begin with, we have this notion of Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Now 
1. The Father is God. 
2. The Son is God. 
3. The Holy Spirit is God. 
4. Father ≠ Son, Son ≠ Holy Spirit, Holy Spirit ≠ Father. 
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5. There is only one God. 
The problem, of course, is that (1)–(5) look just inconsistent. (1)–(4) seem to imply the 
denial of (5)—and in fact to entail tritheism, as late paganism and Islam thought. But 
Christianity simultaneously wants to maintain that, no, it is resolutely monotheist. 
Eventually people began to realize that part of the problem here is that we’re not 
uniformly counting the same kinds of things in these claims. And so we begin to get 
distinctions being drawn. 
The Greek Church developed its own set of terminology here, while the Latin Church 
developed a somewhat different terminology, influenced in large part by Augustine’s 
famous On the Trinity and by Boethius’s so called “Theological Tractates” (early 6th 
century). 
Eventually the picture came to be something like this: When we say ‘God’, what we’re 
referring to is a substance or nature—and there’s only one of those. The divine nature—
divinity—is such that it allows (and requires) exactly one thing that has (or, because of 
divine simplicity, IS) that nature. (Recall the argument in Monologion, Chap. 3.) Hence 
monotheism. 
On the other hand, when we’re talking about Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and about 
how they’re all distinct, we’re not counting substances or natures. We’re counting 
persons. Hence we get talk about the three persons of the Trinity, and about three 
persons with one nature or essence. 
Well, that’s fine, but what is a person? Etymologically, the word just means a “mask”—
something you “speak through.” But we don’t want to push that etymological metaphor 
too hard. The doctrine isn’t that the three persons are just three different disguises God 
wears, three different faces God puts on. In fact, that view became the heresy known as 
“modalism.” There’s something more metaphysically robust here than that. 
Boethius, in his Contra Eutychen (the official title of which is “On Person and the Two 
Natures”) defines person as: “an individual substance of a rational nature.” And this 
definition became classic. Unfortunately, it doesn’t help us very much, other than telling 
us that persons are conscious (“rational”) things. The fact that we’re talking about an 
individual substance doesn’t help here, because we already know that the nature or 
substance we’re talking about is individual to begin with—there’s only one God, 
remember. In fact, all we have is simply a restatement of our problem: how we can have 
these three persons (three individual substances of a rational nature) all of whom are 
distinct from one another and yet all of them somehow the same individual substance or 
nature called “God.” 
There’s another doctrine involved here as well. Not only are the notions of person and 
nature severed so that we have these three distinct persons sharing the same totally 
INDIVIDUAL nature (the doctrine of the Trinity); they’re also severed in the other 
direction as well—we can have one person with multiple natures. In fact that’s exactly 
what happens in the Incarnation, where—according to the doctrine—Jesus is the second 
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person of the Trinity (= the Son), but has two complete natures, a divine nature and a 
human one: he is both completely God and completely a human being. 
So it goes both ways. In the case of the Trinity, we have one individual substance or 
nature with multiple persons. In the case of the Incarnation, we have one individual 
person with multiple natures. 
These two doctrines have been the motor that has driven a great deal of the most subtle 
medieval thinking. 
You may think these exotic points are of interest only for believing Christians of a fairly 
orthodox persuasion. But if you do, you’re wrong. As often happens in philosophy, 
concepts and distinctions that are originally formulated for a certain highly specialized 
purpose, once made, are there to be used for any other purposes that come along. For 
example, consider John Locke’s discussion of personal identity in An Essay concerning 
Human Understanding, Book II, Chap. 27. Locke is not talking about theology at all, but 
about philosophy of mind, about reward and punishment, and about personal happiness. 
Here’s part of what he says: 
(§ 23)  Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses 
acting [= activating] the same body, the one constantly by day, the other 
by night; and, on the other side, the same consciousness acting by intervals 
two distinct bodies: I ask, in the first case, whether the day and the night 
man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato; and 
whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct 
bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings. 
Again 
(§ 25)  In all which account of self, the same numerical substance is not 
considered as making the same self: but the same continued 
consciousnesses, in which several substances may have been united, and 
again separated from it, 
This is a classic discussion, and it is still with us and still influential. It has nothing to do 
with theology whatsoever, and yet it could not have been written without the distinction 
between person and nature or substance, which comes from the theological background 
of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. 
Augustine’s Theory 
The classic discussion of the Trinity in the Western Church (let’s set aside the Incarnation 
for a moment) is Augustine’s monumental De trinitate. This is a long work, and is 
immensely rich. 
Augustine in no way thinks he is proving the doctrine of the Trinity in this work (or 
anywhere else). He doesn’t think it can be proven; it is something that can only be known 
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through revelation. But what he does try to do in this work is to find helpful ways for us 
to think about the Trinity, to try to make some sense out of the doctrine. The truth of the 
doctrine is taken as a starting point for the work; that’s not up for discussion in it. 
Augustine argues that man is made in the image of God, as it says in Gen. 1:26. It doesn’t 
say that about any of the rest of creation. And therefore there must be certain ways in 
which human beings resemble God that go beyond the ways other creatures resemble 
God. 
Now in the case of other creatures, Genesis reports simply that “God said, Let there be 
” this and that. But in the case of mankind alone, it reports something different. It says 
(1:26 again): “Then God said, Let us make man in our image and likeness.” Notice the 
plural there. 
Who could they be? Obviously, “they” can only be the Trinity, since there simply isn’t 
any other “us” around before the creation of human beings. (Even if you believe there 
were angels around before human beings—which Genesis says nothing about—they 
certainly weren’t doing any creating.) 
Now Augustine thinks this is significant. The fact that the passage in the creation story 
that indicates that man has a special resemblance-relation to God is also the only passage 
in that story where God speaks in the plural suggests that this special resemblance-
relation includes traces of the Trinitarian aspect of God. And so we should expect to find 
in human beings certain features that model the Trinity (imperfectly, to be sure). 
Augustine thinks this kind of modeling can be found most clearly in the case of the 
human mind. 
He considers several different ways in which we can find a kind of “trinitarian” structure 
in the human mind. But the one that seems to work best, and certainly the one that people 
were most impressed with, was the distinction between memory, understanding, and will 
in the human mind. 
(Note: “Memory” for Augustine doesn’t just mean memory of the past. For him, you can 
remember the future too! The word he uses for “to remember” really means something 
more like “to call to mind,” “be mindful of.”) 
Here’s part of what he says (De trinitate, 10.11.18).  (DISTRIBUTE HANDOUT “PASSAGES 
FROM AUGUSTINE ON THE TRINITY—this is passage (1).) 
Memory, understanding, and will are not three lives or three minds but one 
life and one mind. Hence, they are not three substances but only one. 
Insofar as memory is called life and mind and substance, it is being spoken 
of with respect to itself. Insofar as it is called simply memory, it is spoken 
of in relation to something else. The same thing holds for understanding 
and will—both of which may be spoken of relatively. But with respect to 
itself, each is life, mind, and essence. Thus, these three are one insofar as 
each is one life, one mind, one essence [i.e., the same one life, mind, 
essence]  But they are three insofar as they are spoken of in relation to 
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one another. If they were not equal [the three persons of the Trinity are 
supposed to be all EQUAL, ON A PAR]—each to the other and each to all—
they would not comprehend one another. For not only is each one 
comprehended by each one but all are comprehended by each. I remember 
that I have memory, understanding and will; I understand that I understand 
and will and remember; I will that I will and remember and understand; 
and at one and the same time I remember my entire memory, 
understanding, and will. 
As a result of this line of thinking, we get the model according to which the three persons 
of the Trinity are related as God’s memory, understanding, and will. The Father = God’s 
memory, the Son = God’s understanding, the Holy Spirit = God’s will. Yet each of them 
is identical to God, just as in a human being, each of memory, understanding, and will is 
identical to the mind. (Augustine does not have faculty-theory of the mind, according to 
which these would be distinct parts of the mind.) 
Now of course there are lots of problems here. First of all, it may appear that all 
Augustine has done here is to take a very puzzling and seemingly paradoxical doctrine of 
the Trinity and model it in terms of an equally puzzling and paradoxical account of the 
human mind—so that nothing has been gained. 
But that’s not what’s going on. Augustine doesn’t think of this as modeling the doctrine 
in terms of a theory of the mind, but rather modeling the doctrine in terms of the way we 
experience our own mind. You may disagree with that, but that’s what he thinks. 
Note also: This is a model, but it’s not intended to be a analogy in the sense of merely a 
metaphor. This is not meant to be just pictorial thinking or symbolism. It’s more than 
that; it’s a real resemblance between the human mind and the Trinity. 
Contrast this with another example Augustine gives in a different work, Faith and the 
Creed, 9. 17 (Passage (2) on your handout): 
For although we cannot say of a spring that it is the river, nor of the river 
that it is the spring, nor of a draught taken from either of these that it is 
either the river or the spring—nevertheless we call all three water, both 
individually and collectively. 
That’s just a metaphor, and is not presented as anything more. That’s literature, whereas 
Augustine thinks the earlier model is metaphysics (or something close). 
It’s worth noting that Anselm himself uses a very similar metaphor, the famous metaphor 
of the Nile (On the Incarnation of the Word, § 13, Major Works, pp. 232–33). There he 
says (ignore your knowledge of actual African geography) that the Nile is a spring 
flowing through a river into a lake. Yet it’s all one Nile. 
Examples like that are not meant to be taken as anything more than metaphors. The 
examples in terms of psychology are; they’re meant to be taken seriously. For Augustine, 
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they don’t prove anything; they don’t even really explain anything. But they’re not just 
flights of fancy. 
Anselm’s Monologion 
Anselm’s first pass at a theoretical discussion of the Trinity comes in the central parts of 
the Monologion, beginning around Chap. 29. 
By and large, it’s an Augustinian picture Anselm presents. But there are some notable 
differences. 
First of all, what exactly does he think he’s doing in these passages? Here’s, for example, 
what Jasper Hopkins says in his Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, p. 90: 
Anselm supposes that not only can God’s existence be proven but also 
God’s nature as trinity. The Monologion represents the extended attempt 
to formulate the proof. 
On the other hand, in the very next paragraph (pp. 90–91), he says: 
The Monologion contains no sound demonstration of the triunity [“three-
in-one-ness”] professed by Christian theism. What it does contain, though, 
are various analogies and similarities from the domain of human 
experience which tend to suggest a relationship of three-in-one. Anselm 
hopes that under the guidance of these patterns, the human mind may 
come to glimpse, as through a glass darkly, the rationale inherent in the 
Godhead. By invoking these patterns of similarity, Anselm’s program is 
thoroughly Augustinian, as are the linguistic forms through which God’s 
trinity is referred to. 
These seem to me to be two quite incompatible views. When he says in the latter passage 
that the Monologion “contains no sound demonstration,” I take it he’s not just saying the 
arguments don’t work, but saying that Anselm doesn’t even regard them as fully 
demonstrative arguments. 
But the former passage seems to be saying that that’s exactly what he is trying to do. And 
if that’s right, it’s far more than anything Augustine ever tried to do. I must say, the 
former passage seems to me to be correct. To be sure, Anselm toward the end of the 
Monologion allows that we can’t really comprehend how all this works. See the chapter 
title for Chap. 64: “Although this cannot be explained, it must nevertheless be believed.” 
And Chap. 65: “How a true conclusion had been reached regarding an ineffable thing”—
and that’s a baffling chapter. 
But I don’t see anything in the Monologion to suggest that the work takes the Trinity as a 
GIVEN, as Augustine does, and is just trying to find some way of thinking about it. On the 
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contrary, remember what he said in the “Prologue” to the Monologion about the goal of 
that work (p. 1): 
absolutely nothing in it would be established by the authority of Scripture: 
rather, whatever the conclusion of each individual investigation might 
assert, the necessity of reason would concisely prove, and the clarity of 
truth would manifestly show, that it is the case, by means of a plain style, 
unsophisticated arguments, and straightforward disputation. 
And he doesn’t mean to exclude what he says about the Trinity from this methodological 
statement. For, just a few paragraphs later—still in the “Prologue” (p. 2)—he explicitly 
mentions the doctrine of the Trinity, and mentions Augustine’s own De trinitate in this 
connection. 
Anselm’s other writings on the Trinity, the letter On the Incarnation of the Word and the 
On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, to be sure, are aimed at a different audience. They 
do presuppose the doctrine and are aimed at Christians trying to understand it, not at the 
general audience that is the target of the Monologion. 
So, in my estimation, we have something really pretty bold going on in the Monologion, 
and as far as I know something previously unseen in the history of Christian theology. 
There’s another difference between the Augustinian approach and what Anselm does in 
the Monologion. This one isn’t perhaps especially significant. But here it is: 
Anselm doesn’t speak in terms of the divine memory, intellect and will, the way 
Augustine does. In fact, perhaps most authors after Augustine seem to drop the talk about 
God’s memory. The term is a little odd even in Augustine, as we’ve noted. 
So in many authors, including Augustine, we don’t get a good psychological analog for 
God the Father. Some authors, instead of talking about the divine memory, will simply 
talk about the divine mind—which doesn’t mean intellect, since God’s intellect is 
supposed to be the second person of the Trinity, God the Son. (Recall that Ausugtine’s 
talk about memory simply means bringing to mind.) 
Anselm will sometimes use the expression “supreme Spirit” to refer to God the Father. 
But he doesn’t typically talk about memory in this context. 
The second person of the Trinity Anselm describes as God’s intellect—or, as we’ve 
already learned to call it from Monologion, Chap. 10—the divine utterance or word. This 
is thoroughly Augustinian, including the use of the term ‘word’. 
The third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit (the term is a little awkward, as everyone 
recognizes, since after all the word ‘spirit’ applies to all three persons), Anselm doesn’t 
typically speak of in terms of God’s will, but rather in terms of love. (Love and the will 
are closely connected, to be sure, but Anselm usually uses love rather than will in 
connection with the Trinity.) 
So here’s the picture then (let’s leave the Holy Spirit aside for a moment): God knows 
himself—i.e., understands himself. So God is both the knower and the thing known. (God 
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also knows creatures, of course, but they don’t get involved in the inner workings of the 
Trinity.) 
Hence, there is a kind of inner duality in God—so to speak, a kind of subject/object 
polarity. 
This doesn’t mean we’ve got two gods, of course. There’s only one God; we saw that 
back in Monologion, Chap. 3 (the “exists through” argument). And it doesn’t mean there 
are any parts or internal metaphysical structure. No, God is metaphysically simple 
(Monol., Chap. 17). 
And yet we have this duality. Somehow we’ve got two. But what do we have two of? 
Here Anselm candidly admits he doesn’t know quite what to say. He of course subscribes 
to the traditional Latin Church’s formula that God is one essence or substance or nature 
with three PERSONS, but he also says there really isn’t any completely appropriate word 
for what we’ve got three of. (Monol., Chaps. 38, 79). We don’t want to think of the three 
persons as implying that God is some kind of committee or club. We don’t want to turn 
the doctrine of the Trinity into tritheism. 
Here’s part of what he says in Monol., Chap. 38 (pp. 46–47—Anselm hasn’t yet brought 
the Holy Spirit into the picture): 
But although this is so, it is nevertheless in a strange way quite clear that 
the one whose Word exists [God the Father] cannot be his own Word 
[God the Son], and the Word cannot be the one whose Word he is [the Son 
cannot be the Father]  [I]n virtue of the fact that the supreme spirit [the 
Father] does not exist from the Word, whereas the Word exists from him,4 
they admit an ineffable plurality. 
Ineffable indeed—for although necessity compels that they be two, there is 
no way to express what they are two of. For even if they can be said to be 
two equals [which they can] (or something like that) in relation to each 
other, if it is asked what the thing is of which these relatives are said [i.e., 
two equal what], one will not be able to answer in the plural, as when two 
lines are said to be equal or two human beings to be similar. Certainly they 
are not two equal spirits, or two equal Creators, or two of anything that 
signifies either their essence or their relation to creation. Nor are they two 
of anything that signifies the relationship of one to the other; they are not 
two Words or two images. After all, the Word’s being a word or image 
implies a relationship to another; he must be the word or image of 
something. These are the distinguishing characteristics of the Word [= the 
Son], so much so that they cannot in any way be shared by the other [= by 
                                                 
4 This is not supposed to be creation, although it’s a delicate matter to explain why not. One 
difference, of course, is that creation is supposed to be contingent, a result of a free choice on God’s part, 
whereas the generation of the Word from the Father is not supposed to be contingent. 
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the Father]. For he whose word or image he is, is neither an image or a 
word. 
So it is established that one cannot express what the supreme spirit and his 
Word are two of, although they must be two because of their individual 
properties. [I’ll say something about this talk of “properties” in connection 
with the next passage, below.] For it is the distinguishing characteristic of 
the second [= the Son] that he exist from the first [= the Father], and it is 
the distinguishing characteristic of the first that second exists from him. 
Before we go on, let’s quickly bring the Holy Spirit into the picture. He first shows up in 
Monologion, Chap. 49. 
The “supreme spirit” [= the Father] KNOWS itself, and this is responsible for the duality 
that gives us the first two “persons” of the Trinity. But the supreme spirit not only knows 
itself, it also knows that it’s very good! And so it loves itself. And this love is a third 
whatever we want to call it. Furthermore, the “supreme spirit” not only loves itself, it also 
loves its Word [= the Son], and the Word loves it, and it’s all one and the same love 
(Monologion, Chaps. 49–54). And this what we come to call the Holy Spirit, as the third 
“person” of the Trinity. 
Once again, Anselm puts the Holy Spirit in terms of love, not so much in terms of will, 
although clearly love is a matter of the will. 
Now let’s pause and look at some of the implications of all this. 
There are two (or perhaps three) big factors at play in this discussion. One is what we 
might call THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION—in the sense of whatever it is that allows us 
in some cases to have multiple individuals of the same kind. 
The other is the twin principles known as THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES and THE 
INDISCERNIBILITY OF IDENTICALS. (For our purposes we don’t have to distinguish these 
carefully here—we’ll just call them both “the identity of indiscernibles.”) These basically 
say: 
x and y are identical (are one thing) ↔ whatever you can truly say 
about x you can truly say about y, and vice versa. 
(Note: The “Identity of indiscernibles” is a claim, a proposition. The “Principle of 
individuation” is not a claim or proposition, but the answer to the question: what is it that 
allows us to have multiple individuals of the same kind?) 
What the two factors have in common is that they both have to do with counting. 
Now on the first point (the Principle of Individuation), Anselm—like most authors in the 
Middle Ages as well as today, at least among those who address the issue—seems to hold 
that if you’re going to have multiple individuals of the same kind, you need some kind of 
complexity in them (or at least in one of them). 
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After all, if they’re metaphysically (structurally) exactly alike, then how can we say 
there’re two of them instead of just one? And if they’re metaphysically totally different, 
then how can we say they are two of the same kind? (There are other view on this, but 
this is the most common view.) 
No, if they’re going to be two things of the same kind, we need them to be structurally 
alike in some respects, and structurally different in other respects. That is, we need some 
kind of complexity in at least one of them. 
But we know that in God there is no complexity. God is simple in all essential respects 
(Monologion, Chap. 17), and of course there are no accidents in God. 
Hence, as a result of these metaphysical considerations about individuation, we end up 
being resolutely monotheistic; there is only one God. 
On the other hand, what about that other principle we mentioned: the “Identity of 
Indiscernibles”? This, you’ll recall, was the principle that: 
x and y are identical (are one thing) ↔ whatever you can truly say 
about x you can truly say about y, and vice versa. 
Notice that this claim does not exactly link counting with metaphysical structure at all, 
but with language (what you can “truly say” about something). It doesn’t say, for 
instance, that if x and y FAIL to be one thing (and so are two), there must be some 
metaphysical or structural difference between them; it’s just that you can say different 
things about them. 
Yet, although the Identity of Indiscernibles doesn’t exactly link counting with 
metaphysical structure, it has a metaphysical result. If different things are true of x and y, 
then x and y have to be really metaphysically distinct; otherwise you’d have a 
contradiction. (If P is true of x but not of y, then if also x = y, we would have both Px and 
~Px.) 
And that’s exactly what we have in the case of the Trinity. 
As Anselm says (Monologion, Chap. 38 again, p. 47): 
So it is established that one cannot express what the supreme spirit and his 
Word are two of, although they must be two because of their individual 
properties. [‘Properties’ is a Boethian word. It’s not a metaphysical term 
here. That is, it doesn’t mean the structural features of a thing, either 
“essential” or “accidental” features. It just means “peculiarities” or 
something like that—what you can say about a thing but can’t say about 
anything else.] For it is the distinguishing characteristic of the second [the 
Son] that he exist from the first [the Father], and it is the distinguishing 
characteristic of the first that second exists from him. 
And so too, mutatis mutandis, for the Holy Spirit (although he’s the one in the Trinity 
people usually don’t have a lot to say about). 
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The result, therefore, is that the three persons of the Trinity are really distinct (it’s not just 
a manner of speaking), because they are related to one another in distinct ways.  
This is what is meant when it’s sometimes said that the distinctions among the three 
persons of the Trinity are relational. Augustine develops this, as do Anselm and virtually 
everyone else. 
So what I’m suggesting is that part of the “mystery” of the Trinity arises from the clash 
between two fundamental and primordial views: (1) the Principle of Individuation: that 
distinguishing a plurality of things of the same kind requires some kind of metaphysical 
complexity somewhere (hence monotheism, since God’s not complex); and (2) the 
Identity of Indiscernibles: that, metaphysical complexity or not, two things have got to be 
in some sense distinct if there are different things that can be truly said about them. 
OK, that’s what the Monologion has to say about the Trinity. 
Anselm and Roscelin 
Now I want to talk a little about the On the Incarnation of the Word. As I mentioned 
earlier, this relatively short work was completed in 1094. But we have several 
preliminary drafts of it, and it has a rather interesting history. 
We need to go back some four or five years earlier, to 1089–90, and introduce a new 
character, one Roscelin of Compiègne. (Where is Compiègne? SEE THE HANDOUT FOR A 
MAP.) 
Roscelin was an itinerant “secular master.” To say he was an “itinerant master” means 
that he was a teacher who went around from town to town and sold his services to anyone 
who was willing to pay for them. There were several such “itinerant masters” at this time. 
(Recall that this was before universities had yet come into existence.) To say he was 
“secular” does not mean he wasn’t a cleric. It simply means that he was not in a religious 
order like the Benedictines. Clergy who were in a religious order were under the “rule” 
(regula) of that order (like the famous “Rule of St. Benedict”), and so were called the 
“regular clergy.” Clergy who were not in a religious order were called the “secular 
clergy,” and they were under the authority of the local bishop. 
Because Roscelin wasn’t in a religious order, he didn’t have any fellow members of an 
order (more or less like “fraternity brothers”) to write his biography, as sometimes 
happened with the “regular clergy.” (Think of Anselm’s own biographer Eadmer, a 
fellow Benedictine.) As a result, we don’t know a lot about Roscelin’s life, although he 
apparently was a disagreeable and argumentative fellow who made enemies wherever he 
went. So most of his press is negative, and we should perhaps be careful about attributing 
views to him with confidence. 
In any case, around 1089–90, Anselm got a letter from a certain John the Monk, who 
writes to Anselm as if he is one of Anselm’s own monks at Bec, but I’m not sure about 
that. (Distribute the handout “Three Letters concerning Roscelin of Compiègne,” and 
look at the first passage.) 
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John reports that Roscelin had made a very shocking argument: 
If the three persons [of the Trinity] are only one thing and not three things 
on their own, like three angels or three souls, in such a way that 
nevertheless they are the same in will and power [i.e., they all will the 
same things, and can all do the same things—so this first part of the 
sentence says: if the three persons of the Trinity are not like that, but 
rather are one thing], therefore the Father and Holy Spirit were incarnated 
along with the Son. He says that the lord Archbishop Lanfranc had granted 
this statement and that you grant it in arguing the point with him 
[apparently with Roscelin himself, not with Lanfranc]. 
In other words, Roscelin is claiming, the doctrine of the Trinity can be interpreted either 
(1) in such a way that it’s not just the second person of the Trinity—God the Son—who 
was made incarnate in Jesus, but all three persons together, or else (2) the doctrine of the 
Trinity amounts to tritheism (“three things on their own, like three angels or three souls”). 
And furthermore, Roscelin was saying that Lanfranc and Anselm both agreed with him! 
This of course was unacceptable. Furthermore, it was a kind of challenge Anselm had 
never had to deal with before. Previously, his intellectual exchanges seem to have been 
mostly with his own monks at Bec, whose good will he could take for granted—and it 
was all very “in house.”5 But now Roscelin was claiming Anselm’s support for outright 
heresy, and doing so in apparently a public way that went far beyond the walls of the 
Abbey of Bec. Anselm had to defend his orthodoxy for the first time. 
He replied to John sometime before 1092, excusing himself for his long delay. (See the 
second passage on the handout.) 
Around the same time, he also wrote to the Bishop of Beauvais, a certain Fulco (see the 
third letter on the handout), simply affirming his allegiance to the orthodox statements of 
the traditional Creeds. Fulco was asked to take Anselm’s letter to a regional Church 
Council of Soissons that was to be convened in 1092 and that was going to deal with the 
matter. 
At the same time, Anselm started to draft a reply to Roscelin. But then he heard that 
Roscelin had recanted his views at the Council of Soissons, and so put the reply aside as 
no longer needed. 
Also in 1092, Anselm went on one of his visits to England, the one during which he was 
eventually named Archbishop of Canterbury (1093) and never returned to Bec. During 
this trip, he heard that despite recanting his views at Soissons, Roscelin had taken them 
up again anyway, and so he sent to Bec for his unfinished draft of a reply to Roscelin. 
                                                 
5 There was also of course Anselm’s exchange with Gaunilo, who was not one of his fellow-
monks at Bec. But that exchange was conducted, recall, with the utmost good will and respect on both 
sides. 
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(On all this, see the opening paragraphs of On the Incarnation of the Word, in Basic 
Writings, pp. 213–14.) 
He tinkered with his reply through the Spring of 1093, but didn’t get very far with it. (He 
was busy being Archbishop of Canterbury, after all!) We have manuscript copies of at 
least five different drafts of the work. He completed the final draft in 1094, and that is the 
work we know as On the Incarnation of the Word. 
The interesting thing here is that Roscelin may have had a point in appealing to Anselm 
as supporting his own view. (The claim that Lanfranc also sided with him seems to have 
been without merit.) 
In his first draft—although, interestingly, this passage is omitted from the final draft—
Anselm says that Roscelin had quoted him as saying that the persons of the Trinity were 
related to the one substance God as the three qualities WHITE, JUST and LITERATE 
(grammaticus—note the term) might be related to a single human being. 
If you take this analogy seriously and push it, it would imply that the relation between the 
one God and the three persons is like the relation of substance to accidents. This of 
course wouldn’t work, since it would introduce ontological complexity into God. 
Here’s what Anselm admits (we do not have this in our Basic Writings volume, since it 
comes from the preliminary draft): 
If ‘white’, ‘just’, and ‘literate’ are said of a certain man, for instance Saint 
Paul, they do not make many Pauls; similarly, if ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Holy 
Spirit’ are said of God, they do not make many Gods. This I accept, this I 
believe, this I do not deny that I said. 
But although Anselm admits he said this, and even insists that in a sense it’s strictly true 
(Father, Son and Holy Spirit don’t make three Gods, to be sure), it’s clear he doesn’t any 
longer want to maintain the analogy that was the basis for what he said. And in fact, he 
drops all reference to this analogy—including the admission that he ever made it—in the 
final version of On the Incarnation of the Word. 
There are a couple of other interesting matters I want to mention in connection with the 
final version of this work. 
At the beginning of the final draft, Anselm tells us the story about the context that makes 
the work necessary in the first place (namely, Roscelin and his alarming statements about 
Anselm), and then goes on (pp. 215–18) to give a fairly extended discussion of the faith 
seeking understanding theme we saw already in the Proslogion. In the context, what he 
seems to be saying is that Roscelin doesn’t really believe the true Christian faith—he’s a 
heretic—and therefore is incompetent to talk about the Trinity; he simply doesn’t 
understand the issues. 
In this connection, Anselm brings up the problem of universals. This is something we 
haven’t seen him explicitly mention so far this semester, but now he does. 
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I don’t want to talk about the problem of universals very much here (that’s another course 
entirrely), but I do want to say a little about this particular passage in Anselm. 
I mentioned earlier—in connection with the discussion in the Monologion of how God 
can and cannot be said to be in space and time (Monol., Chap. 22–24)—that Boethius had 
given a classic definition of a universal as something that could be present (a) as a whole, 
(b) simultaneously, and (c) in some constitutive metaphysical way, to several things at 
once. (Remember I said that Platonic Forms were not universals, because they failed 
clause (c).) 
Now I should warn you that there’s some scholarly dispute over whether Roscelin is 
getting a bum rap here. But it seems he did not believe in universals. He thought the only 
things that exist are entirely individual. He also seems to have held—and this is where we 
need to be especially careful about whether Roscelin actually held views that are 
attributed to him only by people who are attacking him—that there is no difference at all 
between an individual substance and its qualities (whether universal or not). E.g., an 
apple is identical with its redness. 
And Anselm seems to be saying it is because of these views that Roscelin incompetent to 
talk about the Trinity. Here’s what he says (p. 217): 
… those dialecticians—or rather, heretics of dialectic—in our own day 
who suppose that universal substances are nothing but empty air (flatus 
vocis—literally, “verbal puffs”), who cannot understand color to be 
anything but body or human wisdom to be anything but the soul [in short, 
there is no distinction between substances and qualities], ought to be 
blown far away from any engagement with spiritual questions. … For they 
do not yet even understand how the plurality of human beings in the 
species are one human being [that is, they are one in universal nature]. 
How, then, will they comprehend how the plurality of persons in that most 
hidden and most exalted nature—each of whim individually is God—are 
one God? Their minds are too dark to distinguish between a horse and its 
color. How, then, will they distinguish between the one God and his 
several relations? [Remember the Augustinian/Anselmian theory that the 
three personal are distinguished by their RELATIONSHIP to one another.] 
And finally, they cannot understand how something can be human without 
being an individual; there is no way they will understand anything to be 
human unless it is a human person, since every individual human being is 
a person. [I.e., for them there is no universal human nature. And 
remember Boehius’s definition of a person as “an individual substance of 
a rational nature.”] How, then, will they understand that the Word 
assumed human being but did not assume a person: that the Word assumed 
another nature, not another person? 
That last part is technical terminology. In the doctrine of the Incarnation—which is after 
all the topic of On the Incarnation of the Word—the second person of the Trinity, God 
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the Son who already has a (or rather the) divine nature, was said to assume a human 
nature, with the result that in the Incarnation we end up with one person with two natures. 
Anselm is here saying that the assumed human nature has got to be the universal human 
nature. If it were an individual human nature, it would be a person (according to the 
Boethian definition), and we would end up with not only two natures in Jesus but with 
two persons as well—which is heresy. (Note that Anselm has just given us a theological 
reason for believing in universals: they are needed, he thinks, to avoid heresy about the 
Incarnation.) 
Unfortunately, the appeal to a theory of universals, while it may help to sort out the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, doesn’t seem to me to help with the doctrine of the Trinity at 
all, and in fact would seem to confirm tritheism, which was one of the horns of the 
dilemma Roscelin had tried to impose on Anselm. 
 Anselm says that if Roscelin can’t understand how three human beings can share the one 
universal human nature, then he can’t understand how the three persons of the Trinity are 
one God. But that would seem to suggest that the one divine nature is a universal divine 
nature. And in that case, then JUST AS when we have three individual persons sharing the 
one universal human nature, we say we have three men, SO TOO when we have three 
individual persons sharing the one divine nature, we would have to say we have three 
Gods—tritheism. Otherwise, I fail to see how Anselm can say the problem of universals 
is relevant here at all. 
On the Procession of the Holy Spirit 
I don’t want to talk about On the Procession of the Holy Spirit beyond simply telling you 
what the topic is in that work. (This work is not in our Basic Writings volume, but it is in 
Davies and Evans, Major Works.) 
First of all, “procession” in this context doesn’t mean a parade. It refers to how the Holy 
Spirit proceeds from whatever it proceeds from. 
In the early history of the Church, the first Ecumenical Council of all the bishops in 
Christianity (or at least all those who could come) was held in the Greek town of Nicaea 
in 325. There the fundamental doctrines of the faith were formulated in what has come to 
be known as the Nicene Creed. When it comes to the Holy Spirit in the Trinity, the 
Nicene Creed has little to say. It just says, “And [we believe] in the Holy Spirit.” 
In the Second Ecumenical Council, the Council of Constantinople in 381, this was filled 
out a little bit. It says: 
And [we believe] in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, who proceeds 
from the Father, who is adored at once and conglorified with the Father 
and the Son, [and] who spoke through the prophets. 
Later on, particularly —but not exclusively—in the Latin West, the statement that the 
Holy Spirit “proceeds from the Father” was revised to read “proceeds from the Father and 
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the Son.” The Latin for “and the Son” = filioque, so the controversy that eventually arose 
over this adjustment became known as the Filioque Controversy. 
This expanded formula was debated on and off in both the Latin West and the Greek East 
for some time, but without there really being any great heat raised over the matter. 
Then in 1014, the German Holy Roman Emperor Henry II went to Rome for his 
coronation and found that the Creed was not being used liturgically during the Mass, and 
he thought it should be. At his request, the Pope added the Creed, as it was received in 
the West with the filioque. This was the first time the phrase was used in the Mass at 
Rome. 
Forty years later, by 1054, the matter had contributed to the Great Schism between the 
Greek Eastern Church and Latin West. That “schism” endures to this day. The Greeks 
had decided they didn’t approve of the filioque addition, while the Latins insisted on it. 
Part of the Schism was theoretical, and part of it was political, and much of it was simply 
a matter of “hotheads” on both sides. On the theoretical side, in addition to the actual 
wording of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, the argument was also over whether the 
Pope had a right to make a change in the Creed on his own, without the authority of an 
Ecumenical Council behind him. 
In 1098, while Anselm was in self-imposed exile at the papal court (because of a dispute 
with the King of England over the right of appointing bishops), he was appealed to by 
Pope Urban II to discuss this issue. There had been a Council called at Bari in Italy—not 
a full Ecumenical Council, but a lesser one—and it had been attended by certain 
representatives of the Greek Church, who were presenting their arguments against the 
addition of the filioque-clause to the Creed. 
Urban II asked Anselm to reply to their arguments, and the result is On the Procession of 
the Holy Spirit. 
What is the theoretical issue here? Well, clearly the Father in the Trinity is regarded by 
all parties as somehow the origin of the other two Persons. This “originating” should 
emphatically not be thought of as tantamount to creation. First of all, it’s eternal and 
necessary (while creation is neither), and second, the other two persons of the Trinity are 
in no sense inferior to the Father (as creatures are to their creator). Nevertheless, all 
parties agreed that the Trinity somehow starts from the Father. 
The question is whether the Holy Spirit originates with the Son in addition to the Father. 
The Latins said yes (filioque), the Greeks said no. Here then is the Latin picture: 
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The relation of Father to Son is sometimes called Paternity, and the relation of both 
Father and Son to the Holy Spirit is sometimes called Spiration. These are the relations of 
origin to originated. We can also talk about the converse relations, the relations of 
originated to origin (in which case the arrows would go the other direction). Those 
relations are called Filiation (Son to Father) and Procession (Holy Spirit to Father and 
Son). 
Now Anselm’s basic argument in On the Procession of the Holy Spirit is a kind of 
argument we will see much more prominently in the Cur Deus Homo—it’s an appeal to a 
kind of aesthetic appropriateness. After all, God can do nothing “unfitting,” and so 
among the “necessary reasons” he thinks we can use to argue for truths of the faith there 
are included not only logical or metaphysical arguments, but what we would think of as 
purely aesthetic considerations. 
In the present instance, Anselm’s argument is purely of this aesthetic variety; it’s not 
particularly Scriptural, not particularly theological in the technical sense, and certainly 
not metaphysical. His point is simply that there is kind of symmetry on this Latin picture 
that is lacking on the Greek picture according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the 
Father alone. 
For on the Latin picture, each person of the Trinity has a certain feature that is unique to 
it, and each person has certain other features it shares with one of the other persons. (And 
of course there are features shared by all three, but those belong to the divine nature, and 
are not the relational features that distinguish the persons of the Trinity.) 
The Father is the only person with Paternity, and the Son is the only person with 
Filiation. The Holy Spirit is the only person with Procession. Or, to put it in a way that 
doesn’t sound like a purely terminological matter: The Father is the only person who 
stands at the origin end of a one-to-one relation (Paternity). The Son is the only person 
who stands at the originated end of a one-to-one relation (Filiation). The Holy Spirit is 
the only person who stands at the originated end of a one-to-two relation (Procession)—
or, equivalently, who does not stand at the origin end of a two-to-one relation (not 
Spiration), or who does not stand at the origin end of any relation (either Paternity or 
Spiration). 
The Father and the Son are the only two persons who stand at the origin end of a two-to-
one relation (namely, Spiration)—or at the origin end of any relation. The Son and the 
Father 
Son 
Holy Spirit 
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Holy Spirit are the only two persons who do not stand at the origin end of a one-to-one 
relation (not Paternity), or who do stand at the originated end of any relation. The Father 
and the Holy Spirit are the only two persons who do not stand at the originated end of a 
one-to-one relation (not Filiation), or the only two persons who do not stand at the origin 
end of one relation and the originated end of another. 
Obviously, the aesthetic symmetry is a bit strained here. But the point is that, strained or 
not, there is no such symmetry on the Greek view, according to which the Holy Spirit 
proceeds only from the Father. On that view, the Father is the only person who stands at 
the origin end of two relations (Paternity and Spiration). The Son and the Holy Spirit are 
the only two persons who do not stand at the origin end of any relation. But what is 
unique to the Son? What is unique to the Holy Spirit? What do the Father and the Son 
share? What do the Father and the Holy Spirit share? 
We will see a lot more of this kind of appeal to symmetry in the Cur Deus Homo. 
On the Virginal Conception and on Original Sin 
Now I want to say a few things about the doctrine of original sin. We’ve already 
encountered this doctrine in On Freedom of Choice and in our discussion of On the Fall 
of the Devil (although it wasn’t really talked about explicitly in the latter dialogue)—
there we talked about the sin of Satan but not the original sin of Adam and Eve). And 
we’ll see it again in Cur Deus Homo. 
There are several theological points that come up in this dialogue. First of all, there is the 
doctrine of original sin itself, the doctrine that after the fall of Adam and Eve in the 
Garden of Eden, not only were they in big trouble, but so were all the rest of us—their 
descendants. In terms of Augustine’s metaphor of the servant who jumped in a ditch 
rather than serve his master, not only did Adam and Eve jump in the ditch and were 
therefore punished, but all the rest of us are still being punished for what they did. 
The difficulty with this doctrine is of course the notion of collective guilt it seems to 
imply, the idea that people who did not commit any crime can nevertheless be held 
responsible for and punished for the crimes of those who did. 
But there is more. Anselm seems to have had the view that the only human being who 
was never “tainted” by original sin, from the moment of conception, was Jesus. And this 
comes out in this treatise. 
This is complicated, because Anselm’s name has often been associated with another 
doctrine that was becoming increasingly popular in his day, and not least among his own 
pupils: the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of Mary. 
The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception holds that not only was Jesus conceived 
without original sin, but so was his mother Mary, through a unique grace of God. Mary 
was not somehow released from the stain of original sin; she never had it. This view was 
later declared (in the nineteenth century, by Pope Pius IX) to be part of the Catholic faith, 
but had not been settled in Anselm’s own day. 
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As I say, Anselm’s name is often associated with this doctrine, but he seems not to have 
held it, and in fact to have distanced himself from it. It conflicted with the doctrine of 
salvation he was working out. But in any event, he did maintain that this exemption from 
original sin held in the unique case of Jesus, because of the circumstances of his 
conception. 
Anselm believed, as all other Western Christians of the time did too, that Mary was a 
virgin when she conceived Jesus. Jesus was not conceived in the normal manner, by the 
sexual intercourse of male and female (whether with Saint Joseph or any other male), but 
by the miraculous activity of God himself. 
Hence the phrase “On the Virginal Conception” in the title of this work. 
(The doctrine of virginal conception or virgin birth is NOT the same as the doctrine of the 
Immaculate Conception, although people frequently confuse the two. Anselm believed 
the former but not the latter.) 
OK, so let’s look briefly at this treatise On the Virginal Conception and on Original Sin. 
First of all, if you’ve looked at all at the Cur Deus Homo (as was assigned, after all), 
you’ve met Boso (pronounced exactly the way you’re afraid it is). Boso was a monk at 
Bec, and apparently the only one there who Anselm thought was a serious interlocutor in 
discussion. 
We know the names of various other monks at Bec, through letters and other sources. But 
Boso is the only one who actually appears in Anselm’s writings. While the three 
“Philosophical Dialogues” and the De grammatico are merely dialogues between a 
“Master” and a “Student” (or “Disciple”), the Cur Deus Homo actually presents Boso as 
the partner in the dialogue. 
Well, so too, although On the Virginal Conception and on Original Sin is not a dialogue 
at all but a sustained treatise, it is addressed at the very beginning to Boso, who 
apparently was the occasion for writing it in the first place. 
OK, now what is original sin? The basic story is familiar enough. The story is that the 
serpent (= really Satan in disguise) tempted Eve in the Garden of Eden, and she ate of the 
fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which they had been forbidden to eat. 
Then she in turn tempted Adam, and he ate it too. And so they both sinned. And—
somehow—as a result of this primordial human sin, the entire human race has “fallen.” 
The whole of human nature has lost justice (in the sense defined as early as On Truth and 
discussed in On Freedom of Choice and On the Fall of the Devil). 
Hence we too (who belong to the human race)—all human beings with the sole exception 
of Jesus—come into the world without justice, and there’s nothing we can do about it on 
our own. That’s why salvation requires outside help (grace), which is the topic of Cur 
Deus Homo. Cur Deus Homo was written earlier (completed 1098) than On the Virginal 
Conception and on Original Sin (1099). And in fact, On the Virginal Conception is 
something of a “companion piece” to Cur Deus Homo, filling in some loose ends left 
open in the former work. 
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That’s one theme: Original sin infects the whole of human nature—with the unique 
exception of Jesus. (Recall, Mary was subject to original sin; Anselm did not hold the 
doctrine of Immaculate Conception.) 
But there’s another theme that rests uneasily with this, and that’s that “original sin”—as 
the name implies—has something to do with origins. 
There’s a very curious claim made at the end of Cur Deus Homo (and we might as well 
start bringing that into the picture)—CDH II.21—which argues that, while it is possible 
for human beings to be “saved,” it is impossible for the devils to be saved. 
We’ll perhaps look at this claim more closely later on. But for now I just want to bring 
out one point of the argument there: There’s nothing like “original sin” for the devils. 
They sinned, of course. But it doesn’t work the same way. Why not? Because the devils 
do not share a common origin. 
They share a nature or essence in common, to be sure. Devils are fallen angels, after all, 
and Anselm (unlike Aquinas) thinks all angels share the same angelic nature. But, he says 
(CDH II.21 [Basic Writings, p. 235]): 
 unlike human beings they are not of the same race. For it is not the case 
that all angels are from one angel, as all human beings are from one 
human being [= Adam]. 
The word ‘race’ = genus, and has to do with “generating” and “generation.” The point, 
therefore, is simply that angels are not “descended” from one another, or from a common 
“ancestor.” They were each created separately—with the same nature, to be sure, but 
completely independently of one another. 
What difference does this make? Well, here’s where things get murky. The idea seems to 
be to fill in the gap somehow in the move between saying that Adam and Eve personally 
sinned and saying that their sin corrupts the whole of human nature. 
Why should that result follow? I don’t know how to fill in all the steps entirely, but part 
of the idea is that this follows in the case of human nature, because all other human 
beings are descended from Adam and Eve—whereas it doesn’t follow for angelic nature 
because other angels are not in any sense descended from the ones who rebelled. The 
latter’s sin remains purely their own personal matter. There’s no notion of collective guilt 
or corporate responsibility for the angels, whereas there is for human beings. 
Some Issues about Salvation and Original Sin 
OK, let’s get some of the issues out on the table, and then perhaps we can see how 
Anselm is attempting to weave them together. 
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Collective Guilt/Corporate Responsibility 
The first issue we have to deal with is the notorious notion of collective guilt or corporate 
responsibility that seems to be implied in the doctrine of Original Sin. How is it that I can 
justly be punished for sins that I didn’t commit, but someone else—namely, Adam and 
Eve—did? This is a notion that strikes us as profoundly foreign and just plain morally 
wrong. 
To be sure, there are some cases where we hold one person responsible for another 
person’s deeds. For instance, parents may be legally responsible—and liable—for what 
their children do. But children are never held responsible for what their parents do. And 
besides, children are legally incompetent. But both Adam/Eve and we their descendants 
are morally adults. 
So what can we say to make sense of this view? 
Well, here’s one way of trying to make sense of it in part. I don’t know of any secondary 
literature that develops this particular line of thinking, but it’s perhaps the best I know of. 
I first found it suggested by certain remarks in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety, and I 
was pretty surprised to find Anselm making some of the same claims. (In fact, SK sounds 
a lot like Anselm on many points.) Anselm doesn’t develop the idea in the way I’m about 
to suggest any more than Kierkegaard does, but the parallels are there, and they are 
striking. Here goes: 
Kierkegaard makes the puzzling claim that each individual human being is BOTH HIMSELF 
AND THE RACE. I.e., not “race” in the sense of racism, but in the sense of “descendants of 
Adam” that we just talked about. 
The idea can perhaps be motivated like this: Suppose some recent ancestor in your 
immediate family was engaged in some particularly dastardly practice. (Let’s say, he was 
a cannibal.) And you feel this somehow reflects on you. After all, this is the sort of thing 
families cover up and hide. You somehow feel lessened by the fact. But why should you? 
After all, he was the one who was a cannibal; you aren’t! And yet you feel somehow 
implicated in  his deeds. 
(It works the other way too. You can feel proud of someone else’s accomplishments. You 
somehow bask in the glory whenever your favorite sports team wins a big game. But 
again, why should you? After all, you had no part in it; you’re not on the team, let’s say.) 
The point is that, whether or not we have a nice, tidy theory that explains this notion of 
collective responsibility, and in fact whether or not we think it theoretically makes no 
sense at all—nevertheless WE DO FEEL that responsibility, we feel MORALLY 
COMPROMISED by it. And furthermore we feel we SHOULD feel that way. 
We don’t have to accept that responsibility, of course. We can reject that feeling. But the 
only way to do that is to deal ourselves out of the family. 
So too, the only way to avoid the responsibility for Adam’s sin—or for anyone else’s sin, 
for that matter—is to deal ourselves out of the human family. In short, to BECOME 
INHUMAN. 
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So too, Anselm says (On the Virginal Conception and on Original Sin, Chap. 10, p. 340): 
 The only remaining possibility, then, is that all his [= Adam’s] 
offspring are debtors [to God] for no other reason than that they are Adam: 
not, however, because they are Adam without qualification, but because 
they are Adam the sinner. 
I think this approach has a lot going for it, and is one that hasn’t been explored 
sufficiently in the literature—either on Kierkegaard or on Anselm. 
But there’s at least one problem with it that we need to acknowledge. It doesn’t explain 
why I should be particularly responsible for the sin of Adam (or of Adam and Eve) any 
more than I should be responsible for your sins. And yet the doctrine of Original Sin says 
I am. It’s the sin of Adam and Eve that corrupts the whole of human nature, and that will 
send me to eternal hellfire unless special steps are taken—not your sin, which may make 
me feel ashamed but will not damn me forever! 
So what is it about the sin of Adam and Eve that is special? 
Well, part of the idea seems to be that at the time of their sin, Adam and Eve were the 
only human beings who existed; human nature was at that time found only in them. And, 
he says (On the Virginal Conception and on Original Sin, Chap. 2, p. 330): 
And because the whole of human nature was in them [= Adam and Eve], 
and nothing of human nature was outside them, the whole of human nature 
was weakened and corrupted. 
Again, in Chap. 9 (p. 339), he says: 
 if only Eve had sinned and not Adam, it would not have been necessary 
for the whole human race to perish [one of the traditional consequences of 
original sin] but only for Eve. 
The idea then seems to be the peculiar view that if ALL the members of a species do x, 
then in a sense the species itself does x. Thus (Cur Deus Homo I.18, p. 274): 
For since the whole of human nature was in our first parents [= Adam and 
Eve], the whole of human nature in them was overcome in such a way that 
it [= the NATURE] sinned, with the exception of that one man whom God 
knew how to keep free from Adam’s sin [namely, Jesus]  
This is a view associated with Odo or Tournai (slightly earlier than Anselm), who seems 
to have held it precisely in order to make sense of the doctrine of original sin. 
Is this an appeal to the theory of universals? I think it is is Odo, but I’m not sure in 
Anselm. Note the implication: If it is, then here is another place where Anselm seems to 
be implying that orthodoxy REQUIRES realism with respect to universals. (We’ve already 
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seen this in connection with the Incarnation in On the Incarnation of the Word, in his 
criticisms of Roscelin.) 
But I’m not sure this is what is going on in Anselm. What makes me hesitate is the fact 
that Anselm keeps vacillating between (1) talk that sounds like talk about the universal 
human nature, and (2) talk about the “genetic” relation of descendence all other human 
beings have to Adam and Eve. (The latter need not imply any sort of universal, any more 
than we need to suppose any sort of universal Spade-family-nature or universal 
Germanity—even though those are genetic matters. I’m not now talking about “genetics” 
in the sense of DNA or chromosomes, but in the sense of “family trees.”) 
Here’s the problem: I mentioned a moment ago how, for Anselm, Jesus is the only human 
being who never had original sin. And yet he was a fully constituted human being, and 
therefore shared in the universal human nature. So if the entire nature were corrupted and 
made sinful by Adam and Eve, then how could Jesus’s human nature not have been 
corrupted and sinful just as for the rest of us? 
Anselm seems to argue something like this: Adam was never born; he was created 
directly by God. Eve too was never born; she was taken from “Adam’s rib,” so she too is 
in a funny way related to Adam (derived from him). 
All other human beings—including Jesus—are born, and are therefore descended from 
Adam and Eve, and ultimately from Adam. They all, so to speak, belong to the race of 
Adam. 
Now, apart from Adam and Eve themselves, all other human beings—except Jesus—are 
not only descended from them, but also descended from them by the normal reproductive 
process involving male and female. In Jesus alone do we have a case of virginal 
conception and birth. (So much for other stories of parthenogenesis.) 
And somehow this is supposed to make all the difference. 
Jesus did have human nature and was descended from Adam, because his mother was 
descended from Adam. And, as we’ll see, that’s an important feature of the salvation 
story for Anselm. But, because he was not descended from Adam by the normal 
reproductive process, he did not share in the guilt or the penalties of original sin. (On the 
Virginal Conception and on Original Sin, Chaps. 10–12.) 
What this means is that Jesus would not have died in the normal course of events. He 
died because he was executed, not because he was mortal. (See CDH, I.9). Death is a 
consequence of original sin, and Jesus didn’t have original sin. 
Furthermore, this fact has nothing to do with Jesus’s “dual nature,” with the fact that he is 
supposed to be not only a human being but God. In On the Virginal Conception and on 
Original Sin, Chap. 13 (pp. 343–44), Anselm explicitly argues that even if Jesus had not 
been God, but only a mere human being, as long as he was born by virginal conception 
and virgin birth, the results would have been the same—at least these results would have 
been the same. (There are other reasons why it’s important that Jesus was divine.) 
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It’s easy to read all this and see in it merely the view that “sex is dirty,” or something like 
that. But while that may have been part of what Anselm was thinking, it’s definitely not 
the main issue here. There’s something more theoretically important than that going on 
here. 
Let’s see if we can get a handle on it. 
Cur Deus Homo 
And with that, let’s turn to the Cur Deus Homo, that last thing I want to talk about in this 
class. 
As I mentioned earlier, the Cur Deus Homo was finished in 1098 (On the Virginal 
Conception and on Original Sin was done the following year, 1099). 
It is a dialogue, and in fact is the only one of Anselm’s dialogues where his interlocutor is 
a real person: Boso. (On the Virginal Conception and on Original Sin was addressed to 
Boso, but was not a dialogue.) Boso was fourth Abbot of Bec. (First there was Herluin, 
then Anselm, then somebody else, and then Boso, 1124–36—after Anselm’s death.) 
When Anselm became Archbishop of Canterbury, he sent to Bec and summoned him to 
come to Canterbury to serve as a kind of intellectual companion. 
As David Brown indicates in his article in the Cambridge Companion (p. 279), this is the 
work of Anselm that has had the most influence overall. (Not the Monologion or even the 
Proslogion.) This is probably because there really isn’t really anything quite like it 
before. There had been earlier efforts to tell the Christian “salvation”-story, to try to make 
sense of it in terms of the larger divine plan or whatever, and even to defend certain parts 
of it as not sheer lunacy—e.g., the notion of a God-man with two natures but only one 
person. But Anselm was the first one—not even Augustine tried it before—to argue that 
the story was not only a possible story and not outright inconsistent but also an altogether 
reasonable and sensible story, and in a sense even necessary. 
The dialogue is divided into two books. In Book I, Chap. 1, Anselm states the question 
that is the theme of the whole work (p. 245): 
This is the question that many unbelievers commonly raise as an objection 
against us, deriding Christian simplicity as foolishness, and that many 
believers ponder in their own hearts: by what reason or necessity did God 
become a human being and, as we believe and profess, restore life to the 
world by his own death, when he could have accomplished this through 
some other person, whether angelic or human, or even by his will alone? 
Notice the reference to the “unbelievers.” They are all throughout this work. And, in 
order to answer the unbelievers, we can’t presuppose the various aspects of Christian 
doctrine, since that’s precisely what they are “deriding  as foolishness.” So this work, 
like the Monologion, is going to be one of those works where we are not appealing to 
Scripture. Here’s what he says, for instance, in the “Preface” to the work (pp. 238–39): 
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The first [book] presents the objections of unbelievers who reject the 
Christian faith because they think it contrary to reason, and the answers 
given by believers. It goes so far as to prove by necessary reasons—
leaving Christ out of the picture, as if nothing concerning him had ever 
taken place—that it is impossible for any human being to be saved apart 
from Christ. But the second book—which again proceeds as though 
nothing were known of Christ—demonstrates, by means of argument and 
truth that is no less evident, that human nature was established in order 
that the whole human being, both body and soul, should at some time 
enjoy blessed immortality, and that it was necessary that the purpose for 
which human beings were made should in fact be achieved, but only 
through the agency of a God-man, and that it was necessary that 
everything we believe about Christ take place. 
Who are these “unbelievers”? Well, apparently they aren’t here the usual “straw man 
pagans” (although they do get mentioned at II.22, at the very end of the work). Instead he 
seems to be thinking mainly of the Jews and perhaps also of Muslims. (He met some 
Muslims on one of his travels, and apparently got along quite well with them.) And that’s 
significant, because both Jews and Muslims certainly believe in God to begin with. 
(There’s no attempt in the CDH to argue for the existence of God.) And they also—in a 
sense—believe in the doctrine of Original Sin. The story of Adam and Eve’s sin and the 
expulsion from the Garden of Eden for them and all their progeny is, after all, in the 
Book of Genesis, and so has an authentic Jewish pedigree. Muslims too accept the story, 
although both Jews and Muslims have their own take on it. 
But what they don’t accept is the view this “original sin” was quite the calamity that 
Christians think—think of Augustine’s “servant in the ditch” story, for instance, where 
the servant can do absolutely nothing to fix the situation on his own. 
Still, the Jews and the Muslims have the Adam and Eve story. And so, likewise, there is 
no attempt in CDH to argue that the original sin took place, or even that Adam and Eve 
are the ancestors of us all (as opposed to a theory of “multiple origins,” for instance). 
(There is an attempt to argue that the consequences of original sin are as dramatic and 
catastrophic as Christians believe.) 
Here is an outline of the general picture in the dialogue—leaving out a lot of the details 
that need to be filled in. 
Human beings, of course, have wills. And wills, as we saw back in On Truth, have a kind 
of truth. A will is true when it has rectitude, when it does what it ought to do, when it 
fulfills its teleology, does what it was designed to do. Now the designer of course is God. 
So the will has rectitude when it does what God intended it to do. 
Furthermore, justice, as we know, is simply rectitude of will preserved for its own sake—
that is, doing what God intends you to do simply because it’s what God intends you to 
do. But Adam and Eve, although they were created with original justice, failed to keep it. 
They did not do what God intended them to do. They not only lost justice, they lost the 
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will for justice—just as we saw happened with the Devil in On the Fall of the Devil with 
its discussion of the two wills (the will for justice and the will for advantage). 
This loss not only affects Adam and Eve but also affects all their progeny. (This is one of 
the steps that needs a lot of filling in of details.) So none of their progeny is just, and 
none of them even wants to be (i.e., wants rectitude of will for its own sake, although 
they may want it to avoid punishment). 
Therefore, the human race, the descendants of Adam and Eve, incur a kind of collective 
debt or obligation as a result of Adam and Eve’s sin. (This is another step that needs 
filling in. What is the collective debt or obligation—over and above the individual debts 
or obligations we all have, original sin or no original sin, to do what we ought—what 
God intended?) 
Now the strategy here seems to be that only a God-man will suffice to pay off this 
additional debt. A pure human being can’t do it, because even apart from the fact that 
human beings don’t even want to do so (they’ve lost the will), they already owe God 
everything they’ve got and everything they can do, and so have nothing left over to pay 
any additional debt. The same thing applies to any other creature. 
On the other hand, a pure God wouldn’t be a candidate to pay off the debt, and neither 
would any non-human creature (e.g., an angel), because they don’t owe the additional 
debt in the first place. Therefore—it takes a God-man . Only a God has the power to pay 
off the debt, and only a man owes it. 
That’s a bare-bones account of some of what’s going on in this work. 
There are lots and lots of “at first glance” problems, and lots and lots of “even on further 
consideration” problems as well. 
Here is where I don’t know what to say. This is not an aspect of Anselm I know well, and 
I’m not a theologian in the first place. So I’m not sure I know the rules of the game here. 
I’m pretty sure a lot of the objections people typically have to Anselm’s account are 
misguided. And a lot of the secondary literature I’ve put on E-Reserves talks about many 
of these objections. But even after reading that literature, I’m still sure how the picture 
works. 
Here are some factors: 
Aesthetic arguments 
Part of the problem Anselm is addressing in this work is a matter of propriety. To be sure, 
God is omnipotent and not under any obligation to anyone, so he can—both 
metaphysically and morally—do anything he chooses to. 
But isn’t there something strange about choosing to redeem human beings the way he 
did? First of all, why redeem them at all? Why not just let them stew in their own juice? 
After all, humanity blew it on its own. But even if he decides he is going to redeem them, 
why not just forgive them? Why go through all the bother of  becoming incarnate, of 
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suffering all the normal indignities of being a human being, much less the particular 
torment and indignities of the crucifixion? Isn’t there something unseemly about all that? 
As Boso says (p. 250): 
If you say that God—who you say created all things by his command—
could not have accomplished all those things [= the redemption] simply by 
commanding them, you are contradicting yourselves, since you are 
making him out to be powerless. On the other hand, if you acknowledge 
that he could do all this simply by commanding it, but that he did not will 
to do it except in the way you describe, how will you be able to show that 
he is wise, when you claim that he willed to suffer such indignities for no 
reason at all? For all the things you mention reside in God’s will. God’s 
wrath is just his will to punish. So if he does not will to punish human sin, 
human beings are free from their sins and from God’s wrath and from hell 
and from the power of the devil  So if indeed God was unwilling to save 
the human race except in the way you describe, when he could have done 
so through his will alone, face up to how you are impugning his wisdom—
to put it mildly. After all, no one would judge a man to be wise if, without 
reason, he expended great effort to do something he could have done quite 
easily. 
Notice the references to “for no reason at all” and “without reason” here. The threat is 
that the Christian salvation story makes God look irrational, capricious. 
Anselm, of course, is always looking for necessary reasons. And that’s what he does in 
this work too. But—especially in this work—it turns out the “necessary reasons” include 
not just logical or metaphysical reasons, but also considerations of “fittingness”—what 
sound frankly like aesthetic reasons. (We already saw some of this in On the Procession 
of the Holy Spirit.) 
Listen to this, for example (CDH, I.3, p. 248)—Anselm is speaking in the dialogue: 
If they [= the unbelievers] attentively considered how fitting a way this 
was to accomplish the restoration of humankind, they would not deride 
our simplicity but join with us in praising God’s wise benevolence. For it 
was fitting that just as death entered the human race through the 
disobedience of a human being, so too life should be restored by the 
obedience of a human being. It was fitting that just as the sin that was the 
cause of our damnation had its origin from a woman [= Eve, who sinned 
before Adam did], so too the author of our justice and salvation should be 
born of a woman [= Mary]. And it was fitting that the devil, who through 
the tasting of a tree defeated the human being whom he persuaded, should 
be defeated by a human being through the suffering on a tree [= the cross] 
that he [= the devil] inflicted. 
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Again (II.8, p. 296): 
There are four ways in which God can make a human being: from a man 
and a woman, as everyday experience shows; or from neither a man nor a 
woman, as he created Adam; or from a man without a woman, as he made 
Eve [directly from Adam’s rib]; or from a woman without a man, which 
he had never done. So in order to prove that this last way was within his 
power and had been held in reserve for this very deed, nothing was more 
fitting than for him to assume the human being whom we are seeking from 
a woman without a man. 
The appeal here is to a kind of almost rhetorical balance. And it runs all throughout the 
CDH and to some in extent in On the Procession as well. Anselm was far from the first to 
appeal to rhetorical symmetry and balance in presenting theological views. Augustine 
made a career out of it. And there’s a certain justification in doing so. One of the 
functions of rhetoric is to persuade people and to change lives, after all, and appealing to 
these considerations of form and beauty, these cadences of “just as  so too,” is a good 
way to get your audience caught up in what you’re trying to convince them of. 
But Anselm thinks these aesthetic considerations have more than a purely rhetorical 
force; he seems to think they have a rational force as well. In other words, they’re not just 
good for persuasion, but also for reasoning. Thus (CDH I.10, p. 260): 
 we will not accept anything unsuitable [= unfitting], however slight, 
concerning God; and we will not throw out any argument, however 
modest, that is not defeated by some weightier argument. For just as an 
impossibility follows from anything unsuitable in God, however slight, so 
too necessity accompanies every argument, however modest, that is not 
defeated by some weightier argument. 
The problem with this of course is that Anselm seems to be confining his sense of 
“suitability” and aesthetic balance to Greco-Roman rhetorical tastes. There are, after all, 
different ways of constructing an aesthetically pleasing and well-balanced whole, and 
they may not all lead to—or even permit—the same results. And even within the confines 
of Anselm’s aesthetic notions, there seem to be more than one way to do it. For instance, 
when he says in CDH I.3 (p. 248): 
It was fitting that just as the sin that was the cause of our damnation had 
its origin from a woman, so too the author of our justice and salvation 
should be born of a woman 
Note how the sin came from a woman, whereas the salvation doesn’t come from a 
woman but from a man born of a woman. Wouldn’t it have been a tighter parallel and a 
more fitting arrangement if the savior had been a woman instead of a man? 
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Feudal considerations 
Another feature of the Cur Deus Homo that is often cited in the secondary literature—
usually as an objection to his theory—is his appeal in essential ways to notions of justice, 
duty, satisfaction and honor that seem to be peculiar to the medieval feudal society in 
which Anselm found himself. So the objection in effect is that Anselm’s theory is too 
anachronistic to be of any use in present theological contexts. And even if it’s not 
anachronistic, it’s just too legalistic—as if the salvation story were some kind of lawsuit. 
There is some tendency in the more recent secondary literature to get past this objection. 
Richard Campbell, in his paper “The Conceptual Roots of Anselm’s Soteriology” (on E-
Reserves), argues that while these notions do have the ring of medieval feudalism, at least 
some of them are conceptually grounded far more deeply than that. For instance, we’ve 
already seen the notions of duty and justice developed in the On Truth, in ways that have 
nothing especially to do with feudalism but instead with a much broader notion of 
teleology. 
I think Campbell’s paper is very interesting, but undeveloped. The ideas in it need to be 
worked out much more fully. 
Besides, it must be confessed that there are some features of Anselm’s account that do 
sound pretty quaint and perhaps anachronistic. For instance, there is the odd notion that 
the severity of a crime or offense depends not just on what you do but who the victim is. 
Yet there is a basis for this even in modern thinking. For instance, it’s one thing to strike 
your neighbor. That might get you no more than a charge of public disorder or at most 
battery. But it’s quite another thing to strike the king. That might well get you hanged. 
Threatening your neighbor might get you a court injunction or a charge of intimidation. 
Threatening the President will be taken much more seriously. 
So too, disobeying a passer-by on the street who tells me to stop staring at him is 
probably at worst bad manners. Disobeying a police officer who tells me to clear the area 
might be regarded as a more serious matter. But disobeying God, Anselm thinks, is an 
infinite crime of unspeakable hideousness. 
So we can make sense out of some of this even in a modern context. The special status of 
police officers or the President, for instance, can be explained as necessary for them to do 
their job, or for the maintenance of public order. But that isn’t going to apply to God, 
who can do his “job” no matter what. 
And yet Anselm is pretty strong about the infinite seriousness of any offense against God. 
For instance, Cur Deus Homo I.21 (pp. 281–82)—Anselm is speaking: 
Imagine that you found yourself under God’s watchful eye and someone 
said to you, “Look over there,” but God said, “I do not in any way want 
you to look.” Now ask yourself in your own heart what there is, among all 
the things that are, for the sake of which you ought to take that look, 
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contrary to the will of God. [Not surprisingly, Boso replies that there’s 
nothing for the sake of which he OUGHT to do that.] 
 what if it were necessary that either the whole world and whatever is 
not God perish and return to nothing, or else you do such a small thing 
contrary to God’s will? [Same answer.] 
What if there were many worlds, as full of creatures as this one is? 
Boso: Even if there were infinitely many worlds spread out before me, I 
would give the same answer. [In short, it wouldn’t be justified even for the 
sake of an INFINITE number of universes!] 
Anselm: That is how seriously we sin every time we knowingly do 
something, however small, contrary to the will of God 
There’s also lots of talk about God’s demanding payback, satisfaction. The upshot of the 
“feudalism” objection then is that what we end up with is a picture of God as a petulant 
tyrant with a tender ego. 
Sketch of some of the argument in CDH 
Let’s look more closely at some of the moves of the argument in CDH. For this, I’m 
taking a lot of guidance from Frank Burch Brown’s summary in his “The Beauty of Hell: 
Anselm on God’s Eternal Design.” (That paper goes on to criticize Anselm’s views in 
ways I’m not sure I want to endorse. But his summary of CDH is one of the clearest 
accounts I know of an otherwise very diffuse and complex argument. 
First of all, in addition to all the other things he created, God also created rational 
creatures. These included not only human beings but also the angels. (Angels appear also 
in both the Jewish and the Muslim traditions.) And they were created for the purpose of 
their enjoying eternal blessedness. 
Now God, in his infinite wisdom, knew that if he was going to create rational creatures 
for this purpose, there was a certain “reasonable and perfect number” of them that should 
enjoy this blessed state. 
At first this just sounds like some kind of bizarre number-mysticism. But Steven S. 
Aspensen makes a good point in his paper “In Defense of Anselm” (on E-Reserves, n. 8): 
Humans, being social creatures, would be considered happier in a social 
setting with a certain number of individuals to interact with. To illustrate 
this point, consider the family: people often debate the proper number of 
children to supply the social environment most conducive to a family’s 
happiness; they also come to conclusions which seem justified. So too, it 
seems, God would know the proper number of rational beings [including 
angels] to create for favorable social interaction. [Presumably, the angels 
and human beings are going to be one big happy family up there.] It may 
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be a particular number or any within a suitable range of numbers, which is 
not specified by Anselm. 
Ok, so we’ve got this ideal number. But some angels fell. So we need to make up for 
them, or else God’s plan would be frustrated in a most unfitting way. 
Why God couldn’t have just “overcommitted” on the original creation, so that—in his 
omniscience—he ends up with just the right number of rational creatures enjoying 
blessedness, I don’t know. As far as I can find, Anselm never considers that alternative. 
But let’s assume that somehow it’s ruled out. 
How else then are we going to restore the ideal number? 
Well, why not just make some more angels—i.e., new ones to take the place of the fallen 
ones? 
But that would be unfitting. The new angels would be in the position of seeing what 
happened to their fallen fellows, and so would realize that their will for advantage 
[commodum] exactly coincided with their will for justice—and in fact justice was to their 
advantage. 
(Recall how in On the Fall of the Devil it was important that the angels have a real 
choice, and that they not know in advance how God would react to disobedience—he 
might just be merciful, after all. It was therefore important that they choose without being 
fully informed of where their best interests really lay.) 
 So new—after-the-fact—angels wouldn’t be in the same situation as their older kind. 
And in fact, they would not have any real choice about persevering. 
So it would be unfitting and improper to reward them with the blessedness won by the 
free choice of their older fellows. 
Thus, new, additional angels won’t do the trick. 
But neither can the fallen angels be redeemed by a kind of perfect representative of their 
kind—as humans can, it will turn out. This is because, recall, angels do not constitute a 
race. There is no descendant-relation among them. (We’re still not sure what difference 
this makes, but in any case that’s supposed to rule out the possibility of any kind of 
angel-redeemer.) 
Furthermore, it would be unfitting—and therefore impossible—for God just to forgive 
them outright, and to reward them along with those who didn’t need forgiving in the first 
place and who persevered in justice all along. 
So there’s no way to make up for the number of fallen angels through angels, either 
additional ones or the original ones. 
But the only other rational creatures are human beings. Therefore, the only way to restore 
the ideal number of the blessed is through men . 
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Furthermore, it would have been unseemly and inappropriate to have the number of 
blessed human beings end up being exactly the same as the number of fallen angels. For 
in that case, each blessed human being would have occasion to know that he got to be 
blessed only because some angel fell, and would therefore have reason to rejoice over the 
fall of the devils! How unfitting that would be! 
So the original plan for the ideal number of blessed rational creatures must have included 
from the very beginning a certain number of human beings. 
But there’s a problem. Adam and Eve, the original human beings, fell too. And, unlike 
the angels, human beings constitute a race (they are all descended from Adam and Eve). 
Therefore, when Adam and Eve fell, their sin somehow infected human nature as a 
whole. (We still don’t know how that works.) 
On the other hand, that same fact—that human beings constitute a race—somehow means 
that it’s possible for a perfect representative of the race to fix things for the race as a 
whole, and to set things right again. (Again, we still don’t know how this RACE business 
works.) And that’s exactly what happened. 
Now, how does this redemption-business work? 
Well, we need to start with the idea of a kind of double-debt involved in a crime. If I take 
something that belongs to you—say, I steal your car—it’s not enough in order to fix 
things, to make it OK again, if I just return your car. No, in addition I have to do 
something more, I have to pay some additional penalty, whether monetary or otherwise, 
something more that I didn’t owe you before. This is what in the law we call “paying 
damages.” And it doesn’t matter whether any real “damage” has been done. You may be 
filthy rich and have whole fleets of cars and not really suffer any real loss at all if I steal 
one of them. But that doesn’t make any difference. There’s still something inappropriate 
and unfitting about your writing off my crime if I just return what was properly yours and 
don’t do anything further. 
So, first I owe you the car I took, and then I owe you “damages.” (Note the legalism in all 
this.) 
Now, in the case of God, a sin consists of taking from God the obedience that is rightfully 
owed to him from the outset. (Recall the notion of duty from as early as On Truth.) And 
in fact every human being owes absolutely everything he has to God from the very outset. 
So when a human being sins, he takes from God something he owes to God. In order to 
make it right again, he must now only give back to God the obedience he owed him in the 
first place, but also pay “damages.” He must do something more. 
But what else can he do? He already owes God everything he has. So there’s nothing left 
over that’s available to pay as damages. 
And that’s the situation we’re all in. We’re all in the position of owing something we 
can’t pay. 
And this is where Jesus comes in. How does it work? 
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Here is where things get very murky for me, because we’re getting this confusing trade-
off between the notions of race and nature. I still need to do work on this. 
But one approach I find very helpful but not sufficient to solve all our problems is a 
distinction drawn by Steven S. Aspenson, in his paper “In Defense of Anselm” 
He distinguishes between what he calls (a) a “societal” debt—not a debt to society, but a 
debt owed by society as a whole, that is, a social debt or what we might call a collective 
DUTY, and so a corresponding social or collective GUILT if that duty is not fulfilled, and 
(b) a “personal” debt or duty, and correspondingly a personal guilt if YOU don’t fulfill it. 
He gives the following example (p. 38) of “societal debt” or collective responsibility: 
 the Constitution of the United States, playing the role of a codification 
of the requirements of justice [I’m not sure that’s what it does, but never 
mind], obligates each citizen to supply someone to fill the office of 
President but does not hold any citizen guilty of violating that obligation if 
he himself does not exercise supererogation in societal action by becoming 
President. 
So the idea here is of a kind of “non-distributive” duty or responsibility. Any one person 
could satisfy it by becoming President, and if no one does, then something’s gone 
collectively wrong and needs to be fixed. But no single individual is obligated to become 
President. 
So too, the analogy goes, by sin the human race as a whole has incurred a certain duty or 
obligation to God. Any one human being could satisfy it (if he were able and willing), but 
no one individual is obliged to do so. 
What is this social debt? Well, it seems to be the “damages” we talked about earlier. 
Apparently any member of the race is eligible to pay the damages owed because of the 
original sin of Adam and Eve, and for that matter any subsequent sins they or their 
descendants might commit. 
Similarly, I can pay your court fines if it comes to that. 
On the other hand, there has to be some connection between whoever or whatever pays 
the fines and the person who incurs them. If the judge should turn around and suddenly 
discover a fabulously valuable diamond on the floor under his bench, or if the heavens 
should suddenly open up and start raining down dollar bills, that wouldn’t count as 
paying your fine. 
This is why the racial element seems to be prominent in Anselm. (Why it’s a matter of 
race and decendance rather than a matter of nature, as with the angels, I don’t know.) 
In any case, Jesus pays this debt to rectify the sin of Adam and Eve. 
On the other hand, whatever he uses to pay this debt can’t be something he already owes 
to God. That wouldn’t count, any more than I can pay your court fine by offering my tax 
payments. I already owe those. 
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So what we need is for Jesus to offer in payment something that he doesn’t already owe 
to God, and something sufficient to pay the debt incurred by the sin of Adam and Eve, 
and by any subsequent sins committed by them or their descendants. 
What can that be? Insofar as he is a human being, he already owes God his complete 
obedience and everything he has. 
Yes—but he doesn’t owe God death. He’s under no obligation to die. Death, remember, 
is a consequence of original sin. But Jesus is exempt from original sin. So he doesn’t 
have to pay that penalty. Recall, Jesus was not in the normal course of events mortal. 
Therefore, if he does voluntarily die anyway (which is of course what happened), that 
overpayment is available to help pay down the debt incurred by Adam and Eve and by 
their progeny. 
This much is true even if Jesus is not God, but merely a human being. As long as he 
never had original sin, his death can be used in this way. 
On the other hand, if he is only a human being, his death won’t be sufficient to pay off 
the social debt Aspenson describes. After all, the offense against God, and therefore the 
damages incurred was of infinite magnitude (recall the feudal notion)—over and above 
restoring to God what was owed to him in the first place and was “stolen” from him by 
sin. 
So no mere human, no matter how virtuous and innocent, can ever do anything that will 
completely pay off the “damages.” And for the same reason, no other creature can do it 
either. Only God has that kind of “value.” And yet only a human being—a member of the 
“race of Adam”—is eligible to do so in a way that is fitting and appropriate. 
What we need, therefore, is someone who is both a member of the human race—and 
therefore eligible to pay off the debt—and also divine—and therefore able to pay enough. 
That’s why we need a God-man. And that’s cur deus  homo. 
